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This thesis compares the identity politics of Frantz Fanon and ‘Periyar’ EV Ramasamy. After 
framing an interpretative paradigm through which the core ideas of Fanon could be deciphered, 
an interpretation of Fanon as a rigorous critic of identity politics is arrived at. Exploring Fanon’s 
strained relation with the particularist Black identity politics of Negritude and his own 
imperative for the need to transcend from particularist identity politics to a genuine, universal 
humanism, I seek to prove that while Fanon rejected the false universalism of European 
humanism, he did not support rigidly identitarian movements either. Fanon’s universalism was 
based on a reciprocal and respectful recognition between cultures and peoples, working 
towards a universal humanism. After a brief introduction to the socio-historical context of 
Ramasamy’s politics, I then use this Fanonist lens to critique the anti-caste political discourse of 
Ramasamy, especially how he articulated his concerns towards the Brahmin Other and the non-
Brahmin Self, and his approach towards the untouchable Dalit castes. I argue that his fixation 
with the Brahmin identity as the ultimate Other responsible for the inferiorization of the non-
Brahmin castes, and his consideration of this identity as immutable and irredeemable, made a 
lasting universality impossible. Yet, Ramasamy’s penetrating insights on the myriad ways in 
which native culture in the colony oppresses minorities and marginalized groups challenges 
Fanon’s beliefs in the redemptive power of Third World anti-colonial universality. In the 
conclusion, based on the dialogue between Ramasamy and Fanon, I explore the limits of 
particularism and the needs of universalism, making a case for a constitutive, but conditional, 







Abstract                                                                                                                                                                   3 
Introduction                                                                                                                                                            6 
The First Protagonist ............................................................................................................................... 7 
The Second Protagonist ........................................................................................................................ 11 
A Comment on Sources ........................................................................................................................ 13 
A Comment on the Comparison ........................................................................................................... 14 
1.1 How to Interpret a 'Rorschach blot on legs'                                                                                           17 
Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 17 
The Scripture is the ultimate authority and there is nothing outside it ............................................... 18 
There is no one truthful reading of the Scripture, but truthful readings which attempt to be honest to 
its essence ............................................................................................................................................. 23 
Anyone can interpret the Scripture, but not all interpretations are valid and a wanton 
misinterpretation is to be avoided ....................................................................................................... 24 
1.2 A Survey of Literature on Fanon                                                                                                                28 
‘Stages’ in Fanon Studies ...................................................................................................................... 29 
First Stage ............................................................................................................................................. 30 
Second Stage ......................................................................................................................................... 31 
Third Stage ............................................................................................................................................ 37 
Fourth Stage.......................................................................................................................................... 41 
Fifth Stage ............................................................................................................................................. 44 
Introducing Caste to Fanon .................................................................................................................. 49 
2. Fanon and Negritude                                                                                                                                     51 
Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 51 
Negritude: The idea .............................................................................................................................. 52 
Orphic tragedy or a ‘Great Black Mirage’? ........................................................................................... 59 
Sartre to blame? ................................................................................................................................... 67 
3. 'To explain the other to myself': Fanon's Articulation of Identity Politics                                         73 
Identity, Identification, Identity Politics ............................................................................................... 74 
Identity and the Master and Slave Dialectic in Fanon .......................................................................... 77 
Fanon, Universality and Particularity .................................................................................................... 81 
5 
 
Becoming Human: Fanon’s Project Identity ......................................................................................... 87 
Conclusion............................................................................................................................................. 91 
4. Contextualizing EV Ramasamy                                                                                                                     93 
Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 93 
Caste ..................................................................................................................................................... 94 
The Stage .............................................................................................................................................. 96 
Ramasamy’s Discourse – Its Context and Content ............................................................................. 101 
Political Legacy .................................................................................................................................... 108 
Criticisms ............................................................................................................................................. 109 
Conclusion – and a Beginning of a Dialogue ....................................................................................... 111 
5. ‘A Phase in the Dialectic’: A Fanonist Critique of Ramasamy’s Discourse on Caste                       112 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 112 
To begin with ...................................................................................................................................... 113 
The ‘Shudra’ identity of the non-Brahmin and Anti-casteist Casteism .............................................. 114 
The Brahmin Other ............................................................................................................................. 118 
The Dalit Particularity ......................................................................................................................... 128 
Conclusion........................................................................................................................................... 131 
6. Beyond Anti-Colonialism: Fanon, EV Ramasamy and a Democratic Politics of Identity               134 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 134 
A Short Note From and About ‘Indian History’ ................................................................................... 135 
Notions of Nations .............................................................................................................................. 139 
White Men, Coloured Women ........................................................................................................... 148 
Is Identity Politics and Universalism Reconcilable? ............................................................................ 152 
Conclusion                                                                                                                                                          155 
Introducing My-Self ............................................................................................................................ 156 
The Other ............................................................................................................................................ 157 
A Constitutive and Conditional Pluralism ........................................................................................... 162 






“What is your caste?” – This is a question that almost every Indian encounters at some point in 
their life. While liberal Indian and postcolonial scholarship tends to downplay the importance 
and centrality of caste in shaping modern Indian political discourse, belonging to a caste has 
practical implications in the everyday lives of a billion Indians. Most political parties, including 
Communist parties, field their candidates based on caste constituencies. Caste violence, 
especially against untouchable Dalit castes, is prevalent across India. Modernity and urbanism 
has done little to the erasure of casteism, though it has modified the manner in which caste 
operates, and caste has found its own ways of adapting to and entrenching itself within modern 
institutions.1 It is a veritable social capital2 which determines access to power circles, who gets 
included and who gets excluded. The brilliance of caste as a form of discrimination lies in its 
ability to be invisible, obvious, subtle, explicit, brutal, sophisticated, naive, insidious, religious, 
secular, primordial and modern, all at the same time. But the most crucial feature of caste 
politics is its particularism; intra-caste political solidarities and mobilizations are built on the 
premise that only the members of that caste can share particular experiences and hence, 
worthy of exclusive identification. This is true for castes at all levels of the hierarchy. To 
paraphrase Frantz Fanon, each identity is sealed in its peculiarity,3 with no possibility of 
complete transcendence. This too was a point of great consternation for ‘Periyar’ EV 
Ramasamy, a radical anti-caste activist in South India.  
I have been involved with caste based social justice movements, which have been 
inspired by the thoughts of Ramasamy, both as a participant and as an observer. What has 
piqued my academic interest is the construction of the Self and the Other in these movements. 
The main thrust of these movements is that Indian society is structured in such a way that the 
minority Brahmin castes are privileged at the expense of the majority non-Brahmin castes. 
Some of the actors advocate political secession of the Tamil Nadu state as a solution, while 
others argue for greater social reform within India and proportional representations for non-
Brahmin castes in education and employment. But all political activists and intellectuals 
                                                          
1 See Surinder Jodhka, Caste, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 161-169 
2 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Forms of Capital”, in John G. Richardson ed., Handbook of Theory and Research 
for the Sociology of Education, New York: Greenwood, 1986, pp. 241-258 
3 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. Charles Lam Markmann, London: Pluto Press, 2008, p. 31 
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following Ramasamy’s tradition are united in their consideration of the Brahmin as the enemy 
Other. This binary has been criticized by several others, but the most compelling critiques come 
from those intellectuals and activists who argue that the universalizing tendencies of this 
discourse silences the particular concerns of Dalit politics.  
Identity politics as such is fraught with the contradiction between universality and 
particularity. Fanon, as a theorist who dealt with race, humanism, and decolonization, has 
produced a body of work that attempts to make sense of this contradiction, in an effort towards 
reconciliation. The core focus of my thesis is to build a critique of identity politics based on 
Fanonism, and bring it to a dialogue with the identity politics of Ramasamy. This thesis 
addresses critical methodological questions when dealing with a controversial and contested 
intellectual legacy as that of Fanon and attempting to use it for political critique in a different 
social climate. Examining among others, Quentin Skinner’s thesis on the ‘mythology of 
doctrines’ and Umberto Eco’s theory of the ‘Model Reader’, and critiquing the method 
deployed by Dominick LaCapra in his approach to intellectual history, the paper attempts to 
establish why the venture to find coherence within the corpus of the author is important. 
Arguing that the concern over the transition from particularity to universality informed Fanon’s 
reading of identity politics throughout his work, I trace out the paradigms of Fanon’s identity 
politics. I use this Fanonism to critique Ramasamy’s political discourse, his construction of the 
non-Brahmin Self and the Brahmin Other, and his position on Dalit particularity. Finally, I use 
Ramasamy’s context specific political insights to critique Fanon’s abstract universalism and his 
insistence on anti-colonialism being an unconditional requirement for any emancipatory 
politics. Besides being an intervention in Fanon studies and the debate on caste politics in 
modern Tamil political history, the thesis also attempts to address a crucial question of identity 
politics, namely the challenge posed by particularities to a Universalist political project.  
The First Protagonist 
Frantz Fanon (1925-1961) is generally understood as a theorist of decolonization. His magnum 
opus The Wretched of the Earth (WOTE) and the preceding Black Skin, White Masks (BSWM) are 
considered excellent critiques of colonialism and often are prescribed as guidebooks by many 
radical identitarian movements. Fanon delves deep in his analysis of colonialism and despite 
frequent deployment of Marxian terms, he does not fall under the trap of conventional 
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Marxism and the class binaries it works with. Fanon gives more attention to the superstructure 
of colonialism, explaining how the process of colonialism creates a strong sense of the Self and 
the Other. Throughout his writings, he treats identity as a site of resistance and also provides 
certain essential frameworks for understanding identity and identity based resistance 
movements.  
The research seeks to trace out certain primary problems to address to expand the 
scope of Fanon studies. Pointing out to the various interpretations of Fanon, Henry Louis Gates 
remarked that the thinker is “a Rorschach blot on legs.”4 Indeed, Fanon has been interpreted as 
an anti-colonialist, postcolonialist, pan-Africanist, humanist, a Black nationalist, a Marxist-
Leninist. Often, these interpretations seek to place Fanon in a relationship with colonialism 
and/or postcolonialism. An influential interpretation in Fanon studies is that of philosopher 
Nigel Gibson. Criticizing the ‘postcolonial sensibility’ of reducing Fanon into “a relic from a 
previous age rather than a living thinker, revered and important but somewhat naive”5, he takes 
postcolonialists like Homi Bhabha to task for presenting Fanon “as if Fanon’s voice is ‘relatively 
opaque’ and can no longer really be heard or understood today.”6 Gibson contends that many 
of Fanon’s analyses in the chapters of the WOTE are useful for understanding developments in 
the postcolony like the rural-urban divide, rise of the lumpenproletariat, emergence of the neo-
colonial bourgeoisie. But even his studies of Fanon are limited to cases that could be broadly 
categorized under postcolonial studies and Black identity politics, for instance, his utilization of 
Fanon to analyse post-apartheid South Africa.7  
If Fanon is to be relevant for the study of identity politics beyond colonialism and 
postcolonialism, and beyond a critique of Black identity politics, what interpretation of this 
‘Rorschach blot on legs’ would be most apt? Sartre argues in The Problem of Method that “The 
idea is the man himself externalizing himself in the materiality of language” and that it must be 
studied in all its developments, to discover its intentionality in order to grasp its deviations and 
to pass at last to its objective realization.8 While Sartre’s book on method provides some useful 
                                                          
4
 Henry Louis Gates Jr, “Critical Fanonism”, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Spring, 1991), p 457-470. The 
analogy is interesting, considering the nature of the Rorschach blot.  
5 Nigel C. Gibson, “Relative Opacity: A New Translation of Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth-Mission 
Betrayed or fulfilled?”, Social Identities, Vol. 13, No. 1, January 2007, p73 
6 Ibid, p79 
7 Nigel C. Gibson, Fanonian Practices in South Africa: From Steve Biko to Abahlali baseMjondolo, 
Scotsville: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011 
8 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Problem of Method, London: Metheun, 1963, p113 
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insights to the task at hand, that of an analysis of Fanon’s articulation of his ideas, I would also 
like to use the theoretical framework of the Cambridge School in the study of political thought, 
specifically that elucidated by Quentin Skinner. Since the vital part of the research is concerned 
with what Fanon meant by what he says in his works, it would be essential, as Skinner argues, to 
decipher the writer’s intentions in order to decipher the meaning in the text – “to know what a 
writer meant by a particular work is to know what his primary intentions were in writing it.”9  
Along with Skinner’s contention that the writer’s intentions are “inside” his works, his further 
argument that to understand what the writer may have been doing in using some particular 
concept “we need to first of all grasp the nature and range of things that could recognizably 
have been done by using that particular concept, in the treatment of that particular theme, at 
that particular time”10 is of relevance to this research that seeks to retrieve the meaning(s) 
behind concepts and themes addressed by Fanon at that particular time and trace its relevance 
for a different period, different context.  
Taking Umberto Eco’s appeal for creative interpretation while maintaining fidelity to the 
essence of an author’s text as an interpretative strategy and cautiously avoiding Quentin 
Skinner’s ‘mythology of doctrines’ (both of which are discussed in Chapter 1), this research 
attempts to find an essence in Fanon’s writings and a coherence of themes in his corpus.  In 
Eco’s words, “To decide how a text works means to decide which one of its various aspects is or 
can become relevant or pertinent for a coherent interpretation of it, and which ones remain 
marginal and unable to support a coherent reading.”11  
While Fanon has generally been confined to Black politics and critiques of colonialism, I 
seek to extend Fanonism to a study of identity politics in any society marked by social 
hierarchies. Fanon did after all ask “Is there in truth any difference between one racism and 
another? Do not all of them show the same collapse, the same bankruptcy of man?”12 My Fanon 
is someone who is grappling with the particularities of anti-colonial identity politics and yet, 
attempts to arrive at transcendence towards a universal humanism. The Fanon I seek to present 
is a theorist of identity politics, who seeks to move from the particular to the universal through 
the process of ‘reciprocal recognition’. Core to my argument is the hypothesis that Fanon’s 
                                                          
9 Quentin Skinner, “Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts” New Literary History, Vol. 3, No. 
2, On Interpretation: I (Winter, 1972), p404 
10 ibid, p406 
11 Umberto Eco,  “Reply” Interpretation and Overinterpretation ed. Stefan Collini, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992, p146 
12 Frantz Fanon,  Black Skin, White Masks, p86 
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humanism provides a framework for understanding identity politics and the necessity of 
drawing sharp binaries with identities as politics. An identity, in itself, can be a source of 
meaning, or attachment to an individual, which identifies them to a collective and differentiates 
them from others. William Connolly argues that “Identity requires difference in order to be, and 
it converts difference into otherness in order to assure its own self-certainty.”13 But for this 
identity to become political, as identity politics, it requires an Other, an ‘enemy’ in the 
Schmittian sense, with whom there is a possibility of confrontation. Fanon, as we shall see, is 
very Hegelian in his belief that post-confrontation, there is a possibility of recognition and 
reconciliation. 
This thesis, however, does not delve extensively on the theme of violence in Fanonism. 
While Fanon has become a name that has been associated with violence, thanks largely to the 
interventions of influential liberal thinkers like Hannah Arendt and the manner in which he was 
appropriated by supporters of the Black Power movement in the USA, Fanon himself had a 
guarded position as regards the potential of violence. It must be noted that his consideration of 
the emancipatory possibilities of violence occupies only one chapter in his entire works. On the 
other hand, the last chapter of the WOTE is explicitly concerned with the pernicious 
psychological effects that random retaliatory violence can have on those participating in it. 
Fanon views violence in an instrumental manner, his approach to violence is more descriptive 
than prescriptive. This nuance is sadly missed by both Fanon’s liberal critics and his 
overenthusiastic supporters. Likewise, philosophers like Sartre and Walter Benjamin have 
produced more intensive works on violence; it does indicate some prejudice that their names 
do not provoke a spontaneous association with violence while that of Fanon’s does. My reading 
looks at Fanon as considering violence a necessary step in the dialectic of decolonization, which 
is instrumental in the native asserting his identity and self-worth. But Fanon’s theoretical 
concern remained with arriving at a genuine universalism in which both the ex-colonized and 
the ex-colonizer would be transformed, and reconciled. This is explored further in Chapter 3.  
All secondary literature on Fanon shows his strained relationship with the Negritude 
movement. In Chapter 2, I explore Fanon’s perspective on Negritude, arguing that he had no 
faith in its prospects. Differing from several scholars who tend to pit Fanon against Sartre on the 
question of Negritude, I argue that Fanon was very much Sartrean in his rejection of the 
                                                          
13 William Connolly, Identity|Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Expanded edition), 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002, p64 
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particularist identity politics of Negritude and its essentialization of the Negro identity. This 
leads us to Fanon’s concern, the movement from particularity to universality. I discuss this in 
Chapter 3, where after an initial consideration of general ideas in the study of identity politics, I 
engage with the Hegelian (to put it more accurately, Kojevean) influence on Fanon. I show how 
Fanon, skeptical of cultural, racial or national particularism, believed that through reciprocal 
recognition, shared solidarity and struggle against oppression and by replacing the false 
universality of the oppressor with a genuine universality of the oppressed, a new humanism 
would be born. This Fanon provides a framework for understanding Ramasamy’s caste politics 
in Tamil Nadu.  
The Second Protagonist 
I shall explore whether Dravidian identity politics in the state of Tamil Nadu in India can be 
understood through the reading of Fanon arrived at before. As an ideology, Dravidianism, or the 
belief that the people of South India in general and Tamil Nadu in particular belong to a 
Dravidian civilization that has been suppressed by brahminical hegemony has dominated 
intellectual and political circles in the state ever since the 1920’s – ever since 1967, the parties 
that have been in power in the state are offsprings of the movement and lay claim to its 
intellectual and political legacy. The Dravidian Self-Respect Movement which began in the 
colonial period and whose politics continue to have great resonance in the region even now 
drew extensively from the ideas of ‘Periyar’ EV Ramasamy, a leading ideologue of Dravidianism.  
‘Periyar’ EV Ramasamy (1879-1973), growing up under the British colonial power in 
South India, differs from Fanon in that he viewed the spaces opened up by colonialism as 
enabling spaces for identity based assertion for his target group, the non-Brahmin castes. He 
used identity, the non-Brahmin identity, to critique the dominant discourses of mainstream 
Indian nationalism and brahminical Hinduism.  While for Fanon, owing to the particularity of his 
situation, “race becomes the lens through which social relations and theories of time are 
judged,”14 for EV Ramasamy it was caste.15 While both claimed to speak for the ‘natives’, a 
                                                          
14  Nigel C. Gibson,  Fanon: The Postcolonial Imagination, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2003, p16 
15  Attempts were made to categorize casteism as racism in Durban conference 2001. The Indian 
government’s relentless campaign against the proposal made it a failure. This spawned intense debates in 
the academic circles. Incidentally, EV Ramasamy referred to Brahmins as ‘Aryans’ and ‘non-Brahmins’ as 
‘Dravidians’ in loose racial terms. But his ‘Dravidian’ was an open-ended category that could 
12 
 
sharp contrast between the two thinkers, it would appear, is in their identification of the 
‘Other’. While for Fanon it was the colonizer who degraded the native and himself in that 
process, for EV Ramasamy it was the Brahmin who, he claimed, did the same to the non-
Brahmin while maintaining a ‘pure’ status for himself. In Chapter 4, I introduce Ramasamy, caste 
in Tamil Nadu, the social and political context in which Ramasamy operated, and the core thrust 
of his discourse. After a discussion of caste and its social structure in Tamil Nadu, I introduce the 
ideological precursors to Ramasamy. Explaining how the intellectual climate was fertile for the 
emergence of Ramasamy’s discourse, I provide the contours of Ramasamy’s identity politics. 
Caste, as an identity, was central to Ramasamy and his political efforts were directed towards 
the destruction of the caste system. To Ramasamy, the Brahmin was the Other who was the 
core beneficiary of this system and thus, he directed his polemic against the Brahmin as a 
symbol that contained religious, social and political power. Critics of Ramasamy have alleged 
that in his focus on the Brahmin as an enemy and in his invocation of the non-Brahmin identity, 
he was insensitive to the interests of the Dalit castes. I consider the accusations against 
Ramasamy’s non-Brahmin politics, which I explore in detail through a Fanonist lens in the 
succeeding chapter.  
The popular assertion of a stigmatized identity in EV Ramasamy and his Dravidian 
movement can be compared, at a general level, to the Negritude movement. This is covered in 
Chapter 5, where I show how much like the Negritude thinkers, Ramasamy used an inferiorized 
identity of “Shudra” (the lowest caste category in the Hindu system) to incriminate the valorized 
Brahmin Other identity. However, unlike the Negritude thinkers, Ramasamy did not celebrate a 
pristine past of the identity of the Self. Instead, he was willing to look at the Self in a nuanced 
manner, recognizing that non-Brahmin identity itself was fractured. While Ramasamy was 
flexible with regards to the non-Brahmin identity, he nevertheless was insistent on two 
particularities – one, the Brahmin identity, which was to be an absolute enemy Other, incapable 
of reform, and to be subject to ridicule; two, the Dalit identity, which was unique owing to its 
experience of untouchability, which needed to be respected. Using Fanon’s assessment of 
identity politics, I evaluate these articulations of Ramasamy.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
accommodate almost anyone in the subcontinent who was considered ritually lower in the Brahminical 
conceptualization of society.  
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Yet, Fanon’s theoretical underpinnings also carry their own pitfalls. According to Fanon, 
while anti-colonial nationalism might suffer from drawbacks, the anti-colonial nation as such 
was a legitimate entity. Ramasamy on the other hand problematized the idea of a nation that 
was sought to be created by the discourse of anti-colonial nationalism. Likewise, Fanon’s 
perspective of women only conceived them as sexualized objects in a racial or an anti-colonial 
conflict.  Ramasamy in his discourse encouraged the creation of autonomous social and political 
spaces for women, never failing to underscore that the narratives of oppressed castes 
themselves might privilege the men over women. While Fanon never assumes that the native’s 
anti-colonial discourse might itself be a process of privileging certain identities over others, 
Ramasamy was keen on challenging the internal and native forms of oppression as he 
considered them far more insidious and persistent than colonialism. I discuss these and other 
related issues in Chapter 6.  
In my conclusion, I probe whether there is a possibility of reconciling what appears to 
be two divergent viewpoints on identity. Syncretizing the two, I argue that a democratic politics 
of identity will have to involve solidarity and struggle based on an inclusive identification, that 
would compel both the Self and the Other to radically evaluate fixedness of their identities. The 
real success of such a political discourse would be in its inherent potential to enable, without 
superficially suturing differences, discrete social groups to transcend their particularities to 
something larger, universal. 
A Comment on Sources 
Since the thesis involves my interpretation of Fanon and the utilization of that interpretation to 
interpret Ramasamy’s discourse, I have relied mostly on primary sources of the two thinkers, 
though secondary sources figure where necessary. The second chapter generously uses 
Negritude poetry and excerpts from essays so as to give the reader a comprehensive account of 
the problem that intrigued Fanon. As for Fanon himself, I have made reference to his four 
published works. His doctoral thesis (unpublished), which deals with clinical psychology, has 
nothing to contribute to the aims of this research. Likewise, the correspondence with his family 




In the course of a long and eventful political career, Ramasamy produced a voluminous 
amount of writings which were mostly published in three papers (Kudiarasu, Puratchi and 
Viduthalai), besides a journal (Pagutharivu) and an English weekly (Revolt) which were 
published for a brief period. His speeches were also published in the aforementioned papers 
and journals.  Selected articles from Revolt have been published as a book recently. Likewise, 
subject-wise selections of his articles and speeches have also been published in the volumes of 
Periyar Kalanjiyam and Thoughts of Periyar EVR (Speeches and Writings of Periyar EV 
Ramsamy). The primary sources that I refer cover the period of his active political life, from 
1925 till 1973.  
A Comment on the Comparison 
Fanon’s published works cover roughly a decade, from his BSWM (1952) to WOTE (1961). His 
last work, considered to be a manifesto for Third World liberation, was compiled in a hurry, 
dying as he was from leukaemia. Throughout his political life, Fanon was an outsider. A Black 
Martinician in France, a French citizen in Africa, and one from a Christian background among 
Arab Muslims. Though he was fully committed to the Algerian anti-colonial struggle, he was 
never fully Algerian, and his influence on the course of the Algerian struggle was thin, save for 
his functioning as a useful intellectual face at solidarity conferences. His grasp of pre-colonial 
Algerian history was hazy at best. Fanon’s writings clearly show that his understanding of Islam 
as a socio-political factor in Algeria was superficial and he viewed it only in instrumental terms, 
vis a vis French colonialism. Anti-Black racism among Arabs, Arab role in slavery, anti-Semitism 
in the Arab colonies, and Islamic patriarchy were subjects he scooted over. While he was well 
versed in existential philosophy and deserves to be categorized as an important existential 
thinker, he was prone to making gross generalizations and predictions about the colony, many 
of which may now seem naïve and romantic. He remains a marginal figure in the intellectual 
imagination of both France and Algeria. However, he has had a rebirth in Anglo-Saxon world, 
mostly in the departments of postcolonialism and race studies, where he is mostly read as a 
‘Black’ thinker, an identitarian, a postcolonialist, or as an advocate/analyst of anti-colonial 
violence.  
On the other hand, Ramasamy’s works cover almost five decades. Ramasamy was an 
insider to Tamil Nadu’s culture, society and politics. Though never possessing a formal 
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education, Ramasamy was well versed in Tamil Nadu’s history, its literature, the Hindu religious 
texts, and his discourse addressed the intricacies of the caste system, its intersection with 
colonialism, class and native patriarchy. An iconoclast, he believed in the power of reason and 
rational deconstruction of religious myths and traditional social mores. The spearhead of a 
militant social reform movement that would significantly transform the political discourse of 
Tamil Nadu’s politics, Ramasamy is a household name among Tamils, associated with atheism, 
anti-Brahminism and social justice. He is almost never referred to by name, but only by his 
epithet, ‘Periyar’ – the Great One. No political party can expect to gain a foothold in Tamil Nadu 
without acknowledging their debt to the Periyar.  
Fanon’s independent Algeria was wracked by civil war between the government and 
Islamists killing more people than French colonialism, anguishing over which, his wife Josie 
Fanon committed suicide in 1989. Tamil Nadu is one of the most stable and economically 
successful states in India, and Ramasamy’s political successors, even if they have diluted many 
of his radical ideals, have delivered good governance with their politics of competitive 
populism.16   
In a sense, this research does some mild injustice to both individuals. I use the prism of 
Fanon, a highly educated person who also had the privilege of familiarity with the theories of 
intellectual giants like Sartre, Hegel and Freud to analyse the political discourse of an 
uneducated autodidact and problematize it. Likewise, using Ramasamy’s insights which were 
derived from his long political career and extensive hands-on knowledge of the contradictions 
within the native society, I critique the thoughts of a man who might have revised his theories 
had he but been alive to witness the fratricidal civil war in postcolonial Algeria. Nevertheless, as 
mentioned before, this research is an attempt to expand the scope of Fanon studies. Never has 
Fanon been brought to engage with a social dynamic as complex as caste. I hold that Fanonism’s 
critique of identity politics, its assessment of particularism and universalism, has a potential to 
serve as theoretical tool to analyse the caste identity politics of Ramasamy. Likewise, this 
research is also an attempt to point out and fill the gaps in the Fanonian critique through 
Ramasamy’s criticism of nationalism, religion and native forms of oppression.   
                                                          
16 See for instance A. Kalaiyarasan, “A Comparison of Developmental Outcomes in Gujarat and Tamil 
Nadu”, Economic and Political Weekly, April 12, 2014, vol. xlix no. 15, pp. 55-63. For a more detailed 
account of how the populist schemes of the Dravidian parties helped in efficient delivery mechanisms of 
government services and also to increase participation of marginalized communities in decision making 
processes see Vivek Srinivasan, Delivering Public Services Effectively: Tamil Nadu and Beyond, New Delhi: 
OUP, 2014.  
16 
 
In what is a rather tedious novel, American writer John Wideman makes one interesting 
point – “To leave his island Fanon must risk the sea.”17 This research attempts to take Fanon 
from the island of race and postcolonial politics, across the Arabian Sea, and introduce him to 
the world of caste and the ideas of a radical social reformer who just might be the person with 
whom Fanonism needs a critical dialogue.  
  
                                                          
17 John Edgar Wideman, Fanon, New York: Mariner Books, 2010, p. 146 
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How to interpret a ‘Rorschach blot on 
legs’ 
“The devil can cite Scripture for his purpose.” 
-William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice 
Introduction 
 
Depending on whether one is a liberation theologist in Brazil, a White Republican in Southern 
America, or a Pentecost evangelist preacher in India, the Scripture of the Bible can mean 
entirely different things. For a person who is called an apostle of violence and a messiah for 
colonized peoples,18 a prophet of liberation,19 a ‘Marx of the Third World’,20 whose magnum 
opus was considered a Bible by movements world over,21 and who was notoriously labelled a 
“Rorschach blot on legs”22 it is but inevitable that Frantz Fanon’s works would be subject to 
numerous interpretations and that his ‘scriptures’ will be cited by several for several purposes. 
But even if we were to agree that the bard was correct in noting that a ‘Scripture’ can be 
interpreted to suit one’s purpose, how do we conclude that the interpreter is the ‘devil’ – that 
is, that the interpretation was a misinterpretation? Or how do we arrive at a ‘good’ 
interpretation? 
At the Marxism 2009 conference in London, Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Zizek, citing 
Adorno, says that when dealing with a great philosopher, the question to be raised is not “what 
                                                          
18 Robyn Dane, “When Mirror Turns Lamp: Frantz Fanon as Cultural Visionary”, Africa Today, Vol. 41, No. 
2, Arts and Politics in Africa (2nd Qtr., 1994), p70 
19 Cameron Duodu, “Frantz Fanon: Prophet of African liberation”, available from 
http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/78486, 2011, [Last accessed on 20-05-2013]. Also see Peter 
Geismar’s work in similar sentiment, Fanon: The Revolutionary as Prophet; a Biography, New York: Dial 
Press, 1971 
20 Dennis Forsythe, “Frantz Fanon - The Marx of the Third World”, Phylon (1960-), Vol. 34, No. 2 (2nd Qtr., 
1973), pp. 160-170 
21 Immanuel Wallerstein, “Reading Fanon in the 21st Century”,  New Left Review, 57, (May – June 2009), 
p118 
22 Henry Louis Gates Jr., “Critical Fanonism”, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Spring, 1991), p 457-470. 
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can this philosopher tell us”, but rather “what is our situation in his eyes.”23 When Fanon rather 
explicitly proclaimed in BSWM that “I do not come with timeless truths” and that “I belong 
irreducibly to my time”, how can we legitimately and truthfully see our situation in his eyes? 
Conceding to Fanon, I argue that the original absolute truth in Fanon’s texts is irrevocably lost. 
Everything on Fanon post-mortem has only been interpretations for particular political/ social/ 
academic projects and my research is an addition to that. But I also argue that it is possible to 
have fidelity to the Scripture, the original texts of Fanon through an attempt to arrive at truthful 
readings by relying on the concepts and formulae used by Fanon in his texts and deciphering the 
essence of his works, and by a scrupulous avoiding of inserting ideas into his mouth that he had 
never wrote about. The last is a sin that quite some readers of Fanon are guilty of.  
I set out to erect three methodological paradigms within which I shall conduct my 
research.  
 
1. The Scripture is the ultimate authority and there is nothing outside it. 
2. There is no one truthful reading of the Scripture, but readings which attempt to be 
honest to its essence.  
3. Anyone can interpret the Scripture, but not all interpretations are valid and a wanton 
misinterpretation is to be avoided.  
The Scripture is the ultimate authority and there is nothing outside it 
 
For a Tamil male living in South India attempting to use Fanonism to grapple with Dravidian 
politics that has dominated his region of residence for well over half a century, of what 
consequence is a letter written by Fanon to his mother in 40s or the ‘historical context’ that he 
was on his deathbed while writing the WOTE? Indeed, these facts could and should be the 
objects of interest were one writing a biography of Fanon. But for a researcher interested in 
contributing to what Lewis Gordon et al. term the fifth stage of Fanon studies, or the work with 
and through Fanonism “for the development of original work across the entire sphere of human 
                                                          
23 Slavoj Zizek, ‘What does it mean to be a revolutionary today?’ at Marxism 2009, London, available from 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_GD69Cc20rw [Last accessed on 25-05-2013] 
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studies”24 in order to explore the ways in which he is a useful thinker for our times and for 
different cultural and political contexts, what Fanon did for a living, who he interacted with, 
what was his physical or mental condition at the time of writing his texts, what were his motives 
etc. are irrelevant.  
I take from Skinner that the motives of an author in writing stand “outside” his works 
and their meaning is not so relevant in arriving at the meaning of his works and that a writer’s 
intentions are “inside” his works and therefore, no special effort need be taken in their 
recovery.25 From this, it can be legitimately argued that knowledge of a writer’s intentions in 
writing is equivalent to knowledge of what the writer means by what he says in his work.  
Operating from a pro-Derridean framework, American intellectual historian Dominick 
LaCapra in his “Rethinking Intellectual History and Reading Texts” criticizes specifically the 
Skinnerian view for tending to “assume a proprietary relation between the author and the text 
as well as a unitary meaning for an utterance.”26 Accusing this view for permitting “an overly 
simple idea of divisions or opposing tendencies in a text and of the relationships between texts 
and analytic classifications of them”, he contends that “It is significant that an intention is often 
formulated retrospectively when the utterance or text has been subjected to interpretation 
with which the author does not agree.”27 I can understand the validity of this argument with 
respect to certain cases, say for example, Edward Said who in his essay “Orientalism 
Reconsidered” responded to interpretations of his work Orientalism. But how does this work in 
the case of a Fanon, the overwhelming majority of interpretations of whose works have been 
post mortem, and considering that the only major interpretation of his work that he 
encountered in his time and approved of was Sartre’s preface to WOTE? In the event of an 
author leaving little or no clues on how he should or should not be interpreted, the question, or 
even the threat, of how he can be interpreted looms large. In such a scenario, while not calling 
for a singular dominant interpretation when attempting to construct an ism out of the corpus of 
the author’s works, an appeal can be made for a fidelity to the author by deciphering an 
                                                          
24 Lewis R. Gordon et al, “Introduction: Five Stages of Fanon Studies” in Gordon, Lewis R. et al eds. Fanon: 
A Critical Reader, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996, p6 
25 Quentin Skinner, “Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts” New Literary History, Vol. 3, No. 
2, On Interpretation: I (Winter, 1972), p402 
26 Dominick LaCapra, “Rethinking Intellectual History and Reading Texts”, History and Theory, Vol. 19, No. 
3 (Oct., 1980), p254  
27 ibid, p255 
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essence, a standard that he adopts in his works through the concepts he intentionally28 uses in 
his texts and by not seeing woods or trees where the author is describing an ocean.   
Further criticizing Skinner, LaCapra argues that that to believe that authorial intentions 
fully control the meaning or functioning of texts “is to sacrifice more dialogical approaches and 
to obscure the role of argument in matters of interpretation, including the interpretation of 
intentions themselves.”29 I can see the partial credibility of this argument considering the quite 
some interpretations of the intentions of Fanon that see approval where there is sarcasm, 
condemnation where there critical appraisal and so on. But I fail to see how this can be a 
credible criticism of the Skinnerian position. In a reply to his critics, including Dominick LaCapra, 
Skinner states “any text of any complexity will always contain far more meaning – what Ricoeur 
has called surplus meaning – than even the most vigilant and imaginative author could possibly 
have intended to put into it. So I am far from supposing that the meanings of texts are to be 
identified with the intentions of their authors; what must be identified with such intentions is 
only what their authors meant by them.”30 
To LaCapra, several other factors are also required to be taken into consideration when 
dealing with an author’s text, namely the relation between the author’s life and the text, the 
relation of society to the text, the relation of culture to texts, the relation of the text to the 
corpus of a writer, and the relation between modes of discourse and the text.31 Likewise, Italian 
semiotician Umberto Eco, in his debate on ‘Interpretations and Overinterpretations’ with 
Richard Rorty, Jonathan Culler and Christine Brooke-Rose, draws a distinction between using a 
text and interpreting a text, claiming that those engaging in the latter respect the cultural and 
linguistic background of the author.32  
An argument that WOTE was written in such and such a manner owing to the ‘historical 
fact’ of his physical condition is as useful to a Fanonian analysis of social phenomena as is the 
equally possible claim that BSWM was written so because, let us say, of the ‘historical fact’ that 
                                                          
28 I can see a counter-argument emerging. ‘What about unintentional or unconscious usage of concepts?’ 
If the author has not clarified in later works about the same, even the ‘unintentional’ in the text will have 
to be dealt as intentional in all seriousness.  Also, for a parody on the relevance of the 
unconscious/unintentional to the interpretation of texts, see Umberto Eco, “Between Author and Text” in 
ed. Stefan Collini Interpretation and Overinterpretation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 
p85-86 
29 LaCapra, p256 
30 Quentin Skinner, “A reply to my critics”, in ed. James Tully, Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and 
his Critics, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988, p272 
31 LaCapra, p256-269 
32 Umberto Eco, “Between Author and Text”,  1992, p69 
21 
 
Fanon was in a relationship with a White French woman at the time of its composition. Every 
such extra-textual historical fact cited to support a particular line of argument/interpretation of 
Fanon can and will be complemented, contradicted, contradistinguished by another set of 
known, not so well known, or recently unearthed historical facts around Fanon’s life. To build an 
argument for a political theory or a Fanonian mode of analysis that can be universally applicable 
on the basis of these facts, as with cultural or linguistic background of the author, is mostly self-
defeating. At the risk of sounding audacious, I would even say that even Fanon’s skin colour is 
irrelevant to a universal Fanonian analysis of social phenomena, if it were not for his 
deconstruction of the same within his texts and the manner in which it is done. But more on 
that in later chapters.       
Now, there is also the suggestion that Fanon must be studied along with his 
contemporaries in order to grasp the full weight of his thought. Fanon indeed has been studied 
along with Richard Wright, W.E.B du Bois, Aime Cesaire, Amilcar Cabral, Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert 
Memmi etc and this greatly enriches the debate on the intellectual history of Fanonism.33 
However, for Fanonism by itself to be a model for social and political analysis, a study of his 
contemporaries is rather irrelevant unless they find mention in his texts.  
On this note, I refer to Sartre who, commenting about Gustave Flaubert, writes that it is 
not the simple abstract decision to write that gives Flaubert a peculiar quality but “the decision 
to write in a certain manner in order to manifest himself in the world in a particular way; in a 
word, it is the particular signification – within the framework of the contemporary ideology – 
which he gives to literature as the negation of his original condition and as the objective 
solution to his contradictions.”34 In a not so dissimilar vein, Quentin Skinner argues that to 
understand what a writer may have been doing in using some particular concept, “we need first 
of all to grasp the nature and range of things that could recognizably have been done by using 
that particular concept, in the treatment of that particular theme, at that particular time.”35 
I am in agreement insofar that Fanon did write his texts in order to manifest himself, his 
thoughts, in a particular way, as a totalizing expression of his condition and as a solution to the 
contradictions that he faced as a being-in-the-world – the rigorous study of which is imperative 
                                                          
33 Africana philosopher and Fanon scholar Reiland Rabaka for instance in his 2010 book Forms of 
Fanonism squarely places Cabral within the Fanonist tradition, though it is worthy of speculation what 
Cabral himself would have thought of such a move. 
34 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Problem of Method, translated with an introduction by Hazel E. Barnes, London: 
Metheun, 1963, p146 
35 Quentin Skinner, “Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts”, p406 
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to a Fanonian analysis of our worlds. But I depart from Sartre – and likewise with Skinner - in 
their belief that it is necessary to take into consideration “the framework of the contemporary 
ideology” of Fanon’s “particular time”. Take a different case. An intellectual history of Marxism 
may require a study of the study of intellectual environment of Marx’s period, of what Marx’s 
contemporaries were writing about in that context. But for a Marxist study of a phenomenon, 
or for laying the foundations for a Marxist study of phenomena, it is quite irrelevant to read 
what a Proudhon or a Bakunin were writing in Marx’s time. What could be relevant for a 
contemporary Marxist analysis, or for an attempt to broaden Marxism as field of study, though 
is Marx’s mention of Proudhon or Bakunin in his texts, the manner in which he engages with 
them, and the final intellectual product. Contradicting Sartre and Skinner, I assert that it is 
unnecessary to study the contemporary ideology of a thinker or the treatment of a particular 
concept by that thinker in a particular time in order to grasp the usefulness of the thinker for 
our contemporary times.36  
As a comment on a Fanonist method, Rabaka differentiates ‘revolutionary Fanonism’ 
from ‘critical Fanonism’ – an explicit reference to Henry Louis Gates Jr. and his supporters - in 
that the former is based on a return to Fanon’s original texts (for the purposes of revolutionary 
decolonization and revolutionary re-Africanization) while the latter is based on the 
interpretations of others’ interpretation of Fanon. He accuses the critical Fanonists, labelling 
them “hermeneutic Fanonists” of “the most turgid type of (inter)textualism” and for distracting 
their readers from the “radical political” and “revolutionary aspects” of Fanon’s original texts.37 I 
am in general agreement with Rabaka, though my purpose is neither revolutionary 
decolonization nor revolutionary re-Africanization, and while other dominant interpretations of 
Fanon and Fanonism will be considered when required, the thrust of the research would be 
draw a framework for understanding identity politics from the “radical political” within Fanon’s 
texts.  
                                                          
36 To be fair to Sartre, his humongous work on Flaubert The Family Idiot (an unfinished business, like 
many of his projects) was but an attempt at a complete intellectual biography of the famed 19th Century 
French novelist. Sartre was not attempting to lay the foundations for a Flaubertism.  
37 Reiland Rabaka, Forms of Fanonism: Frantz Fanon’s Critical Theory and the Dialectics of Decolonization, 
Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2010, p193 
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There is no one truthful reading of the Scripture, but truthful readings 
which attempt to be honest to its essence 
 
I revert to LaCapra’s plea for the consideration of the relation of the text to the corpus of a 
writer. He says that usually a corpus is seen in one of the three ways “continuity among texts 
("linear development"); discontinuity among texts (change or even “epistemological break" 
between stages or periods); and dialectical synthesis (the later stage raises the earlier one to a 
higher level of insight). The corpus is thus unified in one way or another (developmental unity, 
two discrete unities, higher unity).”38 He further questions whether these categories are too 
simple for the interpretation of a corpus of complex texts. Fanon’s corpus of four texts began 
with the publication of BSWM in 1952 and concluded with WOTE in 1961. Between these, 
Fanon shows instances of continuity in some themes, discontinuity in some others, and a 
dialectical synthesis in others. The interpretations of these, again, depend on the project of the 
interpreter. For instance, Jock McCulloh finds a dialectical synthesis as regards Sartrean 
influence, Homi Bhabha observes a discontinuity between the psychoanalyst Fanon in BSWM 
and the existential humanist Fanon in WOTE, while Reiland Rabaka finds continuity in Fanon’s 
attitude towards Cesaire’s negritude. If the objective is to arrive at Fanonism as a method of 
social and political critique, it would be necessary to trace a general thematic coherence in his 
corpus, while remaining open to possibility of there being continuity, discontinuity or dialectical 
synthesis – or even all of them.  
A criticism of this approach has been made by Skinner. In an attack on the “mythology 
of doctrines” in the study of history of ideas, Skinner says that the attempt to arrive at the 
fundamental thought or a coherent view of an author’s system gives the thoughts of the author 
“an air generally of a closed system, which they may have never aspired to attain.”39 But the 
study and the application of an ism for study is necessarily systematized. While it is necessary to 
avoid rigidity (a fundamental thought alone matters in author’s corpus), it is equally important 
is to avoid excessive fluidity (the author’s corpus has no fundamental thought in it). The former, 
of course, is totalitarianism. The latter, for the lack of a better word, is nihilism.  The quest, 
then, is for coherence in an author’s corpus, through the study of the concepts he uses in his 
texts, the themes he addresses, and the pattern of his concerns. In my defence, I cite Umberto 
                                                          
38 LaCapra, p268 
39 Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p68 
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Eco who asserts the need to find a coherence in the texts of an author to avoid 
overinterpretation in that “any interpretation given of a certain portion of a text can be 
accepted if it is confirmed by, and must be rejected if it is challenged by, another portion of the 
same text. In this sense the internal textual coherence controls the otherwise uncontrollable 
drives of the reader.”40 Likewise, I can assuage Skinner that I have not taken it on myself to give 
Fanon a coherence that he lacks. There are adequate arguments in his corpus to push for the 
same.  
The attempt to trace coherence, a fundamental thought, or an essence in an author’s 
corpus, will have to meet yet another important counter-argument. Can there be essences or 
fundamental thoughts in a writer’s corpus? I can see scholars reading through Fanon’s texts a 
fundamental essence of humanism, anti-humanism, Marxism, anti-racism, Black racism, anti-
colonialism, violence, and so on. I can also see scholars reading other essences through the 
subtext in Fanon’s texts; let us say, for instance, a Feminist reading of the subtext of Fanon’s 
work could argue, not without some legitimacy, that there is an essential male-centric narrative 
that dominates Fanon’s texts. I have to disagree with the idea that there could be multiple 
essences or fundamental thoughts in Fanon’s corpus, especially since the author himself has 
given no indication that he has made an ‘epistemological break’ between one work and 
another. Likewise, other readings that see in Fanon Marxism, anti-colonialism, machismo, 
violence, Black racism etc.- some with legitimacy, some without – would be dishonest readings 
if they fail to see that these ideas are aspects subservient to a dominant theme in Fanon’s 
corpus or if they substitute these aspects for the dominant theme in Fanon’s corpus.  
This brings us to the third paradigm.  
Anyone can interpret the Scripture, but not all interpretations are valid 
and a wanton misinterpretation is to be avoided 
 
In an evocative essay, French philosopher Alain Badiou writes, “Anyone can be a philosopher, or 
the interlocutor of a philosopher. But it is not true that any opinion is worth as much as any 
                                                          
40 Umberto Eco, “Overinterpreting texts”, Interpretation and Overinterpretation, p65. However, American 
pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty, differing with Eco on this subject claims, “But opposition to the 
idea that texts are really about something in particular is also opposition to the idea that one particular 
interpretation might, presumably because of its respect for 'the internal coherence of the text', hit upon 
what that something is.” See “The Pragmatist’s Project” in Interpretation and Overinterpretation, p103.   
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other opinion.”41 Fanon, the Rorschach blot, invites not only a variety of interlocutors but a 
bizarre assortment of opinions that use him. It can be said Fanon attracts interpretations and 
misinterpretations. It is easy to imagine why and how the furious passages in the chapter “On 
Violence” in WOTE can be used by insurgents world over, the arguments in “Algeria Unveiled” 
used by the Taliban to justify its cultural policy towards women, or his invectives against 
primitivism used by the national bourgeoisie in India to validate their repression of indigenous 
tribes in central India.  
If God the author is dead, it is not that everything is permissible, rather everything is 
possible but also, as Beauvoir would have said it, nothing is expiable.42 The interpreter must 
take full responsibility for his interpretations and misinterpretations, uses and abuses. 
Considering the volatile nature of the God and his Scriptures that the research is concerned 
with, it is possible to misinterpret or even miserably interpret – but it is not permissible. My 
effort is to avoid misinterpretation and misuse as much as possible. This includes scrupulously 
avoiding that ‘mythology of doctrine’ attacked by Skinner, that of "converting some scattered or 
incidental remarks by a classic theorist into their ‘doctrine’ on one of the expected themes" and 
also taking into critical consideration Skinner’s warning of the possibility of crediting the author 
with a meaning that he did not intend to convey or finding a preferred doctrine in the author’s 
texts.43 Sadly, this is a sin quite some followers, users and interpreters of Fanon are guilty of. 
Now, I disagree with LaCapra that a ‘good’ reading of an author is possible. I tend to side with 
Eco that it is the ‘bad’ reading that is to be avoided and what remains will be the attempt at the 
best possible reading of the author. Needless to say, this is impossible without tracing 
coherence in Fanon’s thoughts.  
In his debate with Eco, Rorty, who is against finding coherence or a fundamental 
essence in an author texts, is also opposed to the differentiation between use and 
interpretation of a text. To him, all interpretations are use by the reader. In that spirit, he makes 
an impassioned appeal for an ‘unmethodical criticism’. I am obliged to quote Rorty at large, 
both for the eloquent nature of his plea, and for my disagreements with it.  
 
                                                          
41 Alain Badiou, Philosophy for Militants, Translated with a foreword by Bruno Bosteels, London: Verso, 
2012, p27 
42 Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, New York: Citadel Press, 1948, p16 
43 Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, p60-61 
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Unmethodical criticism of the sort which one occasionally wants to call 'inspired' is the 
result of an encounter with an author, character, plot, stanza, line or archaic torso 
which has made a difference to the critic's conception of who she is, what she is good 
for, what she wants to do with herself: an encounter which has rearranged her priorities 
and purposes. Such criticism uses the author or text not as a specimen reiterating a type 
but as an occasion for changing a previously accepted taxonomy, or for putting a new 
twist on a previously told story. Its respect for the author or the text is not a matter of 
respect for an intention or for an internal structure. Indeed, 'respect' is the wrong word. 
'Love' or 'hate' would be better. For a great love or a great loathing is the sort of thing 
that changes us by changing our purposes, changing the uses to which we shall put 
people and things and texts we encounter later.44 
 
All this is nice. Let us forget for a moment, while reading this emotive and evocative call 
for the use of a text for self-seeking, the Nietzschean injunction that "there is the greatest 
suspicion against 'truth' when pleasurable sensations are invoked to answer the question 'What 
is true?'"45 Encountering Fanon for the first time through WOTE, I had no idea of his skin colour. 
For a long time, I presumed that he was Algerian. I had some difficulty finding both Algeria and 
France on a map. The characters mentioned in his book, but for some prominent ones like 
Marx, Engels, Sartre and Freud, were alien to me. It wasn’t a random stanza or line that made a 
difference to me or rearranged my priorities and purposes. Rather, it was the essence, the 
fundamental thought that lies in WOTE, and in other texts of Fanon – which will be explored in 
detail in the coming chapters – and its possible universal applicability that made a difference to 
me, that made me consider the ways in which Fanon could be useful thinker in analysing politics 
of a different personality, in a different time zone, in a different socio-political context.  
I concur with Eco who, in his reply to Rorty and other critics, asserts that “To decide 
how a text works means to decide which one of its various aspects is or can become relevant or 
pertinent for a coherent interpretation of it, and which ones remain marginal and unable to 
support a coherent reading.”46 Fanon’s dissection of the cultural politics of Tarzan and Mickey 
                                                          
44 Rorty, “The Pragmatist’s Progress”, Interpretation and Overinterpretation, p107 
45 Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Anti-Christ” in eds. Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, The Anti-Christ, Ecce 
Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings, translated by Judith Norman, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005, p49 
46 Umberto Eco, “Reply”, Interpretation and Overinterpretation, p146 
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Mouse are fascinating passages in BSWM. But they are not the aspect of BSWM that facilitate a 
coherent interpretation of it. A great love or a great hate indeed changes our purposes, but they 
also require a great understanding, or at least the attempt at a great understanding, even while 
accepting that a complete understanding may never be possible. I would, of course, be 
interested to know if there was someone who had a great love or loathing for Fanon thinking 
that he was an analyst of comic-strips.  
In his Assorted Opinions and Maxims, Nietzsche said “The worst readers are those who 
behave like plundering troops: they take away a few things they can use, dirty and confound the 
remainder, and revile the whole.”47 
This research shall, to its best, try and avoid this crime.  
  
                                                          




A Survey of Literature on Fanon 
"It has never been more difficult to read Fanon than it is today.” 
 
Philosopher Achille Mbembe expressed the above opinion in a lecture on ‘Reading 
Fanon in the 21st Century’48 at the Colgate University a few years back. Using Fanon to analyze 
contemporary South African politics and issues of social justice, Mbembe made a plea to read 
and apply Fanon to contexts, further arguing that “we need to extricate his work from the 
historical time-frame within which it has been locked in order to make it speak anew.” Likewise, 
Mbembe has also applied Fanonian thought, ‘thought with it and against it’ in quite some of his 
works, most notably in his critical work On the Postcolony.49   
Mbembe’s lecture was inspired by Immanuel Wallerstein’s essay with the same title. 
Criticising those who appropriated Fanon for postmodernist studies and for identity politics, 
Wallerstein proclaimed “Whatever Fanon was, he was not a postmodernist. He might rather be 
characterized as one part Marxist Freudian, one part Freudian Marxist, and most part totally 
committed to revolutionary liberation movements. If he belonged to his time, however, his 
work still has much to offer ours.”50 Given that Fanon usually elicits such quite extreme and 
vocal responses from his readers, interpreters and reviewers, the task of arriving at an 
appropriate survey of literature for the research at hand seems tougher than the research itself.  
This literature review intends to cover existing works on Frantz Fanon in order to get an 
understanding of the current dominant trends in the study of Fanon’s humanism pertaining to 
Fanon’s conceptualization of identity politics. The research is focussed on Fanon’s 
understanding and articulation of identity as politics and his perception of violence influencing 
the same. As sub-themes, the research also seeks to explore how this Fanonian understanding 
of identity politics fits in the framework of pluralist imaginations and also to use Fanon’s 
conceptualization of identity politics to understand the Dravidian political discourse of ‘Periyar’ 
                                                          
48 Achille Mbembe, “Reading Fanon in the 21st Century”, Colgate University, 2010, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VYXlHRez9Ao [last accessed on 04-04-2013] 
49 In a reply to his critics, Achille Mbembe posits his “politics of life” as expounded in On the Postcolony 
against Fanon’s “circulation of death”, concerned specifically with the latter’s theorization of violence. 
See “On the Postcolony: A Brief Response to Critics”, Qui Parle, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2005, p17-20.  




EV Ramasamy, a prominent social reformer in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu who was active in 
both colonial and post-colonial periods.  
Since a substantial part of the research is devoted to arriving at a way of reading 
Fanon’s texts so as to arrive at him as a theorist who provides a framework to study identity 
politics in general, taking Fanonism beyond the analysis of colonialism, postcolonialism and 
Black politics alone, the literature review does not seek to include the primary works of Fanon 
but to give greater focus on how Fanon has been read, and on whether Fanon has been read in 
the manner in which the research seeks to study his works.  
‘Stages’ in Fanon Studies 
 
Fortunately, the task of arriving at a survey of literature on Fanon has been relatively eased by 
the intervention of Lewis R. Gordon, T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting and Renee T. White. The 
academics working on/with Fanonism identify five stages in Fanon studies.51 The first three 
stages involve applications of Fanons works and reactions to it, biographical works on Fanon, 
and intensive research on Fanon’s significance in political theory, in that order. The fourth stage 
“linked to the ascent of postmodern cultural and postcolonial studies in the academy”52 
includes, among others, the works of postcolonialists like Benita Parry, Edward Said and Homi 
Bhabha using Fanon.  
It is the “final” fifth stage that is of chief concern to my research. A critical difference 
between this stage and the preceding ones is that while earlier Fanon was studied, here, he is 
used as a tool, a method, a framework to study a variety of themes and issues. This stage works 
with and through Fanonism “for the development of original work across the entire sphere of 
human studies. Its purpose is neither to glorify nor denigrate Fanon but instead to explore ways 
in which he is a useful thinker.”53 It can be said that this stage was formally inaugurated in the 
academia with the publication of Fanon: A Critical Reader in 1996 edited by Gordon, Sharpley-
Whiting and White – though the academics credit the origins of this stage to the publication of 
                                                          
51Lewis R. Gordon et al, “Introduction: Five Stages of Fanon Studies” in Gordon, Lewis R. et al eds. Fanon: 
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Hussein Bulhan’s Fanon and the Psychology of Oppression in 1986.54 After this ‘break’, Fanon 
has been used as a point of departure by many scholars to probe into several psychological, 
social and political themes. 
First Stage 
 
However, a minor criticism to this ‘stages’ approach can be made. Gordon et al. classify the 
‘stages’ in Fanon studies in a linear, almost teleological manner. But we can see that these 
stages often overlap and extend beyond their supposed time frames. For instance, for the first 
stage, i.e. the ‘practical’ applications of and reactions to Fanon’s thought, Gordon et al. list 
Castro, Che Guevara, Paulo Freire, Hannah Arendt etc. To this list, from around that same time 
period, we can safely add Amilcar Cabral, Steve Biko, Martin Luther King Jr., Malcolm X, Stokely 
Carmichael, theorists of the Iranian revolution and so. But the applications of Fanon’s thoughts 
still continue as can be observed by the energetic citation of Fanon by activists involved in 
national liberation struggles like that of the Kashmiris, Palestinians or the Eelam Tamils, those 
from the First Nations in Canada, the indigenous communities of Latin America, Maoist radicals 
in India, or even, rather poignantly, Black activists critiquing the dominant culture industry in 
the West.55 Though I would personally prefer the term ‘approaches’ to ‘stages’, as regards 
Fanon studies, I will go with the latter term, largely with the meaning of the former.  
It is worthy of observation that the strongest political and philosophical criticisms of 
Fanon appeared in the first stage – related solely to WOTE. Apart from hostile reactions from 
the French left, right and centre, Fanon’s final work elicited strong responses both from 
Vietnamese Marxist-Leninist Nguyen Nghe and from the liberal political theorist Hannah Arendt. 
While Nghe’s criticism in his article in the journal La Pensee was largely based on Fanon’s 
analysis of class and Fanon’s humanist “idealism” in his perspective of violence, Arendt took on 
Fanon’s articulation of violence placing it in the philosophical tradition of, interestingly, Sorel.56 
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In her remarkable work On Violence where she attempts to address the subject and debates 
around it in the 20th Century, Arendt is deeply concerned about the manner in which violence is 
addressed by Fanon, though she finds the Sartrean perspective even more disturbing. While it 
can be criticized that Arendt refers only to WOTE she clarifies in her book that this is so owing to 
WOTE’s “great influence on the present student generation.”57 She immediately adds that 
“Fanon himself, however, is much more doubtful about violence than his admirers.” While 
arguing that Sartre’s preface was on par with Fanon’s “worst rhetorical excesses” and making a 
general condemnation of Sorel, Sartre and Fanon for “irresponsible grandiose statements” 
Arendt also notes that Fanon was to closer reality than other theorists.58 
Second Stage 
 
For the second stage, comprising of “biographical writings”, Gordon et al. cite David Caute, 
Peter Geismar and Irene Gendzier.59 British author David Caute’s short biography Frantz Fanon, 
published in 1970, is the first biography of Fanon. Meant to be a concise profile of Fanon, Caute 
implicitly places Fanon in the Enlightenment tradition, making reference to the Jacobinism in his 
writings. Likewise to Caute, to whom Fanon was an “intransigent revolutionary idealist”, there 
are three successive Fanons “the de-alienated man (Black Skin, White Masks), the free citizen of 
Algeria (Studies in a Dying Colonialism), and the socialist revolutionary (The Wretched of the 
Earth).”60 Caute also identifies a dialectical synthesis between the Fanon of BSWM and the 
Fanon of WOTE in that “The young Fanon was a professional psychiatrist with strong political 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Hegel and Marx with respect to his philosophical conception of violence, completely omitting Sartre. 
Likewise, in a more recent article in the Human Architecture special issue on Fanon, George Ciccareiello-
Maher builds an intellectual dialogue between Fanon and Sorel. See “To Lose Oneself in the Absolute: 
Revolutionary Subjectivity in Sorel and Fanon”, Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-
Knowledge, V, Special Double-Issue, summer 2007, p101-112. It would be an interesting study, since none 
to my knowledge has been made on the same, to attempt a dialogue between Fanon and Sartre’s 
articulation of violence and Slavoj Zizek’s controversial thesis in Violence: Six Sideways Reflections.  
57 Hannah Arendt, On Violence, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1969, p14 
58 Ibid, p20. However, to Cesaire who was writing soon after Fanon’s death, Fanon’s violence was that of 
a non-violent man “it was the violence of justice, purity, of intransigence.” Cited in David Caute, Frantz 
Fanon, New York: Viking Press, 1970, p85 
59 For an intense first-hand account of Fanon’s temperament and his Rome meeting with Sartre, see 
Simone de Beauvoir’s Force of Circumstance, translated from French by Richard Howard, Middlesex: 
Penguin Books, 1968, p605-611. In Beauvoir’s opinion, Sartre was in complete agreement with Fanon’s 
WOTE which was “an extreme, total, incendiary, but at the same time complex and subtle manifesto of 
the ‘Rest of the World’.” 
60 Caute, Frantz Fanon, p31 
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and racial conviction; the mature Fanon was a revolutionary whose perception of the human 
consequences of collective violence was enriched by his knowledge of psychiatry.”61 Caute, 
rather correctly observing that Fanon’s influence and reputation were largely built on WOTE, 
criticizes that work for its “sweeping generalization” especially as regards topics like violence, 
the peasantry, the lumpen-proletariat etc. However, Caute’s conclusion on Fanon based on his 
reading of the latter is poignantly relevant to how the thinker can be seen and how he can be 
interpreted, and worth quoting at large.  
 
Fanon was a socialist; an enemy of capitalism, colonialism and neo-colonialism; a 
revolutionary; an anti-racist who believed in the efficacy and humanist value of violent 
counter-assertion; an opponent of authoritarian and elitist government, whatever its 
nominal label; and a champion of the poorest men on earth, the peasants of the Third 
World. He was not a racist. Although his experiences, the agonies and humiliations of 
his own life, undoubtedly ‘belong’ to the black people, his social philosophy is available 
to black and white people alike. He denounced Europe’s record and Europe’s applied 
values in the period of capitalist imperialism, but he did so in terms of concepts of the 
European revolutionary tradition. There are no total hiatuses in ideological 
development, each new movement has roots in the old. Fanon added to that tradition 
and enriched it.62  
 
Geismar’s Fanon: the Revolutionary as Prophet; a Biography, published the very next 
year, as the title would suggest, is a eulogy to Fanon at best. Incidentally, Geismar died within a 
year of the publication of what would be his life’s work on Fanon. While providing some 
interesting information around Fanon’s life, including about the level of his interest and 
involvement with revolutionary movements in Africa (terming Fanon a ‘Pan-Africanist’), his 
interactions with other leaders, his work as a psychiatrist, the CIA’s interest in Fanon etc., 
Geismar’s account sadly has many things wanting with respect to the intellectual profile he 
creates of Fanon. Besides some obvious errors like reading a strong Jungian influence in Fanon’s 
thoughts, he also seems to draw a binary between an earlier non-violent Fanon of BSWM and 
the later violent Fanon of WOTE. According to Geismar, Fanon "was by no means an apostle of 
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violence when he left for North Africa in 1953; it was the violence of the French in Algeria that 
pushed him into this pattern of thought."63 
Biographical interest in Fanon has not subsided even after the blossoming of the fifth 
stage of Fanon studies.64 The dawn of the millennium saw three biographies on Fanon. David 
Macey’s Frantz Fanon: A Life published in 2000, the most extensive biography on Fanon 
produced till date, Alice Cherki’s Frantz Fanon: A Portrait, originally published in French in 2000, 
in my opinion the most intensive biography on Fanon produced, and Patrick Ehlen’s Frantz 
Fanon: A Spiritual Biography published in the same year.  
Not much can be commented about Ehlen’s work, which, much like Geismar, is largely 
concerned with Fanon’s life than his thoughts. In a rare passage commenting on Fanon’s 
intellectual foundations, Ehlen remarks that Nietzsche topped Fanon’s list of favourite 
philosophers in that “Nietzsche’s description of the transcendent potential of the human will fit 
perfectly with Fanon’s ideas about the vital importance of his own will.”65 Further, Nietzsche’s 
model of free spirit was “desperately needed” by Fanon “who suffered from feelings of 
weakness and helplessness in the face of a system of society he could not change, an outward 
commitment to and display of strength and purpose was his only viable means to rise above 
defeat and regain confidence in his own spiritual nature.” Though Fanon did have an eclectic 
taste in his study of philosophy and literature, I fail to understand through which reading of any 
of Fanon’s texts Ehlen arrived at such a conclusion. Rather ironically, the blurb in the back-cover 
of Ehlen’s work on Fanon, claims that “Patrick Ehlen offers a Fanon of exceptional depth and 
dimension” in the supposedly “groundbreaking debut biography.” If anything, Ehlen’s and 
Geismar’s works on Fanon are interesting coffee-time reads for those interested in exotic 
hitherto unknown aspects of the thinker’s life.66 But as far as the appraisal of Fanon’s 
theoretical contributions are concerned, they inform us much less than the 116 page biography 
by David Caute.  
                                                          
63 Peter Geismar, Fanon: The Revolutionary as Prophet; a Biography, New York: Dial Press, 1971, p190 
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As far as biographies on Fanon go, it would be wise to place the works of Alice Cherki 
and David Macey in the same category as Irene Gendzier’s rigorous work Frantz Fanon: A 
Critical Study. The three books, besides being critically acclaimed biographies of Fanon, are also 
attempts at studying the intellectual history of their subject, with Gendzier’s Frantz Fanon of 
1973 being the first of its kind. Gendzier, tracing the development of Fanon’s intellectual 
development through both an extensive reading of Fanon’s corpus and first hand interactions 
with those who were closely associated with Fanon, differs with the earlier mentioned views of 
Caute and Geismar on the rupture between BSWM and WOTE, pleading instead to take note of 
a fundamental humanist continuity throughout Fanon’s works. For instance, her argument that 
Fanon was consistent on the subject of national culture from BSWM to WOTE and that, “the 
material added at the end of The Wretched of the Earth was an elaboration of those earlier 
discussions.”67  
Claiming to offer “an interpretative study of Fanon’s writings” while seeking to “go 
beyond Fanon to an investigation of selected themes raised in his work”, Gendzier makes a 
daring claim that Fanon was “far more critical in his assessment of the identity of the oppressed 
than some of those who claim to speak in his name.”68 It is this observation, and this critical 
reading of Fanon’s texts, that brings her to conclude that differing from Cesaire, Damas and 
Senghor, who, despite their differences in approaches to Negritude, stood together as to its 
function and potential, “Fanon recognized the historic importance of negritude and admitted its 
powerful personal effect, but he eventually took a strong position against it.”69 Gendzier, credits 
this to both the Sartrean influence on Fanon as well as the latter’s desire to choose a 
universalism as opposed to narrow particularisms. Sadly, this is a point ignored by a legion of 
Fanon scholars.  
Gendzier observes both a Hegelian as well as a Sartrean influence on Fanon. Besides her 
observation that Fanon’s texts reveal a dose of Hegelian and Sartrean language and concepts, 
she also argues with great merit that Fanon’s analysis of the existential condition of Blacks and 
the colonized have in turn contributed to enriching of Hegelian and Sartrean thought. Her take 
on Fanon’s conceptualization of violence, contrasting his theory with that of Sorel and 
defending it against ‘practical accusations’ by the Vietnamese communist Nguyen Nghe, is 
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interesting for the claim that Fanon placed violence in the ambit of “work” by the colonized. 
That is, anti-colonialist violence, an “absolute praxis”, was work by itself.70  
In the same spirit as Gendzier, David Macey calls for a more nuanced understanding not 
just of Fanon’s engagement with identity politics, but of Fanon’s identity as such. “Over seventy 
years after his death, Fanon remains a surprisingly enigmatic and elusive figure. Whether he 
should be regarded as a ‘Martinican’, ‘Algerian’ ‘French’ or simply ‘Black’ is not a question that 
can be decided easily.”71 He criticizes, and quite legitimately, the ‘Third Worldist’ appropriations 
of Fanon that take only the explosive exhortations in WOTE but ignore the arguments in BSWM 
and the post-colonialist readings that focus largely on the latter text, while scrupulously 
avoiding the question of violence critically expounded in the former. “The Third Worldist Fanon 
was an apocalyptic creature; the post-colonial Fanon worries about identity politics, and often 
about his own sexual identity, but he is no longer angry. And yet, if there is a truly Fanonian 
emotion, it is anger. His anger was a response to his experience of a black man in a world 
defined as white, but not to the ‘fact’ of his blackness. It was a response to the condition and 
situation of those he called the wretched of the earth,” Macey states, lamenting the various 
inversions and perversions of Fanon.72 In the tones of Gendzier’s understanding of Fanon’s 
understanding of Negritude, Macey interprets the conclusion of BSWM not as a plea for racial 
equality but rather “a Sartrean bid for total freedom as a radicalized consciousness leaps into a 
future and escapes all ethnic determinations.”73 
Macey’s Fanon emerges most strongly as a political theorist aiming to construct a 
philosophy of universal solidarity with the ‘Wretched of the Earth’ and the author argues 
against reading a Negritude supporter, a phenomenologist, or a psychoanalyst in Fanon. David 
Macey, along with Caute who preceded him, and several Fanon scholars like Reiland Rabaka or 
Nigel Gibson who followed him, arrives at the conclusion that Fanon was trying to arrive at a 
sociogenic explanation of phenomena. While placing Fanon’s corpus in the context of his life, 
his social activities and his commitments, the political atmosphere, Macey is careful not to 
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provide a reductionist or determinist reading of Fanon’s texts. While the details of the Algerian 
war for independence provided would appeal to students of Algerian history, Macey’s 
penetrating criticism of Fanon’s understanding of women’s liberation would greatly interest a 
feminist reading of Fanon.  
Among other subjects, Alice Cherki’s A Portrait of Frantz Fanon calls not just for a 
greater moderation in interpreting Fanon’s erudite exposition of violence, but also to recognize 
the thinker’s contributions to psychiatry, psychoanalysis, cultural anthropology and culture 
studies, and linguistics. The fact that Cherki, an Algerian psychiatrist politically involved in the 
Algerian liberation struggle, knew Fanon personally and, by her own admission, worked closely 
with him from 1955 to 1961, gives her account of Fanon an intensity that surpasses other 
biographical accounts of the man. Cherki quotes Fanon from a conversation that he had with a 
friend – “One should not relate one’s past, but stand as a testimony to it”.74 Her account of 
Fanon tries to remain faithful to that sentiment.  
An interesting fact that Cherki provides her readers is about a book proposal of Fanon 
that never took off owing to his demise. Fanon had apparently created an outline of the book 
project, and the last chapter was to be “Negritude and Black-African Civilization, an Illusion.”75 
While Cherki takes into account Fanon’s criticism of Negritude and his intellectual interactions 
with Sartre, she is also quick to criticize the latter for the foreword to WOTE arguing that he had 
“distorted Fanon’s tone and intention” through his justification of violence while Fanon had 
only considered it a necessary phase.76 Commenting about the period succeeding Fanon’s 
death, Cherki laments the misuse of ‘Fanonism’.  
 
The term “Fanonism” that was increasingly being bandied about was, if anything, a 
mislabelling of his work; his writings were increasingly associated with the importance 
of spontaneous movements, the idealization of rural, peasant masses and their 
assimilation of a Maoist model, and subverted as an apology for violence. The label was 
also a kind of shorthand for humanist idealism, an ideology whose time had passed.77  
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Indeed, a reader can observe that the theme of violence in Fanon’s works is the theme 
that Cherki takes great effort to re-address in her biography.  
Fanon’s biographers mentioned above, different though their choice of historical facts 
from Fanon’s life and interpretations of the same may be, have a few things in common. All 
recognize an underlying essence of universalist humanism in Fanon. All identify Fanon’s critical 
engagement with and criticism of Negritude. And all (maybe with the sole exception of Ehlen 
who seems to find the source of Fanon’s ‘spirituality’ elsewhere), without fail, take into account 
the deep impact of Sartrean philosophy on Fanon.  
Third Stage 
 
The third stage in Fanon studies involves theoretical assessments of Fanon’s works and 
considerations of his contributions to theory as such. The first in this would be Renate Zahar’s 
Frantz Fanon: Colonialism and Alienation originally published in 1974. Approaching Fanon from 
a Marxist-sociological perspective, Zahar’s primary object of inquiry in Fanon’s thoughts is his 
evaluation of alienation within a system of colonialism. Thereby, while being a decent study of 
the topic in itself, she leaves little clues on how this evaluation could be applied to a context 
beyond colonialism. She seeks to find a theory of alienation and emancipation based on Marxist 
premises in Fanon, comparing and contrasting him with the movements in Cuba and China, and 
failing to find it, criticizes Fanon for his ‘fault’. This, of course, is that sin of ‘mythology of 
doctrines’ that Skinner warned against – that of seizing on “some doctrine that a given theorist 
ought to have mentioned, although they failed to do so, and then to criticise them for their 
incompetence.”78 While Zahar, similar to Arendt, traces Fanon’s conceptualization of violence to 
Sorel rather than Sartre, she is  however correct to observe that Fanon’s engagement with 
Negritude was mediated by a Sartrean understanding and that “Fanon’s approach in analysing 
the mechanisms of racial discrimination and its ideological function in the process of colonial 
exploitation is similar to Sartre’s.”79 
Following on her heels, Emmanuel Hansen’s Frantz Fanon: Social and Political Thought 
claims to provide "clear understanding of Fanon's thought, based on a study of the totality of his 
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ideas, using the entire corpus of his writings."80 Ironically, while lamenting the abstractness or 
simplicity of some aspects of Fanon’s thoughts, Hansen himself places abstract concepts in 
Fanon’s mouth. For instance, Hansen argues that “Fanon regards freedom as man’s supreme 
goal. And the whole purpose of man’s existence is to realize this goal”, without clarifying what 
was Fanon’s idea of freedom or what was the intellectual tradition that Fanon derived from in 
arriving at this idea. Hansen finally concludes that Fanon’s ideal society was a blend of 
Rousseauian and Marxist utopia.81   
Hansen in general notes that Fanon’s decisions in life were not determined by his skin 
colour or by a fixed identity but rather on the basis of political understanding. Echoing such a 
sentiment, Richard C. Onwuanibe’s Fanon comes out as the protagonist of a “genuinely 
universalist humanism”, who places a dialectical tension between humanism and instrumental 
violence. Onwuanibe further identifies as features of Fanon’s humanism human dignity or 
recognition, freedom, a search for justice, love and peace, a universalist character, the 
emergence of a new man, and a dialectical character, concluding using a Hegelian paradigm that 
the final stage of Fanon’s revolutionary humanism “attempts to resolve the contradictions of 
the colonial or oppressive system.”82 
We can notice another error of the ‘mythology of doctrines’ being made by authors 
who have sought to analyse Fanon from different theoretical perspectives, namely “converting 
some scattered or incidental remarks by a classic theorist into their ‘doctrine’ on one of the 
expected themes.”83 Marie Perinbam’s work is an apt example of this error. Her work, Holy 
Violence: The Revolutionary Thought of Frantz Fanon, which for some reason has not been cited 
or critiqued by many authors after her, is probably the only work that deals exclusively with 
Fanon’s conceptualization of violence – and ends up as a gross misinterpretation. While 
correctly noting that Fanon grappled with the subject of violence even in BSWM, she argues, 
without any concrete evidence or argument, that Fanon drew heavily from Marx and Sartre “for 
the philosophical script for holy violence.”84 Reading a Sorelian “myth” of violence in Fanon, she 
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paints a picture of him as the perfect ideologue of the jihadist, with a bizarre conclusion that 
Fanon’s theory of holy violence became “a metaphor for the unbeatable combination of 
scientific law and religious faith.”85 All this when Fanon has not mentioned the term ‘holy 
violence’ anywhere in his works. 
Of similar error is political scientist L. Adele Jinadu, who configures Fanon as a Marxist-
Leninist, an unorthodox one albeit. To Jinadu, “What Fanon has done is to adopt Marxist-
Leninist conceptions of society, state and revolution to the concrete historical reality of Algeria 
and, by extension, the rest of Africa and the colonized world.”86 While placing and analyzing 
Fanon’s concept of violence in a Marxist-Leninist paradigm, Jinadu notes that the topic of 
violence was the main point of convergence between Fanon and Sartre,87 qualifying his 
argument by adding that Sartre endorsed WOTE to the point of distortion. Likewise, to Jinadu 
there is an uneasy combination of ethical relativism and ethical universalism in Fanon, owing 
largely to the “methodological individualism” he adopts and his belief in “certain universal 
norms”.88 
The newest addition in the third stage would be Routledge Critical Thinkers Series book 
Frantz Fanon authored by Indian academic Pramod K. Nayar. The author terms Fanon a 
“postcolonial humanist”, arguing that despite dealing with violence, decolonization and race, 
Fanon had an overriding concern of humanism, that his arguments are not restricted to the 
colonial context alone, and that Fanon moves beyond the native and the national towards 
universals.89 Asserting that Fanon was imagining and forging a new humanism, Nayar argues 
that Fanon’s existential emphasis on radical freedom taken from Sartre makes him ideologically 
depart from Negritude and Cesaire. While Nayar mostly places Fanon in the postcolonial 
intellectual tradition, his observations on the relations between Fanon, identity and violence are 
worthy of consideration.  
According to Nayar “violence in Fanon is always the route to self-determination and 
identity formation”90 further arguing that in the Fanonian schema, while instrumental violence 
sought to re-establish the cultural identity of the colonized which the colonial system had 
erased, absolute violence sought the retrieval of a Self that had been buried by the political 
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agents of the same system. Defending Fanon from critics who sought to portray him as an 
apologist of violence, Nayar argues that Fanon doesn’t stress violence for itself but that “He 
treats violence as restitution, a response and a liberatory force through which the oppressed 
colonized can express himself.”91 Nayar’s Fanon was a universalist who was not into the 
particularisms of identity but called for an ethical recognition of identity, respecting difference 
without homogenizing it, and whose fundamental politics was “Building solidarities on the basis 
of a shared history of suffering – no matter what your racial-ethnic-national identity might 
be.”92 
Though Gordon et al have not done so, I think it is apt to place feminist assessments of 
Fanon in the third stage. In one of the most scathing attacks on Fanon, Sri Lankan academic 
Qadri Ismail argues that a gendered critique of Fanon is imperative because of the influence of 
his texts “in some killing fields of the third world.”93 In an obvious case of the Skinnerian error of 
‘mythology of doctrines’, Ismail, drawing an comparison between the gender perspectives of 
Fanon and the Tamil Tigers’ insurgency in the island of Sri Lanka, claims that the essential 
militarism and perspective of violence in Fanon makes him link “nationalism, patriarchy and 
(revolutionary) violence” and that the commonality between Fanon and the LTTE was that for 
both “the native with agency is male and violent.”94 
In similar spirit, but crediting Fanon for being “exemplary” in recognizing the 
importance of the gender dimension in nationalism, Anne McClintock argues that for Fanon, 
women’s agency is agency by designation. “It makes its appearance not as a direct political 
relation to the revolution but as a mediated, domestic relation to a man”.95 Likewise, focusing 
solely on BSWM, Gwen Bergner accuses Fanon of heteronormativity, for overlooking female 
subjectivity and for rendering women in general as “subjects almost exclusively in terms of their 
sexual relationships with men.”96  
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Rita Faulkner, comparing and contrasting Fanon with Algerian activist Assia Djebar, 
offers a more nuanced gendered reading of Fanon. Taking Fanon’s essay “Algeria Unveiled” as 
her point of departure, Faulkner argues that Fanon’s prioritization of the revolutionary 
decolonization of Algeria led him to give secondary importance to addressing native patriarchal 
structures and viewing the veil of Algerian women as “instrumental” in the struggle, adding that 
this gap is filled by Djebar who builds on Fanon to depenetrate, decolonize and depatriachalize 
the Algerian female mind and body.97 
It is worthy here to consider Denean Sharpley-Whiting’s work Frantz Fanon: Conflicts 
and Feminisms which is both a feminist appraisal of Fanon’s works, which places it in the third 
stage, as well as the utilization of Fanonism for feminist study, which places it in the fifth stage 
too. She argues that rather than speak of Fanon as a feminist - implicitly also arguing that rather 
than criticize Fanon for not living up to particular feminist standards - it is more appropriate “to 
speak of Fanon’s radically humanist profeminist consciousness. This consciousness is guided by 
Fanon’s envisioning of women’s liberation from the confines of repressive patriarchal traditions, 
and his advocacy of women’s movement from objects to subjects of history... however, it 
transcends, as does the bulk of his writings, the specificities of the Algerian, sub-Saharan, and 
Martiniquan experiences.”98 
Apart from the major works mentioned above, Fanon has been studied under Hegelian, 
Marxian, Deleuzian, humanist, Sartrean, Africana, and other theoretical frameworks in a wide 
range of academic articles. But Fanon’s legacy became a bone of contention following his 
appropriation by the postcolonial studies scholars. 
Fourth Stage 
 
A general summary of the different ways in which Fanon has been used by postcolonialists has 
been provided in Henry Louis Gates’ popular essay “Critical Fanonism”. Terming Fanon a 
‘Rashomon-like’ character and a ‘Rorschach blot on legs’, Gates outlines the appropriations of 
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Fanon by Homi Bhabha, Edward Said, Benita Parry, Gayatri Spivak, Abdul JanMohammed and so 
on.  Disagreeing with Said and Bhabha, whom Gates accuses of the attempt to frame Fanon as a 
global theorist, Gates concludes that reading Fanon requires an acknowledgement of his 
historical particularity and to not “elevate him above his localities of discourse as a 
transcultural, transhistorical Global Theorist, nor simply to cast him into battle, but to recognize 
him as a battlefield in himself.”99  
Gates is particularly irked by Edward Said to whom both Fanon and Cesaire, “jab directly 
at the question of identity and of identitarian thought, that secret sharer of present 
anthropological reflection on "otherness" and "difference."”100 According to Said, both Fanon 
and Cesaire required a rejection of fixed ideas of settled identity and culturally authorized 
definition.101 Benita Parry also takes issue with this contention, albeit from a different angle. To 
Parry, the task of postcolonial theory is “to address the empowering effects of constructing a 
coherent identity or of cherishing and defending against calumniation altered and mutable 
indigenous forms, which is not the same as the hopeless attempt to locate and revive pristine 
pre-colonial culture”, citing Cesaire and Fanon as examples.102 Parry further suggests, in an 
implicit dig at Said, that “the appointment of Fanon as exemplar of anticolonial theory liberated 
from identitarian thinking should be qualified” since his voyages into Negritude cannot be 
avoided.103  
It is interesting to note that quite some of those who have inferred a support for 
nativism in Fanon’s writings have fallen back on Spivak’s idea of “strategic essentialism”, or the 
postulation of a theoretical essence as a manoeuvre to bring out a sharp contrast between two 
or more points-of-view, to support themselves – while Spivak herself has claimed in the recent 
past that she has thoroughly repudiated that idea.104 Likewise, as a sort of a rejoinder to both 
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Gates and Parry, Neil Lazarus, invoking Fanon, argues that “From the standpoint of 
postcolonialism, it is today impossible to think about politics without invoking the category of 
universality. For in the postcolonial world-system, experience is multiply overdetermined, and 
not least by imperialism itself. Social identity has become world-historical in its constitution.”105  
Fanon has been used by a variety of Indian postcolonial theorists and subaltern studies 
scholars, including Spivak, Dipesh Chakravarti, Partha Chatterjee, Gyan Prakash, Ranjana Khanna 
etc. largely in the analysis of ‘colonial discourse’ and Indian anti-colonial movements. But from 
among all these names, there is none to rival Homi Bhabha considering the passion with which 
he uses Fanon and considering the extent to which he has pushed Fanon in the broader 
postcolonial school.  
Homi Bhabha, is well known for his usage of the concept of “mimicry” in understanding 
identity formation processes under colonialism. Sourcing his arguments chiefly to Lacan and (a 
Lacanian version of) Fanon, he argues “colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, 
recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite. Which is 
to say, that the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence; in order to be 
effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference.”106 Here 
Fanon is a tool to understand psychological (primarily) and political (secondarily) processes 
under colonialism.  
Bhabha asks “Why invoke Frantz Fanon today, quite out of historical context?”107 in a 
paper presented at a conference in 1995, providing some insights on Fanonian understanding of 
identity in the context of colonialism and colonialism oriented racism. But he fails to answer his 
original question apart from a suggestion that Fanon offers “the possibility of thinking our way 
towards a national-internationalism”.108 With respect to Fanon studies, Bhabha is also known 
for his prefaces to BSWM and WOTE which also provide some idea of how Fanon was taken in 
the postcolonial school. The Fanon presented is an explorer of psycho-affective effects of 
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colonialism. The presence of a master narrative or a totalizing theme in Fanon’s works is 
questioned, challenged or denied. In his foreword to the 1986 English edition of BSWM, Bhabha 
writes “Fanon is not principally posing the question of political oppression as the violation of a 
human essence, although he lapses into such a lament in his more existential moment.”109  
Similar sentiments echo in his foreword to the 2004 English translation of WOTE where 
he argues that Fanonian violence “is part of a struggle for psycho-affective survival and a search 
for human agency in the midst of the agony of oppression.”110 Bhabha, who is ambivalent, to 
use his own term, on Fanon’s articulation of violence, gives a too general overview of the 
appropriation of Fanon’s arguments on violence by activists in identitarian movements across 
the world. What he fails to do, however, is to identify whether Fanonism can be a tool for 
viewing and analysing such movements.  
Fifth Stage 
 
Nigel Gibson, while lauding Bhabha and his invention of a ‘new Fanon’ for having “re-vamped 
the status of Frantz Fanon in the academy and opened up whole new areas of study”, he also 
contends that Bhabha’s privileging of the Lacanian Fanon has lead to “clever readings which 
privilege psychoanalytical moves and points of ambivalence, but which have in the main 
produced a very one-sided Fanon.”111 Gibson who takes Bhabha to task for ignoring and 
obfuscating the concrete political aspects of Fanon, criticizes “This postcolonial sensibility which 
names Fanon’s work a “classic” also has a price. For Fanon is now situated as a “founding 
father” of academic postcolonial theory, a relic from a previous age rather than a living thinker, 
revered and important but somewhat naïve.”112  
Starkly differing from Bhabha, Gibson presents a humanist analysis and version of 
Fanon. Along with his influential work Fanon: The Postcolonial Imagination published in 2003 
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and numerous academic articles on Fanonism, he edited Rethinking Fanon: The Continuing 
Dialogue in 1999 and Living Fanon: Global Perspectives in 2011, both compiling diverse views on 
Fanon and his application to the social sciences. Likewise, he has also used Fanonism as a 
theoretical framework to analyse developments in post-apartheid South Africa in Fanonian 
Practices in South Africa: from Steve Biko to Abahlali baseMjondolo published in 2011.113 In 
Gibson’s works in general, Fanon is not just studied, but he is studied with.  
Positively referring to the engagement with Fanon’s idea of ‘lived experience’ by 
scholars like Lewis Gordon and Ato Sekyi-Otu, he also recognizes the shortcomings in The 
Postcolonial Imagination. “For Fanon, the issue was not simply to describe the world of 
experience. What needed to be overturned was the situation itself, and in doing so the 
protagonist could become self-determining.”114 Further elaborating on Fanonist understanding 
of the construction of Black identity, Gibson also analyses Fanon’s utilization of violence. 
Criticizing critics who consider Fanon an ‘apostle of violence’, Gibson makes strong arguments 
in favour of the Fanonist problematization of the role that violence plays in national liberation 
and identity formation. Terming the Fanonist project a “new humanism”,115 this work of Gibson 
is an important contribution in the fifth stage on Fanon studies.  
Of the literature in the 5th stage that has been produced on Fanonist idea of violence, 
most have been generally sympathetic to his framing of the argument that violence is 
emancipatory in the colonial context and pleading for a deeper study into Fanon’s nuanced 
arguments on violence. Gibson, for instance, argues that Fanon does not take violence as an 
absolute, as an end in itself, but rather is aware that “While violence is necessary for the 
destruction of colonialism and inferiority complexes, it is not a sufficient condition for the 
development of a new humanity.”116 Providing his interpretation of the possible intentions 
Fanon might have had in writing violence the way he did, Gibson very briefly problematizes 
Fanon’s arguments on the forging of a common identity through violence.  
The inauguration of the fifth stage in the academia opened up several fields in which 
Fanonian methods of enquiry were applied. Jock McCulloch’s Black Soul, White Artifact: Fanon's 
Clinical Psychology and Social Theory and Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan’s Fanon and the Psychology 
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of Oppression both study ethnopsychiatry and psychological trauma in the context of 
colonialism, critically deploying Fanonist framework. McCulloch’s simplistic claims, for instance, 
that negritude, ethnopsychiatry and African socialism constituted the three main paradigms of 
Fanon’s thoughts, or that Fanon grew increasingly sympathetic to Negritude owing to the 
influence of Sartre, or his conclusive statement right at the beginning of the book that WOTE 
was not a guide to revolutionary action but rather “a panegyric to the inevitable failure of the 
African revolution”,117 is probably the reason why his work was left out of the fifth stage. 
However, McCulloch’s presentation of some rare professional psychiatric papers of Fanon 
would interest those keen on studying Fanon’s contributions to clinical psychiatry. On the other 
hand, Bulhan provides a virile and nuanced account of Fanon’s contributions to the 
deconstruction of the psychological malaise under the colonial system.  
Lewis Gordon and Reiland Rabaka, leading proponents of Africana philosophy, place 
Fanon’s ideology in that tradition. According to Gordon, Africana thought “refers to an area of 
thought that focuses on theoretical questions raised by struggles over ideas in African cultures 
and their hybrid and creolized forms in Europe, North America, Central and South America, and 
the Caribbean. Africana thought also refers to the set of questions raised by the historical 
project of conquest and colonization that has emerged since 1492 and the subsequent struggles 
for emancipation that continue to this day.”118 Rabaka, putting Fanon in the midst of the 
conceptual and methodological framework of Africana critical theory, argues that its 
preoccupation is “synthesizing classical and contemporary black radical theory with black 
revolutionary praxis”119 and that its primary focus revolves around “the search for solutions to 
the most pressing social and political problems in continental and diasporan African life-worlds 
and lived-experiences in the present age.”120  Other major works on the subject include 
Gordon’s An Introduction to Africana Philosophy, Charles F. Peterson’s DuBois, Fanon, Cabral: 
The Margins of Elite Anti-Colonial Leadership, and Rabaka’s Africana Critical Theory: 
Reconstructing The Black Radical Tradition, From W. E. B. Du Bois and C. L. R. James to Frantz 
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Fanon and Amilcar Cabral. Gordon’s Fanon and the Crisis of European Man: An Essay on 
Philosophy and the Human Science, is an excellent attempt at a critique of continental 
philosophy, especially the existentialist and phenomenological variant, through an engagement 
with Fanon.   
 It should be noted here that the philosophers in the Africana School in general view 
Sartre’s appraisal of Negritude in BO with hostility and interpret Fanon to be having the same 
approach. It can however be questioned with what legitimacy do the Africana philosophers 
position Fanon in their paradigm given that Fanon never himself did so, nor ever gave a clue of 
doing so.  Given the broad mapping of interests of Africana thought that Gordon and Rabaka lay 
out, they could easily argue that Fanon’s location(s) and culture(s) place him in the ambit of 
their philosophy. I argue that this cardinal error of placing an original thinker inside a 
philosophical tradition that was devised by others, just because it shares some commonalities of 
interests, given the fact that the thinker gave no indication in his essential thoughts that he was 
clearly moving in that direction, distorts the full potential of that thinker’s thoughts. Mao was a 
Marxist. Marx was not a Maoist. Fanon’s thoughts may definitely be used to strengthen Africana 
philosophy. But Fanon was not an Africana philosopher concerned with strengthening a broad 
‘black radical theory’. That runs against the very essence of his thoughts.  
An interesting perspective on the theme of Fanon’s articulation of violence as the 
political is provided by Vivaldi Jean-Marie in Fanon: Collective Ethics and Humanism. Comparing 
WOTE with Carl Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political, the author notes how violence and the 
presence/imagination of an enemy other creates a sense of collective ethics. Likewise, while the 
sketching out of similarities in Fanon and Schmitt is novel, the author restricts his case study to 
Fanon’s identification of the ‘internal other’, that is, the urban elite national bourgeoisie, and 
not the colonial Other. In Jean-Marie’s analysis of Fanon, “The realization that the enemy of 
national freedom and the revival traditional culture is not necessarily the European has both a 
political and existential impact”, arguing that this realization breaks the Manichean 
classifications of black and white. 121  This observation will be of much use in the case study of 
EV Ramasamy, where again, the Other was an ‘internal other’, the brahmin castes, and not the 
colonial Other.  
While Fanon has been used by scholars to study identitarian movements in particular, 
almost all in the context of colonialism and anti-Black racism, Sonia Kruks attempts to bring out 
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Fanon – taken along with Sartre – as a general theorist/critic of identity politics. With an 
understanding of identity politics that it demands for recognition “on the basis of the very 
grounds on which it has previously been denied”122, she presents Fanon as a part-defender part-
critic of identity. She brings out Fanon’s observation that to affirm, express, or celebrate one’s 
identity can be psychologically empowering but affirmation of identity alone is not to change 
the world.123 Wallerstein too argues from a similar premise. According to him, “Fanon is very 
critical of any attempt to assert cultural identity that is independent of, not located within, the 
political struggle for national liberation.”124 In similar vein, Richard Pithouse, who considers 
Fanon “a revolutionary humanist primarily drawing on and taking forward Sartrean 
existentialism and Marxism”, portrays him as a humanist thinker concerned with immanence 
over transcendental idealism, who took no identity category as fixed.125  
The fifth stage saw the blossoming of quite some interesting compilations of 
interdisciplinary essays that took Fanonian thought as the framework for critical analysis. 
Besides the works of Gordon et al and Nigel Gibson mentioned above, Frantz Fanon: Critical 
Perspectives edited by Anthony C. Alessandrini, Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin White Masks: New 
Interdisciplinary Essays edited by Max Silverman, Fanon and the Decolonization of Philosophy 
edited by Elizabeth A. Hoppe and Tracey Nicholls, Fanon and Education: Thinking Through 
Pedagogical Possibilities edited by George J. Sefa Dei and Marlon Simmons, have used Fanonism 
to analyze identity (almost always the Black-White binary or the colonizer-colonized one), 
racism, anti-Semitism, gender and sexuality, love, violence, intellectual commitment, diaspora 
studies, critical pedagogy and so on.    
The Human Architecture Journal’s special double issue on Frantz Fanon in 2007 also 
covers a wide range of topics involving the usage of Fanonism to investigate, besides several of 
the above mentioned topics, academic trends, literary, cultural and historical issues, and 
contemporary political events. These include the Iraq War, American ‘neo-colonialism’, the 
human rights abuses in Guantanamo Bay, politics in Haiti, migration, tourism etc.  
Fanon has entered academic dialogue with Hegel, Derrida, Biko, Foucault, Du Bois, 
Richard Wright, Arendt, Luxembourg, Cabral, Sartre, Cesaire, Machiavelli, Bourdieu and others. 
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To my knowledge, the only Indian to have the privilege of such a dialogue with Fanon is 
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi.126 Lewis Gordon, incidentally, begins his ‘Histories of Violence’ 
video presentation on Fanon with a caution against an abstract comparison of Fanon with 
Gandhi.127 
Introducing Caste to Fanon 
 
Given the continuation of such diverse interests in Fanon, the question ‘Is Fanon relevant’ 
seems rather redundant. The more challenging question to ask now will be ‘Where else can 
Fanon be made relevant’. The literature survey gives an idea of the different ways in which 
Fanon’s texts have elicited responses, have been worked upon, and have been put to use. The 
interests in Fanonism’s use can be collapsed into four broad themes.128  
 Critique of (mostly Black and White) identity  
 Critique of violence 
 Critique of colonialism, decolonization, postcolonialism 
 Gender critique 
A variety of topics are covered under these broad themes. Conspicuous by its absence is 
any study of caste in India. Of course, one cannot accuse the Indian postcolonial academics who 
use Fanonism that they should have covered caste too, even after considering the continuing 
prevalence of caste based oppression and discrimination in the country – a scholar should have 
that much freedom to ignore the topics that are of no concern to his/her academic project. 
Besides, this research is not about debating why caste was not covered in the existing trends 
but rather about finding a way to make Fanon, a revolutionary humanist by many accounts, 
enter into a dialectical conversation with one of the leading social reformers from India whose 
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politics was focused on caste eradication. As a result, my research shall largely rely upon the 
original thoughts in Fanon’s corpus, with minimal references to sources from the fifth stage and 
maybe the third stage. I do not find the literature in the fourth, first or the second stage 
particularly helpful for my project.  
I am tempted, however, to quote Dharmeratnam Sivaram, a Tamil political analyst and 
journalist, who had the following to say on the postcolonial academics from the subcontinent. 
"You know, in our hatred of the West we fail to see a lot of rubbish that comes from our own 
tradition. That’s why I think the subaltern studies people’s writings have become 
pathological."129 
I believe that Fanon would agree to the spirit of this statement.   
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Fanon and Negritude 
Introduction 
 
This part of the research, which attempts to trace the intellectual influences that shaped Frantz 
Fanon’s framing of identity politics, is broadly divided into two sections. The first shall deal with 
Negritude, touching on its portrayal by its chief protagonists Aime Cesaire and Leopold Senghor, 
Sartre’s engagement with the concept through his Black Orpheus (BO), and Fanon’s critique of 
the concept and of Sartre’s understanding of the same through his utilization of ideas espoused 
in BO and Sartre’s Anti-Semite and Jew (ASJ). Fanon’s engagement with Negritude as a political 
idea is important, as the chapter shall seek to show, to understand the why of his identity 
politics and what he seeks to conceptualize as a revolutionary humanist political ideal.    
The overwhelming majority of Fanon scholars tend to trace an explicit contradiction 
between Fanon and Sartre over the subject of Negritude. However, as I seek to prove, Fanon’s 
engagement with Negritude was not one of simple positive appraisal and correspondingly, his 
critique of Sartre’s view on Negritude was not one of point-blank condemnation. Fanon’s 
perspective of Negritude, and his dialogue with Sartre over the latter’s perspective on 
Negritude, shall lead us into, as we shall see later, Fanonist visions on the idea of lived 
experience and shared solidarity, and on the subject of universalism vs. particularism.   
I start with a discussion of Negritude, and how the main proponents of the idea, namely 
Leopold Senghor and Aime Cesaire, conceived it. The two thinkers were themselves not united 
in their vision of Negritude, except for the fact that they felt that a Negro identity deserved 
better recognition than what existed in Francophone societies. Sartre’s controversial 
introduction to an anthology of Negritude poetry, Black Orpheus, was and continues to be a 
subject of much debate. I seek to show how Fanon, contrary to the reading of many scholars, 
was more in line with Sartre’s critique of Negritude. It is this interpretation of Fanon that will 
inform my next chapter on the Fanonian vision of identity politics. 
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Negritude: The idea 
 
Negritude the word was used for the first time by the Antillean intellectual and poet Aime 
Cesaire in a polemical essay against assimilation published in the March 1935 issue of L’etudiant 
noir, a Paris based publication he had co-edited along with the Senegalese Leopold Sedar 
Senghor and the French Guyanese Leon Damas. The word found its first poetic usage in 
Cesaire’s Notebook of a Return to the Native Land (NR), published in 1939. According to Cesaire, 
it was in Haiti “where Negritude rose for the first time and stated that it believed in its humanity 
and the funny little tail of Florida where the strangulation of a nigger is being completed, and 
Africa gigantically caterpillaring up to the Hispanic foot of Europe, its nakedness where death 
scythes widely.”130 The Negro experience, Cesaire appears to argue, is a universally similar 
response of Blacks to a condition of alienation and “measured by the compass of suffering”.131  
Senghor had a similar perspective on Negritude as a sort of a universal human condition 
of Blacks. To him, Negritude was “the sum total of black cultural values”, and his preferred 
English equivalent of the expression was “black personality”.132 But for all its claims to a Black 
universalism, Negritude was in essence a response to the French policy of assimilation during 
the colonial period, championed by Francophone black intellectuals who were responding to a 
situation created by the French.  Spleth is right when she points out that “The phenomenon of 
rediscovering one’s African past occurred almost exclusively among the Francophone African 
students and it has been theorized that the reaction came in part as a response to certain 
defects in French colonial policy such as the failure of the French to educate in their local 
languages or the erroneous assumptions of assimilation, an objective not adopted by the 
British.”133  
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Negritude’s general thrust was in poetry. “Negritude adorns itself with a tragic beauty 
that finds expression only in poetry”134 states Sartre in BO, claiming that Black poetry is the 
most authentic and revolutionary poetry of that age. Poetry was a means for the alienated Black 
to affirm his135 presence as a historical subject through an assertion of his identity from a 
suffering that the Other’s perception of his skin colour has put him in, a way to reclaim his 
human essence. Besides being a negation of White values, it was also a forceful call to the 
White Other to recognize the Black.  “Put up with me. I won’t put up with you.”136 
 
Negritude was also a memory of the Promised Land, the pristine land, the colonized 
land of ancestors, a beautiful Black Africa. 
Naked woman. Black woman  
robed in the color of life, the shape of beauty,  
I bloomed in your shade, and your soft hands  
veiled my eyes.  
Now in the heart of a summer noon, I come upon you,  
Land of Promise,  
high on a sun hill and your beauty  
stops my heart, like the eagle's flash.  
 
Naked woman, fathomless woman  
flesh of ripe fruit, dark ecstasy of dark wines,  
mouth making lyric my mouth,  
savannah of peerless horizons, savannah quaking  
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in the fervent caress of the East Wind,  
sculptured tom-tom  
taut tom-tom  
moaning under the conqueror's fingers  
your full contralto is the sacred chant of the Beloved.137 
 
While Africa was animalized as the ‘dark continent’ in the literature of the colonizers, 
the poets of Negritude humanized the ‘dark continent’ through a positive affirmation of a Black 
civilization, Black values, Black beauty, and Black past.138  According to Nigerian scholar Abiola 
Irele, to whom the themes of Negritude were a counter-movement to the state of dependence 
on the west, “The quest for new values thus leads the black writer to self-definition in terms 
that are non-western, and the association between the black race and Africa acquires a new 
meaning: instead of being a source of shame, it becomes a source of pride. This is the ultimate 
end of negritude, and much of the literature is dedicated to a rehabilitation of Africa, a way of 
refurbishing the image of the black man. The psychological function of this, as well as being a 
counter to the Negro's inferiority complex, is to permit an open and unashamed identification 
with the continent, a poetic sublimation of those associations in the Negro's mind which 
constitute for him a source of mental conflict in his relationship with western culture: a process 
of self-avowal and self-recognition.”139 It can be further inferred from Irele’s arguments that 
Negritude’s racial exaltation of Black Africa is but a defence against the colonial apparatus that 
sought to socially and psychologically inferioritize the Black and that the use of an African myth 
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was “an attempt to recreate an emotional as well as an original bond beneath the contingencies 
of a particularly difficult historical experience.”140  
Negritude’s poetry was essentialist, a sort of essentialism in reverse. Senghor, for 
instance, opines that analytical reason is European while intuitive reason is African, at times 
pushing the argument to say that reason itself is European while emotion is African. According 
to Senghor, the European mind is essentially “static, objective, and dichotomic. It is dualistic in 
that it makes an absolute distinction between body and soul, matter and spirit. It is founded on 
separation and opposition: on analysis and conflict. The African, on the other hand, conceives 
the world, beyond the diversity of its forms, as a fundamentally mobile, yet unique, reality that 
seeks synthesis”.141 
Cesaire too appears to follow this path, questioning European modernity from a ‘Black’ 
perspective. 
those who invented neither powder nor compass 
Those who could harness neither steam nor electricity 
Those who explored neither the seas nor the sky 
But those without whom the earth would not be earth142 
 
and 
Eia for those who never invented anything 
for those who never explored anything 
for those who never conquered anything 
but yield, captivated, to the essence of things 
ignorant to surfaces but captivated by the motion of all things 
indifferent to conquering, but playing the games of the world143 
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Black innocence is contrasted with the maliciousness of White colonial conquest, Black 
affinity to nature with White domination of culture, and a virgin Black premodernity with the 
penetrative and corrupting White modernity. To reject the colonial Other’s discourse, the poet 
of Negritude uses stereotypes created by the Other to define the self. As Cesaire clarifies in an 
interview in 1967 to Rene Depestre, ‘Negritude’ was an act of defiance and the words negre and 
negritude were a violent affirmation of the self in a White world that chose to assimilate the 
Blacks or ignore their contributions in toto.144  
Negritude subverted the French language to bring out as a positive affirmation those 
attributes of the Blacks that were given a negative image by the colonizers, attempting to 
negate the all-consuming White discourse of colonialism. But its excessive reliance on the 
discourse framed by the White Other as a reference point for the Black Self became the subject 
of severe criticism. Renate Zahar argues that “this negative, revolutionary response to 
colonialism is deeply marked by what it rejects: it bears itself racist features... The relativity of 
negritude stems from the fact that it has to rely on the methods of colonial ideology to react 
against it; even in the act of negating colonialism it reproduces its features.”145 The criticism laid 
on Negritude intellectuals also is that they were confining themselves to a narrow particularism.  
However, in the defence of the proponents of Negritude, Irele writes “In their search for 
identity, the adherents of negritude have had to accept and explore to the full their particular 
situation. But, although preoccupied with a sectional and limited interest, they were inspired by 
a universal human need for fulfilment. In this, they have never strayed from the central, 
enduring problem of the human condition.”146 In order for them to embrace universalism 
humanism, the Blacks had to first embrace the particular situation of their racial condition.  
Consider Cesaire’s passionate appeal:  
 
But if someone asks me what my conception of Negritude is, I answer that above all it is 
a concrete rather than an abstract coming to consciousness. What I have been telling 
you about-the atmosphere in which we lived, an atmosphere of assimilation in which 
Negro people were ashamed of themselves-has great importance. We lived in an 
atmosphere of rejection, and we developed an inferiority complex. I have always 
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thought that the black man was searching for his identity. And it has seemed to me that 
if what we want is to establish this identity, then we must have a concrete 
consciousness of what we are-that is, of the first fact of our lives: that we are black; that 
we were black and have a history, a history that contains certain cultural elements of 
great value; and that Negroes were not, as you put it, born yesterday, because there 
have been beautiful and important black civilizations. At the time we began to write, 
people could write a history of world civilization without devoting a single chapter to 
Africa, as if Africa had made no contributions to the world. Therefore we affirmed that 
we were Negroes and that we were proud of it, and that we thought that Africa was not 
some sort of blank page in the history of humanity; in sum, we asserted that our Negro 
heritage was worthy of respect, and that this heritage was not relegated to the past, 
that its values were values that could still make an important contribution to the 
world.147 
 
Cesaire’s Negritude appears a ‘politics of recognition’ in the Taylorian sense, framed for 
a Black as a being-in-the-world who has been denied his due in society and in history. The Black 
seeks, then, not an abstract particularism but a universalism that will recognize his concrete 
particular condition.   
Hear Cesaire: 
for entrenched as I am in this unique race 
you still know my tyrannical love 
you know that it is not from hatred of other races 
that I demand of myself to become a hoer for this unique race 
that what I want 
is for universal hunger 
for universal thirst148 
 
Cesaire is thirsty for, is hungry for, he demands a universalism that will recognize the 
Black as a unique being-in-the-world. The politics, like the poetics, of Negritude is a demand for 
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a multicultural society where Black as a distinct identity, an identity born out of the shared 
experience of suffering, its history, its culture and its values would be respected.  
What would this multicultural society of the future be like and what would be the role 
of the Black in it? In his famous tract Discourse on Colonialism, a work that had a profound 
influence on Fanon, published in 1950, he argues that the Negritude’s ideal political future 
would be a society which was inclusively modern, where the Black, as a Black, still maintained 
his roots to a pristine past.149  
 
Once again, I systematically defend our old Negro civilizations: they were courteous 
civilizations. 
 
So the real problem, you say, is to return to them. No, I repeat. We are not men for 
whom it is a question of "either-or." For us, the problem is not to make a utopian and 
sterile attempt to repeat the past, but to go beyond. It is not a dead society that we 
want to revive. We leave that to those who go in for exoticism. Nor is it the present 
colonial society that we wish to prolong, the most putrid carrion that ever rotted under 
the sun. It is a new society that we must create, with the help of all our brother slaves, a 
society rich with all the productive power of modern times, warm with all the fraternity 
of olden days.150 
 
It is probably such a sentiment in Cesaire that brings the postcolonial critic Benita Parry 
to support him in her famous essay ‘Resistance theory/ Theorising resistance’ that “Negritude is 
not a recovery of a pre-existent state, but a textually invented history, an identity effected 
through figurative operations and a tropological construction of blackness as a sign of the 
colonised condition and its refusal.”151 
Cesairean Negritude is seen to be more political, while Senghor’s is perceived to be 
cultural. In Africana philosopher Reiland Rabaka’s eyes, Senghor’s culturalism was “a comprador 
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for racial colonial policy, racial colonial anthropology, and racial colonial ethnology.”152 
Senghor’s Negritude has elicited sharp response from scholars who posit a ‘good political’ 
Negritude to the ‘blank cultural’ Negritude.153 The point where quite some Cesaire supporters 
reached a fix was Sartre’s handling of Negritude and Fanon’s handling of Sartre’s handling of 
Negritude.  
Orphic tragedy or a ‘Great Black Mirage’? 
 
Jean-Paul Sartre lent his support to the Negritude movement as it developed in the hands of 
Senghor, Cesaire and Damas. His Black Orpheus, the preface to an anthology of Negro poetry of 
West Indian and African poets compiled by Senghor, published in 1948 remains the most 
influential, and probably the most controversial, statement on Negritude written by a 
supporter.  
Sartre opens his preface by saying that the Black writers in the volume are fixing their 
gaze on the white man, who has thus far enjoyed “the privilege of seeing without being 
seen.”154 The whiteness of the White’s skin was a further aspect of vision, a claim to “the secret 
white essence of things”, like virtue, like truth, it consolidates the white man’s claim to 
universality: the mythic idea that white represents the very essence of existence. One of the 
primary functions of Negritude is to challenge this claim. The “wild and free looks”, the “quiet 
and corrosive looks” of the Negritude poets ‘ate away’ the White claims to universalism by their 
contestation that the human essence was not White.  
Sartre recognizes the need for Negritude’s particularism. “These black men are 
addressing themselves to black men about black men; their poetry is neither satiric nor 
imprecatory: it is an awakening to consciousness.”155 Yet, he also concedes that Negritude is an 
appeal to a universalism, albeit of a different kind, one that would recognize the Black. “I should 
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like to show that this poetry which seems racial at first is actually a hymn by everyone for 
everyone.”156 A substantial part of the essay that follows is dedicated to show how the Black, 
through a necessary consciousness of his situation as a Black being-in-the-world, eventually 
reclaims a humanity denied to him. The Black is a victim of the situation created by the White 
capitalist enterprise not owing to his position as a class but “because he is a black man and 
insofar as he is a colonized native or a deported African. And since he is oppressed within the 
confines of his race and because of it, he must first of all become conscious of his race. He must 
oblige those who have vainly tried throughout the centuries to reduce him to the status of a 
beast, to recognize that he is a man.”157 
This observation led Sartre to coining his controversial definition of Negritude – anti-
racist racism.158  
 
The negro cannot deny that he is negro, nor can he claim that he is part of some 
abstract colorless humanity: he is black. Thus he has his back up against the wall of 
authenticity: having been insulted and formerly enslaved, he picks up the word "nigger" 
which was thrown at him like a stone, he draws himself erect and proudly proclaims 
himself a black man, face to face with white men. The unity which will come eventually, 
bringing all oppressed peoples together in the same struggle, must be preceded in the 
colonies by what I shall call the moment of separation or negativity: this anti-racist 
racism is the only road that will lead to the abolition of racial differences.159 
 
Negritude, thus, is manifested as an ‘anti-racist racism’, but it is the only avenue open 
to the Negro for an authentic freedom and would ideally lead to the abolition of racial 
differences. Appropriating a Hegelian dialectic, Sartre posits White supremacy as the thesis and 
Negritude as the antithesis, the synthesis being a classless society without racism. Sartre 
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perceives negritude as a ‘weak moment’ in the progression of dialectics, which leads to the 
transcendence of racism and ultimately leading to a pluralist society. Negritude is a means and 
cannot be an end in itself.  
Hence the title to the preface to the anthology of Negritude poetry, ‘Black Orpheus’. 
Like the tragic Greek poet Orpheus, who descended into hell to retrieve his beloved but loses 
her on reaching ground, the Black poet descends into his existential hell to retrieve Blackness 
only to lose it later once he hits the surface of humanity. “Thus Negritude is for destroying itself, 
it is a "crossing to" and not an "arrival at," a means and not an end.”160 
He concludes 
 
It is when negritude renounces itself that it finds itself; it is when it accepts losing that it 
has won: the colored man - and he alone - can be asked to renounce the pride of his 
color. He is the one who is walking on this ridge between past particularism - which he 
has just climbed - and future universalism, which will be the twilight of his negritude; he 
is the one who looks to the end of particularism in order to find the dawn of the 
universal.161 
 
Much like in Anti-Semite and Jew, Sartre opines that it is the socialist revolution, in 
which the Black will play an authentic role, and the establishment of a classless society that will 
put an end to racism and herald a genuine pluralism. Till then, the anti-racism racism of 
Negritude is but a passing phase in the dialectic.  
Fanon’s engagement with Sartre on these contentious passages in BO has been a 
subject of considerable debate among Fanon scholars. In fact, it wouldn’t be an exaggeration to 
say that Fanon’s engagement with Negritude is mediated by his dialogue with Sartre on the 
subject. Fanon had an uneasy relationship with Negritude. Sympathetic, empathetic, 
ambivalent, acerbic, hostile are all words that can be used to describe Fanon’s reaction to 
Negritude in his works. As later parts of the chapter shall show, it is this response to Negritude 
that would be an important factor in shaping Fanon’s concept of identity politics. 
The very first mention of Negritude in BSWM is as a reaction to Sartre’s categorization 
of the same as a “minor term of a dialectical progression”. Fanon appears to express his 
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discontent with Sartre when he says “When I read that page, I felt that I had been robbed of my 
last chance. I said to my friends, “The generation of the younger black poets has just suffered a 
blow that can never be forgiven.” Help had been sought from a friend of the colored peoples, 
and that friend had found no better response than to point out the relativity of what they were 
doing.”162  
Arguing that BO was an intellectualization of Black experience, Fanon proclaims that 
Sartre had destroyed ‘black zeal’ – Fanon needed, as a ‘Black’ himself, to lose himself 
completely in Negritude.163 “Without a Negro past, without a Negro future, it was impossible for 
me to live my Negrohood. Not yet white, no longer wholly black, I was damned. Jean-Paul Sartre 
had forgotten that the Negro suffers in his body quite differently from the white man.”164 Fanon 
here seems to allude to the uniqueness of the lived experience of the Black in a racist society, 
where without the intervention of Negritude, an authentic way forward was not possible.  
But then 
 
In no way should I dedicate myself to the revival of an unjustly unrecognized Negro 
civilization. I will not make myself the man of any past. I do not want to exalt the past at 
the expense of my present and of my future.165 
 
Fanon comes full circle to Sartre’s understanding that Negritude and its exaltation of 
race specific culture cannot be an end in itself. In fact, his attack on Negritude’s generalizations 
is caustic, claiming to have no wish “to be the victim of the Fraud of a black world.”166 
Disagreeing with John McCulloch’s contention that Fanon became more sympathetic to 
negritude with the passing of time – ironically, as the author argues, owing to Sartre’s 
influence167 - I tend to agree with Azzedine Haddour’s argument that while Fanon grappled with 
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the issue of blackness in all his works, it is erroneous to suggest that “this continued critical 
engagement with negritude demonstrates Fanon’s endorsement of its ideology.”168 
Parry also concurs that Fanon’s engagement with Negritude was not unproblematic. 
She writes, “Fanon’s writings function at a point of tension between cultural nationalism and 
transnationality, without ‘resolving’ the contradiction and without yielding an attachment to 
the one or the aspiration of the other.”169 She further claims that Fanon’s “wavering empathy” 
with the concept became an “ambiguous critique” in ‘Racism and Culture’ and his later 
writings.170 
While BSWM is generally considered a text sympathetic to Negritude, Fanon’s sarcastic 
remarks on Negritude’s glorification of a great Black past give a different account.  
 
Let us be clearly understood. I am convinced that it would be of the greatest interest to 
be able to have contact with a Negro literature or architecture of the third century 
before Christ. I should be very happy to know that a correspondence had flourished 
between some Negro philosopher and Plato. But I can absolutely not see how this fact 
would change anything in the lives of the eight-year-old children who labor in the cane 
fields of Martinique or Guadeloupe.171 
 
Fanon, here, reflects a sentiment reflected in Sartre’s What is Literature? that to write 
for one’s age was to want to go beyond it to the future.172 Fanon concludes BSWM thus, “The 
body of history does not determine a single one of my actions. I am my own foundation. And it 
is by going beyond the historical, instrumental hypothesis that I will initiate the cycle of my 
freedom.”173 So the Fanon scholar Nigel Gibson is wrong here when he interprets that “For 
Sartre, negritude represents the free existentialist choice of immediacy, but for Fanon there 
never was a choice.”174 
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Indeed, Fanon’s engagement with Sartre on Negritude has been the object of interest of 
several academics dealing with Fanonism. The Fanon scholar Reiland Rabaka spends 46 pages in 
a chapter called ‘Antiracist Fanonism’ in his work Forms of Fanonism to prove that Sartre 
suffered from a racist paternalism and that Fanon was well aware of this when he criticized 
Sartre’s Hegelian analysis of Negritude.175 In similar vein, Robert Bernasconi asserts that Fanon’s 
arguments ‘against’ Sartre in BSWM might be today understood as “a version of standpoint 
theory or the epistemology of provenance”, but which were developed by Fanon in his time as 
existential phenomenology.176 Bernasconi further claims that in Fanon’s criticism of Sartre, 
Fanon “insists that Sartre should acknowledge his limitations as a white man”,177 giving the 
image of Fanon as a philosopher of lived experience.  
The Africana existentialist philosopher Lewis Gordon, while critiquing Sartre’s alleged 
patronizing slips in BO that privileges the (White) proletariat as the ideal to which the Blacks 
must be raised, is also keen to note that Fanon’s criticism of Sartre is not on the level of pure 
lived experience of identity, i.e., the argument that Sartre as a White man has essential 
limitations in understanding Negritude, but on the level of an existentialist politico-
philosophical outlook. Gordon’s contestation that according to Fanon “one’s standpoint and 
identity are helpful, but not total. One can place oneself in another’s place”, shall in the later 
chapters assist our understanding of Fanonian identity politics. Likewise, philosopher Ato Sekyi-
Otu’s argument that Fanon was deeply concerned about a “truer version of human universals”, 
while maintaining that Fanon “cast a suspecting look at the coercive objectification of Sartre’s 
account of Negritude – its manifest objectivism, but also its covert and informing 
ethnocentrism”178 will also be taken up in the later chapters dealing with Fanonian tensions 
over the contradictions between the ideas of universalism and particularism.179  
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Fanon’s criticism of negritude progressively intensifies from BSWM to WOTE. Taking this 
into account, Sonia Kruks is right in identifying that “Fanon’s objection is not that Sartre is in 
error in asserting that negritude is a transitional movement. Sartre’s mistake, in fact, is to have 
told the truth!”180 She further asserts that in the concluding arguments of BSWM Fanon draws 
on the most radical transcendental conception of freedom that Sartre had developed in Being 
and Nothingness, going against the essentialist rhetoric in negritude.  
The problem for Fanon is that the followers of negritude advocated a return to a 
cultural past while they were politically removed from ground realities that were unfolding.181 
He describes this return to a mythic past as an ahistorical movement and dubs negritude as a 
“great black mirage” in which the cultural, historical and national differences of the blacks were 
lost. Considering the search for a “Negro people” as a source of conflict, he explicitly states his 
intention to understand and destroy this source.182 Consider the scathing critique of negritude 
in ‘Racism and Culture’:  
 
Rediscovering tradition, living it as a defense mechanism, as a symbol of purity, of 
salvation, the decultured individual leaves the impression that the mediation takes 
vengeance by substantializing itself. This falling back on archaic positions having no 
relation to technical development is paradoxical. The institutions thus valorized no 
longer correspond to the elaborate methods of action already mastered.  
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The culture put into capsules, which has vegetated since the foreign domination, is 
revalorized. It is not reconceived, grasped anew, dynamized from within. It is shouted. 
And this headlong, unstructured, verbal revalorization conceals paradoxical attitudes.183 
 
Fanon finds no revolutionary praxis for a genuine decolonization in such a purely 
‘culturalist’ approach.184 One could say along with the Black Marxist scholar Adele Jinadu that 
while Fanon was not opposed to cultural nationalism per se, Fanon’s quarrel with Negritude 
was that “it tended to become a form of mystification, elitist in orientation and direction; above 
all, it lacked a populist vision; it did not constitute a radical ideological program; rather, it 
became an ideology of collaboration with the West.”185 
In WOTE he adds to this critique of negritude. The argument he presents, that negritude 
is not revolutionary enough, complements Sartre’s views in BO, albeit in a much stronger and 
direct fashion. Fanon identifies two reactions of elites among the colonized to culture. Initially, 
when forced to choose between the culture of the colonizer and the native tradition, this elite 
goes with the former. Later, some members of these elite, during the period of decolonization, 
abandon the culture of the colonizer in which they were hitherto assimilated and seek 
anchorage in their native culture. To Fanon, however, the attempt of the native elite to 
rehabilitate the native culture is nothing but “a banal search for exoticism”.186 By the time of 
writing WOTE, Fanon came about to irrevocably dismissing Negritude along with its essentialist 
rhetoric as a backward looking ideology, an abstraction. McCulloch is right to point out that 
Fanon was opposed to this because “This abstraction appears in the practice of lumping all 
Negro people under a single category, thereby denying the heterogeneity of Negro experience. 
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Like the colonial racists, the poets of negritude presume race to be the determinant of the 
individual's social identity.”187 Anti-racist racism was not enough.  
Sartre to blame?  
 
Albert Memmi, Tunisian writer, Fanon’s contemporary and author of The Colonizer and the 
Colonized, writes in ‘The Impossible Life of Fanon’ “Yet it was Fanon's particular tragedy that, 
while henceforth he hated his former colonizer, he never again returned to Negritude and the 
West Indies.”188 He credits this to the influence of Sartre’s Black Orpheus and Anti-Semite and 
Jew. 
Sartre’s account of non-recognition as oppression, together with his strongest call for 
the oppressed authentically to affirm their identity, is found in Anti-Semite and Jew. To Sartre, it 
is the Anti-Semite who creates the Jew189 and that the situation in which the Jew finds himself, 
“an ensemble of limits and restrictions”, is created by the Anti-Semite, and it is as a being-in-a-
situation that the Jew makes his choices.  
The most common response that the Jew makes is that of “flight”, either into 
assimilation or into a universalist rationalism where the particularities of the Jewish condition 
can be avoided. Sartre dubs both as inauthentic choices. In contrast to the inauthentic Jew, 
Sartre describes the authentic as the one who demands recognition for what he is. And follows 
an important passage for understanding the Sartrean influence on Fanonian politics 
 
If it is agreed that man may be defined as a being having freedom within the limits of a 
situation, then it is easy to see that the exercise of this freedom may be considered as 
authentic or inauthentic according to the choices made in the situation. Authenticity, it 
is almost needless to say, consists in having a true and lucid consciousness of the 
situation, in assuming the responsibilities and risks that it involves, in accepting it in 
pride or humiliation, sometimes in horror and hate.190 
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Anticipating later critiques of universalism, Sartre argues that the old style abstract 
humanism of the liberal democrat is not merely inadequate, but itself oppressive. Liberal 
universal humanism puts the Jews in a handicap, not only does it seek to suppress the 
particularities of concrete groups, it also obscures the dynamics of oppression behind the 
screen of a universal human essence. While he warns against the democrat’s assimilationist 
rhetoric which converges with that of the Anti-Semite in denying the Jew his place in society, in 
Sartre’s eyes, assimilation proper does not pertain to the liberal democrat’s schema which puts 
difference under erasure. It does not exact from the Jew conformity and submission in the 
name of universalism. Rather, Sartre insists that this assimilation must be based on an ethics 
that respects the difference of the Jew. He thus rails against the twin danger to the authentic 
Jew: 
 
For a Jew, conscious and proud of being Jewish, asserting his claim to be a member of 
the Jewish community without ignoring on that account the bonds which unite him to 
the national community, there may be not so much difference between the anti-Semite 
and the democrat. The former wishes to destroy him as a man and leave nothing in him 
but the Jew, the pariah, the untouchable; the latter wishes to destroy him as a Jew and 
leave nothing in him but the man, the abstract and universal subject of the rights of 
man and the rights of the citizen.191 
 
Taking on from Sartre, Fanon is explicit on the question of recognition – “He who is 
reluctant to recognize me opposes me.” Consequently, his starting point in BSWM is the 
problem of authenticity. To Fanon, the colonized black is a product of a socially produced but 
real situation of inferiority which they have internalized. They thus suffer from a “psycho-
existentialist complex” that prevents them from authentic self and social transformations. The 
social origin of the Black’s neurosis lies in the attitude of the white, colonial society to 
blackness. Appropriating Sartre’s notion of the overdetermined otherness of the Jew, Fanon 
writes “I am overdetermined from the outside. I am not the slave of the ‘idea’ that others have 
of me but of my appearance.”192 But while the Jew can attempt at assimilation through 
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invisibility, the fact of blackness prevents the Black from doing the same. Like Sartre’s Jew, 
Fanon’s Black too engages in flight.  
 
The young black in the Antilles... identifies himself with the explorer, the bringer of 
civilization, the white man who carries truth to savages—an all-white truth. There is 
identification—that is, the young Negro subjectively adopts a white man’s attitude.193 
 
Another response is the escape into the universal, much like the Jew, much more 
specifically for Black intellectuals who try to evade their racialized situation by an appeal to 
reason or other transcendental universals.  
The strategy of authenticity deployed by the Blacks, then, might appear to be negritude, 
wherein the affirmation of Blackness, a Black culture, a Black past is seen as an end in itself. But 
as mentioned above, Fanon’s attitude towards this is ambivalent in BSWM and hostile in WOTE. 
The reason I argue – and here I agree with Sonia Kruks who identifies Fanon’s political position 
that “the affirmation of identity can be liberating only in the context of a struggle also to 
transform wider material and institutional forms of oppression”194 – is Fanon’s 
conceptualization of identity politics was one shaped not by affiliations and recognitions of 
cultural pasts, but a call for a reciprocal recognition within the present with the intention of 
transcending all particularist identities towards a new universalist humanism.  
Certain other critical questions emerge while dealing with Fanon’s engagement with 
Negritude. It is clear that Fanon’s engagement with Negritude mediated by his dialogue with 
Sartre, especially in BSWM, is a contentious issue for several scholars dealing with Fanonism. 
Since Fanon’s appropriation of the Sartrean framework throughout his works will be dealt with 
in the later chapters in more detail, it is necessary to set out here the intention behind Fanon’s 
theses in BSWM. In a Skinnerian sense, to speak of intentions of a writer may either refer to his 
plan to create a certain type of work or to describe an actual work in a certain way.195 Further, 
considering that a writer’s intentions are inside his works, “to know what a writer meant by a 
particular work is to know what his primary intentions were in writing it.”196 
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I would argue that BSWM is much more prone to various misinterpretations, like the 
anomaly of Rabaka, than the acidic WOTE, largely owing to the complex nature of the subjects 
addressed and the ambiguous manner in which they are addressed by the author. Scholars 
White, Black and Brown have misinterpreted Fanon’s engagement with Sartre, some arriving at 
ludicrous conclusions. Among others, BSWM is a work of social satire executed with ironical wit. 
The object of satire, the comic subject as Aristotle would have it, “the laughable is a species of 
what is disgraceful. The laughable is an error or disgrace that does not involve pain or 
destruction; for example, a comic mask is ugly and distorted, but does not involve pain.”197 
Doesn’t the white mask worn by the black skin involve the question of ugliness and distortion? 
And isn’t this mimicry itself a matter of satire?  
Fanon says 
 
Why write this book? No one has asked me for it. 
Especially those to whom it is directed. 
Well? Well, I reply quite calmly that there are too many idiots in this world. And having 
said it, I have the burden of proving it.198 
To whom is it directed? Who are the objects of Fanon’s satire? 
The problem is important. I propose nothing short of the liberation of the man of color 
from himself. We shall go very slowly, for there are two camps: the white and the black. 
Stubbornly we shall investigate both metaphysics and we shall find that they are often 
quite fluid. 
We shall have no mercy for the former governors, the former missionaries. To us, the 
man who adores the Negro is as “sick” as the man who abominates him. 
Conversely, the black man who wants to turn his race white is as miserable as he who 
preaches hatred for the whites. 
In the absolute, the black is no more to be loved than the Czech, and truly what is to be 
done is to set man free.199 
 
Fanon further adds:  
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Concern with the elimination of a vicious circle has been the only guide-line for my 
efforts. 
There is a fact: White men consider themselves superior to black men. 
There is another fact: Black men want to prove to white men, at all costs, the richness 
of their thought, the equal value of their intellect.200 
 
The above passages should make it clear that Fanon was not just intending to satirize 
the fallacies of White racism and the phenomenon of Blacks wearing white masks, but equally 
the attempts of the Negritude thinkers to prove the distinctiveness of being Black. It is not in 
the scope of the research to analyze the intentions behind the several scholars dealing with 
Fanonism who have overlooked this ‘fact’ and have interpreted Fanon accordingly, but a 
general observation can be made. A tendency among such scholars is to project Fanon as a sort 
of a Black messiah relevant in the contexts of studying (mostly anti-Black) White racism, 
colonialism and postcolonialism. At the risk of sounding polemical, I would like to state that this 
is as fallacious as the argument that Marx was the messiah of White workers. Fanon was a 
revolutionary humanist and a Universalist, and it is those universalising tendencies in his 
philosophy alone that can enable him to be appropriated in the study of radical identity politics 
at large.  
This brings us to other connected questions. If, as William Connolly would have it, 
“every identity is particular, constructed, and relational”201, what role does the kind of 
humanism espoused by Fanon play in its study? Does Fanon’s universalism create a 
metanarrative that erases differences, as has been alleged by the likes of Christopher Miller, or 
does it herald a sort of pluralism that recognizes difference under an universalising category? If 
so, what is this category and what shapes it? 
Likewise, does Fanon see identity as a fixed category in politics? Is he a philosopher of 
‘lived experience’ as has been stated by many? Is this ‘lived experience’ the same as the one 
described in standpoint theory, or is it, as Nayar argues, the ‘commonality of suffering’ among 
                                                          
200 Ibid, p3 
201 William Connolly, Identity|Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Expanded 
Edition), London: University of Minnesota Press, 2002, p46 
72 
 
Third World peoples?202 Or is it a question of shared solidarity in struggle? I discuss these 
questions in the next chapter. 
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‘To explain the other to myself’: 
Fanon’s Articulation of Identity Politics 
 
But in the very world, which is the world 
Of all of us,—the place where in the end 
We find our happiness, or not at all! 
-Wordsworth  
 
It is very easy to consider Fanon as an exponent of Black identity politics. Several 
ambiguous passages from Black Skin, White Masks, when read in isolation, might confirm that. 
Some have read Fanon as an advocate of anti-colonial nationalism while others prefer the term 
nationalitarian. Fanon has also been projected as a philosopher of African existentialism.203 All 
of these approaches are partly true. True, because Fanon does address these questions 
intensely in his works; partly, because the essence of his works indicates a continuity of concern 
with a broader question, the question of moving from particularity to universality. In this 
chapter, exploring Fanon’s critique of identity politics and by tracing out its core aspects, I seek 
to present how a transcendence of particularist identity to a universalist identity informed 
Fanon’s theory on the subject. I start with a discussion of identity and identity politics, briefly 
touching upon poststructuralist, postmarxist and liberal accounts of identity politics. Then, I 
delve into Fanonian discussions of identity and identity politics. I begin with a discussion of the 
Master-Slave dialectic of Fanon, which was inspired by his reading of Alexandre Kojeve’s reading 
of Hegel. Following this, I talk about the Fanon’s handling of universality and particularity in 
identity politics, and I show how Fanon was interested in moving from particularism to 
humanism. I argue that Fanon’s project identity was becoming human, which was in line with 
his philosophy of Sartrean humanism. Sceptical of cultural nationalism and racial and national 
particularism, Fanon placed his bet on a reciprocal recognition, which would lead to a mutual 
                                                          




enriching of all cultures and peoples. Through shared solidarity and struggle against oppression 
and by replacing the false universality of the oppressor with a genuine universality of the 
oppressed, a new humanism would be born.  
 
Identity, Identification, Identity Politics 
 
According to Alexandre Kojeve, man is self-conscious the moment he says “I”.204 What is I? I is a 
person’s sense of self at a particular time, in particular circumstances, which they share in 
common with one set of people, and do not share with others. In short, I is the starting point of 
Identity. Aristotle famously observed that to be aloof from society, one must be an animal or a 
god. One can make a similar observation about ‘Identity’. Identity is always social. It is not 
possible for an individual to have an identity that is exclusive to them, that is uniquely personal 
and above society. When I claims an identity, it is always in relation to someone else. Or, I 
becomes an identity only when it has a sense of we. This is what William Connolly means when 
he says that “Identity is relational and collective.”205  
Bhikku Parekh, however, elucidates three types of identities – the personal, the social 
and the human. According to Parekh, personal identity defines individuals as “unique human 
beings, distinct, as this person rather than some other”, social identity “pertains to their 
membership of different organizations, communities and structures of relationships [...] and 
leads to different forms and levels of social belonging” and human identity, “the widest and also 
the shallowest, defines them simply as human beings.”206 While Parekh’s definition of social 
identity is largely acceptable, his idea of personal identity is a bit too simplistic. As sociologist 
Richard Jenkins aptly notes “Individual identity – embodied in selfhood – is not a meaningful 
proposition in isolation from the human world of other people. Individuals are unique and 
variable, but selfhood is thoroughly socially constructed.”207 
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For instance, take ‘Frantz Fanon’. As an individual who was born in the French Antilles in 
1925 and who died in a hospital in Washington DC in 1961, Frantz Fanon was a unique 
individual, just like the author of this paper, and the reader of this paper. And unless one 
believes in parallel universe, there was and will be only one Frantz Fanon. However, ‘Frantz 
Fanon’ is not an identity. Fanon possesses an identity by virtue of belonging to the Fanon family, 
a particular class, a particular nation, a particular gender, a particular sexual orientation, a 
particular political orientation, a particular literary preference and so on. That is, Frantz Fanon 
has an identity, or as Parekh would have it, a social identity, only by virtue of belonging to a 
social group. Frantz Fanon, by himself, is not a Black, a French Martinician, or even a man or a 
human – all of these are identities conferred on to him by discursive practices, which he 
accepts, or rejects, or refashions according to his agency. 
In his account of identity and agency, cultural theorist Stuart Hall, taking from Michel 
Foucault, argues that what is to be considered is not a theory of subjectivity but rather that of 
discursive practices. He qualifies that this is an attempt “to rearticulate the relationship 
between subjects and discursive practices that the question of identity recurs - or rather, if one 
prefers to stress the process of subjectification to discursive practices, and the politics of 
exclusion which all such subjectification appears to entail, the question of identification.”208 
What is to be noted here that Hall relatively privileges discursive practices in the construction of 
identity over the subjectivity of the actor. As I will be arguing later, to Fanon, it is ultimately 
agency that counts. To Hall, identification is never complete, never a totality or a subsumption, 
but rather a suturing.209 
David Howarth also lays emphasis on a shift from identity to identification.210 In the 
process of identification, political frontiers are produced “by complicated hegemonic practices 
which divide social spaces and confer identity by creating antagonistic relations between forces, 
and by linking together different demands and subjectivities into common projects.”211 Here, we 
see a marked progression from identity to identity politics. Or, we can say that identity politics 
begins for the individual when the I begins a process of identification with an identity as 
different from and as opposed to another identity/identities. I enters the realm of the political 
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when it is part of a we and recognizes an oppositional they. Opposition and conflict are central 
to the Fanonist conception of identity politics as we shall see.  
However, the liberal camp is likely to take offense at this position. For instance, to 
Amartya Sen, plurality of identities at any given point in time must be acknowledged and 
respected and he opposes the “singular affiliation” to any particular identity. He argues “The 
incitement to ignore all affiliation and loyalties other than those emanating from one restrictive 
identity can be deeply delusive and also contribute to social tension and violence.”212 In Sen’s 
perspective, an individual’s identity as a football fan is as important as her identity as a woman 
from some particular social, ethnic, or national group. What Sen, in essence, is advocating is a 
liberal politics of apolitical recognition where individuals recognize the plurality of identities of 
their self and of others without identification with any particular identity and avoiding social 
antagonisms – thus avoiding politics itself. This is fine under conditions of absolute peace, which 
of course, does not exist. In situations where the existing system has thrust an identity upon a 
group against its consent, an inferiorized identity like that of the Blacks or the colonized or the 
non-Brahmins in Tamil Nadu, the political act is to not just recognize pluralities, but to suture a 
unity from these pluralities, an identification, a hegemonic process, to bring together “different 
demands and subjectivities into common projects.”   
Besides, Sen misses a difference between roles and identities. According to sociologist 
Manuel Castells, roles “are defined by norms structured by the institutions and organizations of 
society” whereas identities are “people’s source of meaning and experience” and provide a 
stronger source of meaning than roles “because of the process of self-construction and 
individuation that they involve.”213 Castells also introduces three types of identity namely 
legitimizing identity “introduced by the dominant institutions of society to extend and 
rationalize their domination vis a vis social actors”, resistance identity “generated by those 
actors who are in positions/conditions devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of domination, 
thus building trenches of resistance and survival on the basis of principles different from, or 
opposed to, those permeating the institutions of society”, and project identity “when social 
actors, on the basis of whatever cultural materials are available to them, build a new identity 
that redefines their position in society and, by so doing, seek the transformation of overall 
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social structure”.214 These three types will be of use to understand Fanon’s conceptualization of 
identity politics.  
In general, identity politics has been a subject of scorn by leftists for reducing politics to 
narrow particularities which make any form of larger emancipatory movements impossible. 
Likewise, it has been defended by postmodernists for being a celebration of diversity, 
multiculturalism and so on. This paper, though the author is carefully sympathetic to the former 
position, seeks to avoid taking both extremes. Instead, I seek to show, with Fanon, how an 
emancipatory politics of identity necessarily entails identification with an identity which also has 
the potential to transcend itself into something larger. This takes from Laclau that “There is no 
politics of pure particularity. Even the most particularistic of demands will be made in terms of 
something transcending it.”215 
Following are the questions that I seek to address: What is the Fanonist conception of 
identity politics? What are the normative contours it is shaped by? How are the tensions 
between the particular and the universal resolved? And finally, is the “human identity” of 
Parekh a viable political project according to Fanon?  
Identity and the Master and Slave Dialectic in Fanon  
 
Fanon explicitly addresses the Hegelian theme of recognition, that is, the dialectic of the Master 
and Slave, in his Black Skin, White Masks. Fanon scholar Hussein Bulhan notes that Fanon, like 
Jean-Paul Sartre, was influenced by Kojeve’s interpretations of Hegel.216 According to Kojeve, to 
recognize the Other without being recognized by him is the basis of Hegelian schemata of the 
Master-Slave dialectic.217 In the beginning of the dialectical process, the Master is in a privileged 
status, because by virtue of force and violence, he has been recognized by the Slave. The 
Master’s humanity is recognized as universal and absolute. Likewise, the Master’s humanity 
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necessarily rests on a progressive dehumanization of the Slave. That is, “the Master is Master 
only by the fact of having a Slave who recognizes him as Master.”218 
The Slave works for the Master without being recognized. Yet, it is through this work 
that the seeds of self-consciousness are sown. And if at all the Slave needs recognition, he 
needs to risk his life and overcome the fear of death through a fight with the Master. Since the 
Master has laid claim to universality by virtue of domination, the Slave through the fight seeks 
the recognition of his particularity in an abstract universality. That is to say, “He is not content 
with attributing a value to himself. He wants this particular value, his own, to be recognized by 
all men, universally.”219  
Fanon echoes this when he says “He who is reluctant to recognize me opposes me. In a 
savage struggle I am willing to accept convulsions of death, invincible dissolution, but also the 
possibility of the impossible.”220 But what complicates Fanon’s perspective is that he takes 
Hegel a step further, contextualizes Hegel with respect to the Blacks, by adding the dimension 
of the coloured Slave. With a Sartrean analysis, Fanon notes that the Black is created by the 
gaze of the White. The White person, who possessed material superiority, also possessed 
epistemological superiority which gave him power not just to make the Slave work for the 
Master’s interests, but also to define the Slave as ‘Black’, to determine the paradigms of 
discourse under which the Slave’s identity was structured. That is, epistemological superiority 
was a precursor to create discursive practices that constructed an epidermal superiority.  
Thus, the White identity, Whiteness, is the standard towards which the Black aspires to. 
In this ‘world of becoming’ in a society characterized by unequal relationships between racially 
marked social groups, becoming White means becoming more human for the Black. While the 
White is recognized without recognizing in return, it is the Black who needs recognition from 
the White, and this is why, Fanon claims, that Black undergoes a process of ‘lactification’. The 
desire of the woman of colour for the White man and the desire of the man of colour for the 
White woman are but manifestations of the desire to be more human in a world where 
Whiteness is the norm. The White identity is the legitimizing identity which the Master wields 
by virtue of his material and epistemological power. Even when the White colonial Master talks 
about man or humanity, he is referring only to his own image. Even when the White Master 
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frees the coloured Slave and abolishes the material conditions of slavery, the unequal 
relationship persists because, to Fanon, the ‘Negro Slave’ is one who has not fought or risked his 
life for freedom.  
 
Historically, the Negro steeped in the inessentiality of servitude was set free by his 
master. He did not fight for his freedom. 
 
Out of slavery the Negro burst into the lists where his masters stood. Like those 
servants who are allowed once every year to dance in the drawing room, the Negro is 
looking for a prop.221 
 
The Black was given ‘freedom’ as a gift by the White master and it mutilated the 
process of reciprocal recognition. Since there was no fight proper, he seeks to either further 
mutilate himself by imitating the White master, or enter into the particularist solipsism of 
Negritude. Without an ethical recognition, the Black is torn between the myth of a superior 
White humanity and the myth of a pristine and pure Black past. The politics of Black experience, 
for all its claims to separatism, was still functioning in the discursive paradigms set by the 
Whites. As Jenkins observes, “The capacity of authoritatively applied identification to constitute 
or influence individual experience affects whether or not individuals internalise the label(s) 
concerned.”222 
However, to Fanon, both are just attempts at reform of the system. The man who does 
not/has not experienced the fear of death and waged a fight to the death for recognition is 
bound to the existing world and at best, only attempts to reform it “to change its details, to 
make particular transformations without modifying its essential characteristics” – but 
considering that the given world is the world of the Master and the Master’s version of 
humanity or universality, “it is not reform, but the “dialectical”, or better, revolutionary 
overcoming of the World that can free him and – consequently – satisfy him.”223 In Fanon’s 
view, both assimilating into the White culture and romanticizing a Black past were mere 
reformist attempts and not a radical rupture with the status quo.  
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Negritude and Fanon’s criticism of the same were discussed extensively in the chapter 
before. To some extent, Negritude could be called a politics of resistance identity because it 
contests the inferior status conferred on to the Blacks by the Whites in power and calls on the 
Blacks to take pride in their selves. Its ‘anti-racist racism’ and belief in the uniqueness of Black 
particularity could be explained as “the exclusion of the excluders by the excluded.”224 However 
to Fanon, it still was, to take from Sartre, a passing phase in the dialectic and not an end in 
itself. A pitfall of Negritude was that in their attempts to reject White racist definitions, it 
overidentified with an imagined Negro authenticity and Negro pasts, leading Fanon to comment 
that “Negro” was only a cultural term that had no historical or sociological basis.225 Further,  
 
When one says “Negro people,” one systematically assumes that all Negroes agree on 
certain things, that they share a principle of communion. The truth is that there is 
nothing, a priori, to warrant the assumption that such a thing as a Negro people 
exists.226 
 
An identity, to Fanon, cannot conjure up mythical and pristine pasts but must be 
historicized. Likewise, a politics that emanates from it must not be based on unique communal 
experiences of the past but with a vision for the future. This is why Fanon begins the conclusion 
of Black Skin, White Masks with a quote from Karl Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte “The social revolution . . . cannot draw its poetry from the past, but only from the 
future. It cannot begin with itself before it has stripped itself of all its superstitions concerning 
the past.” To overcome the Master-Slave dialectic that existed between the White-Black 
relationships, the whole of the past had to be set aside for the interests of a common future 
where man would be recognized as man. “Both must turn their backs on the inhuman voices 
which were those of their respective ancestors in order that authentic communication be 
possible.”227  
Fanon’s consternation with Negritude is owing to its excessive emphasis on the 
uniqueness of the Black identity and experience which only assists compartmentalization of 
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peoples and not a resolution of the conflict. The Slave does resist the Master’s values but 
without providing a value that would overcome the dialectic. The prejudice of the Black towards 
his own race was not a path to universal political liberation but only an abstract cultural 
dialogue that only his own hear. Whereas, Fanon argues “A people that undertakes a struggle 
for liberation rarely legitimizes race prejudice.”228 In a sense, Fanon anticipates the 
contemporary debates around “reverse racism” and empathetically states his opposition to any 
sort of racial essentialism.229 In his very first book, Fanon places his lot on the side of a 
universalist humanism that he uses as an evaluating standard in his assessment of identity 
politics. Sonia Kruks is thus right to argue that while Fanon believed that to affirm, express, or 
celebrate one’s identity can be psychologically empowering, he ultimately was of the opinion 
that affirmation of identity alone is not enough to change the world.230 Fanon’s identity politics 
needed more than a relic of the past, ‘a black mirage’, to validate itself. This leads to the 
question of identification. Now, we can see that Fanon was strongly sceptical of identification 
with an essentialized, valorised racial identity that claimed validation only through particularity 
and lived experience. It is in positing an alternative to this – as well as to the White-colonial 
racism that marks itself as the universal face of humanity – that the Fanonian tensions between 
universality and particularity emerge. It is necessary to understand Fanon’s critical assessment 
of this problem in order to arrive at a clear picture of the norms that guided his identity politics.  
Fanon, Universality and Particularity 
 
Commenting on Fanon’s relationship towards Negritude, Benita Parry writes “Fanon’s writings 
function at a point of tension between cultural nationalism and transnationality, without 
‘resolving’ the contradiction and without yielding an attachment to the one or the aspiration to 
the other.”231 Though Parry is in general favour of the resistance identity of Negritude, she 
concedes that Fanon, in opposing both the nativism of Negritude and the idealism of European 
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humanism, was “projecting the radical hope of an oppositional humanism.”232 This ‘oppositional 
humanism’ of Fanon, which reveals the fallacies of the narrow particularities of Negritude and 
the hypocrisies of European humanism, constitutes Fanon’s project identity.  
We can see that throughout his works Fanon operates with a Sartrean understanding 
that “Particularism can and must claim the status of universality in the absence of a 
comprehensive frame of reference, since to be in perspective necessarily transforms 
particularism itself into its own perspective, and thus into the measure of everything else.”233 In 
his Black Skin, White Masks, the essays on “West Indians and Africans” and “Racism and 
Culture” in Toward the African Revolution and his chapter on “The Pitfalls of National 
Consciousness” in The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon deploys mock sarcasm against those 
among the Blacks and the colonized who focus only on racial and/or national particularities 
without taking the next step towards universality. Likewise, he also targets the humanism of 
Europe for it being a facade for imperialism and suggests a new humanism in place. How does 
Fanon make the transition from particularity to universality? 
It is necessary to have a grasp of the essence of the whole corpus of Fanon’s works in 
order to understand how he negotiates the tensions between universality and particularity. In 
his very first work Black Skin, White Masks Fanon addresses the problem of Black identity in a 
Francophone scenario, mainly in the Antilles and in France. He states his goal clearly at the 
outset – “Toward a new humanism.”234 This new humanism is necessary because “The white 
man is sealed in his whiteness” and “The black man in his blackness”.235 According to Robert 
Bernasconi, 
 
Fanon never lost sight of the fact that historically the discussion of race has always been 
under the sway of racism and that, if we continue to talk about race, it should only be 
because the struggle against racism is far from over and that the concept of race, 
employed properly, was a vital tool in combating racism [...] He insisted that the 
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struggle should be conducted under the auspices of an attempt to create a new way of 
thinking and a new humanity.236 
 
That is, the discussions of the particularity of race must always give way to a synthesis 
of a common humanity where colour would cease to be a factor in assessing an individual’s 
worth. Fanon was compelled to discuss the pathology of White racism and the Black reaction to 
it, the “anti-racist racism” of Negritude so as to arrive at a common and new humanism. The 
first book of Fanon is not so much about the colonial encounter as his later works were, though 
the scenario of colonialism looms in the background. In a society that is racist, that racially 
privileges one group over the other, “The feeling of inferiority of the colonized is the correlative 
to the European’s feeling of superiority [...] It is the racist who creates his inferior.”237 While he 
takes inspiration from Sartre’s thesis that the anti-Semite invents the Jew,238 Fanon places 
greater focus on the agency of the ‘inferior’ to create his own identification in a situation of 
oppression. Or, the Black person, though “overdetermined from without” by a racist society and 
who is a slave of his own appearance239 is nevertheless free to choose who he identifies with 
and how he frames his politics.  
The subject, though identified by others as a ‘Negro’, still has the choice of choosing his 
own identification. However, Fanon’s humanism, which he derives greatly from Sartre, is not a 
liberal concept of individual choice, because in the cogito one not only discovers one’s own Self 
(as say, a Black or a White) but of others as well – man cannot be anything unless the others 
recognize him as such.240 On this, Sartre elaborates 
 
I cannot obtain any truth whatsoever about myself, except through the mediation of 
another. The other is indispensible to my existence, and equally so to any knowledge I 
can have of myself. Under these conditions, the intimate discovery of myself is at the 
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same time the revelation of the other as freedom which confronts mine, and which 
cannot think or will without doing so either for or against me.241 
 
The Black person’s discovery of Self confronts the agency of the White, privileged by the 
system, who refuses an ethical recognition of the former. The White who does not recognize 
the Black opposes the Black, and the Black must wage a fight to attain this recognition. But 
recognition as what? To Fanon, the person neither “has the right to be a Negro” nor “the duty 
to be this or that”, but if the White man challenges his humanity, the racialized subject must 
impose his “whole weight as a man” on the White and check the oppressor’s prejudices.242 To 
Fanon, thus, the subject has one right “That of demanding human behavior from the other” and 
one duty “That of not renouncing my freedom through my choices.”243 And this radically free 
subject cannot search for his destiny in history but rather in a common future. This is the 
essence of the Hegelian idea of recognition: “If recognition occurs, it must occur through the 
mutual and joint action of both, through which the “I’s” become a “We.””244 
This is why Fanon is deeply sceptical about projects that focus more on particularist 
pasts than on a common future. He says “The discovery of the existence of a Negro civilization 
in the fifteenth century confers no patent of humanity on me. Like it or not, the past can in no 
way guide me in the present moment.”245 The Black man should not be locked up into his 
particularist identity and must make a movement towards something larger. When Fanon 
claims in the last chapter of Black Skin, White Masks that it is not the particular history of 
‘Negro civilization’ but the entire history of human civilization interests him, he also adds that 
“The body of history does not determine a single one of my actions.”246 Fanon places the onus 
on the subject’s agency in deciding what his identity is, what his identification is, and what his 
identity politics will be. Here, he echoes the Sartrean humanist thought of radical subjectivity 
that “Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself.”247 
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Fanon speaks more of this in his later writings. “It is the white man who creates the 
Negro. But it is the Negro who creates negritude.”248 That is, though the particular identity of 
the Negro might have been created by the White-colonial-Other, it is the subjectivity of the 
colonized that creates identification with Negritude. After criticizing the particularist politics of 
Negritude for depriving the Blacks of “any possibility of individual expression”249, he makes 
explicit what to him constitutes a genuine universalist humanism: 
 
universality resides in this decision to recognize and accept the reciprocal relativism of 
different cultures once the colonial status is irreversibly excluded.250 
 
Two things need to be noted here. Firstly, the ending of colonialism as a system is an 
unconditional and preliminary step to an ethical recognition among peoples. In all his works, 
Fanon is uncompromising in his belief that colonialism is an absolute evil and that the colonized 
is psychologically conditioned to rejecting the values of the occupier “even if these values 
objectively be worth choosing”.251 The humanity of the colonized “can only materialize from the 
rotting cadaver of the colonist.”252 He qualifies that “At the individual level, violence is a 
cleansing force. It rids the colonized of their inferiority complex, of their passive and despairing 
attitude. It emboldens them, and restores their self-confidence.”253 Violence is an act of self-
affirmation in the quest for ethical recognition where that recognition has been denied to the 
colonized. Colonialism as a parasitic system deprives the colonized, as well as the colonizer, of 
their self-worth. The culture of the natives is devalued, mutilated, and criminalized while that of 
the colonizer is elevated as a model for emulation, and imposed on the natives. To Fanon, in the 
colonial apparatus, the colonialist projects himself as the image of humanity while concurrently 
denying the humanity of the colonized. So, “authentic decolonization is irreconcilable with 
anything that colonialism stands for, because colonialism is essentially a negation of the identity 
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of the colonized.”254 It is only through the ending of this system and the physical ejection of the 
colonizer that the humanity of the colonized could be realized and the transition to universalism 
could be made. Real universal humanism for Fanon begins after the elimination of the colonial 
Other, the Enemy.  
Secondly, reciprocal recognition and acceptance of relativism of cultures provides an 
ethical premise for universalism. According to Adele Jinadu, Fanon’s ethical relativism is a form 
of cultural relativism, which rejects the universality of the colonizing country.255 Likewise, 
Pramod Nayar argues that Fanon’s ethical recognition requires recognizing the identity of all 
Others, a mutuality of recognition, respecting difference without erasing or homogenizing it.256 
However, it must be added that Fanon is careful about unqualified cultural relativism as he 
makes clear in his discussions about Negritude or about the “Trials and Tribulations of National 
Consciousness”, wherein he prefers a switch from national consciousness to a social and 
political consciousness257 and for nationalism to be “explained, enriched and deepened” and to 
be elevated into humanism.258 Anti-colonialism was not an end in itself. It was a means to an 
end, an absolutely necessary means albeit.  
Fanon believes in what Slavoj Zizek calls ‘universality-for-itself’. According to Zizek “The 
universality-for-itself is not simply external to or above its particular context: it is inscribed 
within it. It perturbs and affects it from within, so that the identity of the particular is split into 
its particular and universal aspects.”259 Fanon’s universalism emerges from his deep 
commitment to anti-colonial resistance and decolonization. But while postcolonialists in general 
valorise the anti-colonial particular aspects of Fanon’s writings, they tend to mostly overlook 
that Fanon’s concern is also about how the former colony fares after decolonization in its 
humanizing project. Which is why in “This Africa to Come”, Fanon states explicitly that  
 
Colonialism and its derivatives do not, as a matter of fact, constitute the present 
enemies of Africa. In a short time this continent will be liberated. For my part, the 
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deeper I enter into the cultures and the political circles the surer I am that the great 
danger that threatens Africa is the absence of ideology.260 
 
While the moment of colonial encounter is crucially important in shaping the identity of 
the colonized and his identification with a national project of decolonization, it alone does not 
justify a politics of the future. To Fanon, such a politics would have to transform not just the 
identity of the oppressed, but also that of the oppressor. Given that the ideology of the 
European colonialist, despite its claims to universal humanism, functions in practice as “nothing 
but a dishonest ideology, an exquisite justification for plundering”261, it was necessary for the 
colonized to take up this mission – “For Europe, for ourselves and for humanity, comrades, we 
must make a new start, develop a new way of thinking, and endeavor to create a new man.”262 
Becoming Human: Fanon’s Project Identity 
 
It is instructive here to consider what Laclau would term a discursive strategy of hegemonic 
articulation 
 
there is hegemony only if the dichotomy universality/particularity is superseded; 
universality exists only incarnated in – and subverting – some particularity but, 
conversely, no particularity can become political without becoming the locus of 
universalizing effects.263  
 
Fanon deals with this paradox throughout his writings. His concerns with race, 
colonialism, anti-colonial nationalism are the particularities in which the possibility of a 
universalist humanism is incarnated and likewise, these particularities are transcended to arrive 
at this universalism. Fanon, in arriving at his project identity, is neither taking a vulgar Marxist 
approach that reduces the subject to structures, nor does he take the liberal approach of 
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Amartya Sen which ignores structures and focuses purely on choice. Fanon’s project identity of 
becoming human evolves from a Sartrean understanding of dialectic that 
 
Man undergoes the dialectic, in so far as he makes it, and makes it, in so far as he 
undergoes it. He is not subject to it non-dialectically, like a divine law, or a metaphysical 
fatality: and it does not emanate from himself non-dialectically, as though he were its 
unconditioned creator.264 
 
Or, man has the capacity to make something out of himself from within the limits set by 
circumstances, recognizing these limits and pushing towards a transcendence of these limits. To 
Fanon, the object of all societies based on oppression, be they of racism, or class, or colonialism, 
is to dehumanize one set of people for the benefit of others.  The oppressed subject reacts to 
the oppressive system through broadly three ways – acceptance and assimilation, 
overidentification with an inferiorized identity (Negritude) and a consequent valorisation of the 
same, creation of an emancipatory ideology of resistance that would transform both oppressor 
and oppressed and replace the oppressive system with one that is universally just.  
So to Fanon, violence of the oppressed subject is mere instrumental in ending the 
system of structural violence. Liberal critics of Fanon like Arendt who allege that he “glorified 
violence for violence’s sake”265 are thus missing this crucial point. The criticism266 that Slavoj 
Zizek lays at those whom he sarcastically terms ‘liberal communists’ can also be laid at such 
critics of Fanon – while they condemn the subjective violence that Fanon (allegedly) eulogizes, 
they overlook the fact that this subjective violence is a product of, and is intended to end, a 
structural violence. Fanon, while he was deeply aware of the negative psychological implications 
of subjective violence on the colonized as is evident in his chapter on “Colonial War and Mental 
Disorders” in Wretched of the Earth, his primary concern was to end to what was to him the far 
more insidious structural violence of colonialism.  
Fanon anticipates Johan Galtung who in his widely cited essay on violence argues that 
“Personal violence represents change and dynamism - not only ripples on waves, but waves on 
otherwise tranquil waters. Structural violence is silent, it does not show - it is essentially static, 
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it is the tranquil waters.”267 To Fanon, anti-colonial violence was a dynamic force that would 
sharpen the political resolve of their natives and violate the tranquillity of not just the colonial 
power, but also that of the native elite. This violence was necessary insofar as it conferred 
dignity to the natives who would realize their humanity in a common struggle against the 
colonizer, while simultaneously forcing the colonizers to recognize how they have dehumanized 
the natives and themselves within the system of colonialism. This again stems from Fanon’s 
reading of (Kojeve’s reading of) Hegel. The Slave, through struggle, a labour of his work, gains 
recognition from the Master and ends the Master-Slave relationship. I agree with Christopher 
Lee’s reading in his latest book on Fanon that violence was only a strategic choice for him, 
“though he argued for its tactical necessity and cathartic potential, Fanon recognized its 
traumatic impact from firsthand experience.”268 Fanon was aware that merely resentful anti-
colonial violence would be taken over by the native elites and turned against the masses in the 
postcolony. Hence, he warns against national chauvinism that may take over the anti-colonial 
project.   
Thus, “Anticolonialism is not the end; it must be filled out and developed into a practice 
and awareness of political and social inclusion of the most marginal, and only then will it have 
developed into a true humanism.”269 Fanon considers anti-colonialism, an empty signifier, as a 
tool of a strategic essentialism to move towards his project identity. Once the ‘primary 
contradiction’, to use a Maoist term, of colonizer-colonized is resolved, the erstwhile colonized 
comes to face the native elite or the comprador class which prevents him from fully achieving 
his humanity. This class uses the narrative of a narrow nationalism to legitimize its own privilege 
to the detriment of the impoverished, often aiding neo-colonialism in the process. In the 
postcolony, this elite is becomes the new enemy of the people and the “manicheist 
classification of black and white” disappears and the masses recognize that “One is deprived or 
privileged in virtue of one’s economic and social association.”270 
Fanon notes how the landowners and the urban bourgeoisie in an underdeveloped 
newly decolonized country ensure that “development” that happens favours only their 
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sectarian interests – under this bourgeoisie that is both selfish and incompetent, anti-
colonialism quickly gives way to racism and chauvinism.271 While the racism of the European 
colonial is fuelled by contempt, the racism of the young urban bourgeoisie is fuelled by fear.272 
With neither the extensive resources nor the expertise of the erstwhile master, the new 
bourgeoisie resorts to crude methods of force simultaneously with justifications of its own 
status through appeals to a mythical past and narrow nationalism. This is why Fanon places his 
lot among the peasantry, whom he considers the most affected by colonial political economy, 
and is deeply suspicious of both the urban bourgeoisie and the proletariat. To him, both were 
privileged by the colonial apparatus and must be checked by a vigilant activism of the peasantry 
if at all there is to be an equitable distribution of resources in the postcolony. In such countries, 
“the combined efforts of the masses, regimented by a party and of keenly conscious 
intellectuals, armed with revolutionary principles, should bar the way to this useless and 
harmful bourgeoisie.”273 
These intellectuals, who are in an organic relation with the masses, will with the masses 
create a national culture. But this is a culture that is not purely based on customs, traditions and 
artefacts of the past but “the values that inspired the struggle for freedom.”274 The activist-
intellectual uses selectively the resources of the past through the evaluating standard of the 
anti-colonial struggle and projects them onto the future of the nation as a national culture. But 
this national culture, rather than emphasising on differences among people, attempts to foster 
a spirit of shared solidarity. Scholars have called this outlook of Fanon as “nationalitarian” as a 
concept that stood different from and opposed to bourgeois nationalism.275 This was a 
resistance identity he preferred to racial categories of Negritude. Fanon calls for dismantling 
“not only the racial binaries of colonialism but also the xenophobic cultural nationalism of 
postcolonial nations.”276 In his vision, bourgeois cultural nationalism in decolonized countries 
was not just undesirable but it was also dangerous because of its inability to maintain 
hegemony over the new country. This would inevitably lead to the appearance of factions and 
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feuds, and foster sectarian violence in the postcolony, only to benefit neo-colonial forces that 
would seek to keep their exploitative economic relations with their former colonies intact.  
While one of Fanon’s immediate goals was African unity, “a principle on the basis of 
which it is proposed to achieve the United States of Africa without passing through the middle-
class chauvinistic national phase”277 his eventual goal was a solidarity among the oppressed of 
the Third World which would enable them in a revolutionary restructuring of the society. Yet, 
Fanon is also concerned about the erstwhile oppressor. It must be realized that Fanon is not 
criticizing Europe for being Europe – he is criticizing it for not being Europe enough. “All the 
elements for a solution to the major problems of humanity existed at one time or another in 
European thought. But the Europeans did not act on the mission that was designated them”278 
is a lament, not a curse. So the Third World must transform itself for itself and also for Europe 
and for a new humanism. So Sartre’s message to European readers in his preface to Wretched 
of the Earth that “Fanon has got nothing “in for you” at all”279 must be treated as hyperbole. 
Fanon’s idea of identity politics seeks to transform the identities of both oppressor and 
oppressed, encouraging them to transcend closures. His need to “to explain the other to 
myself”280 is infused with a radical hope of the Self and the Other mitigating their particularities 
and eventually merging, maybe with the instrumental use of violence to alter the system that 
maintains these narrow particularities, into a We. That is Fanon’s project identity – a human 
identity in a ‘world of all of us’. 
Conclusion 
 
From the above study of Fanon’s critique of identity politics, four key aspects of Fanon’s identity 
politics can be traced. 
One, the subject was fully free in identifying with an identity despite the limits that 
circumstances placed upon him. The oppressed has an agency and thereby responsibility in 
fashioning his identity politics of the future from the resources that he can avail of from his 
historical context.  
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Two, anti-colonialism was absolutely necessary for an emancipatory political project 
and identification of the colonized with the anti-colonial resistance was a necessary step. Since 
European humanism failed to have emancipatory potential and served instead as a mask for 
colonial domination, it had to be rejected and there could be nothing progressive for the 
oppressed from the colonial setup.  The perpetuation of colonialism would only mutilate the 
identity of the colonized whereas resistance to it, and identification with the resistance to it, 
opens up egalitarian possibilities. 
Three, while cultural differences should be recognized reciprocally in a spirit of 
conditional relativism, racial or national particularism always had pitfalls. After the ending of the 
colonial status, which is a non-negotiable condition for a politics of the future, the colonized 
nevertheless realize that the colonizer is not the only oppressor and that the oppressor within 
can be as brutal as the oppressor without and more, can also mobilize the empty signifier of 
anti-colonial nationalism to further his own benefits. Therefore, while anti-colonialism is 
absolutely necessary, there should also be a conscious ideological attempt to transcend 
nationalism.  
Four, the transcendence of particular social identity of race and nation must arrive at a 
universal human identity. Shared solidarity and struggle against oppressions are necessary to 
arrive at this universalism. Fanon here could said of advocating what Judith Butler would have 
called ‘competing universalism’ wherein he rejects the universalism of the European to replace 
it with an universalism of the oppressed which alone would be the true universalism.  
Sartre famously said in his play No Exit that “Hell is other people”. Many years after its 
composition, he clarified that what he meant by that particular statement was “if relations with 
someone else are twisted, vitiated then that other person can only be hell.”281 It can be said 
that Fanon’s concern with identity politics was an attempt at redemption from this hell.  
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Contextualizing EV Ramasamy 
 




In the last public speech that he delivered on 19 December 1973 at Chennai, EV Ramasamy, 
popularly known as ‘Periyar’, identified the Brahmin as the enemy of the non-Brahmin 
collective, urged for a war to be waged on Brahminism, and addressing the political categories 
of non-Brahmins and women, called on them to shed allegiance to the Hindu religion. The 
reasoning for his provocative statement above was that according to the Hindu religion, the 
shudras (lower castes) were “sons of prostitutes”.283 
Much earlier in his political life, in a speech in June 1925 at a public meeting of the 
Congress Party in Karaikkudi, Tamil Nadu, he used a similar logic, accusing Hinduism for the ills 
of casteism in the region. Criticizing the shudras for being in a state of “Brahminical illusion”, he 
accused them of being complicit in the perpetuation of a social hierarchy that not only devalues 
them, but by providing them a sense of relative superiority, enables them to oppress those 
castes below them284, the untouchable castes (hereafter referred to as ‘Dalits’285). The 
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94 
 
movement that he spearheaded from 1925 onward was termed by him and his followers as the 
Self-Respect Movement whose chief aim was the abolition of castes, gender and race prejudices 
and the creation of a rational society.  
In this chapter, I will be providing an introduction to EV Ramasamy, whose identity 
politics I will be critiquing in the later chapters through a Fanonist lens. After providing the 
readers with a general idea of caste and its specificity in Tamil Nadu, I place Ramasamy in his 
socio-historical context and trace the contours of EV Ramasamy political discourse. While 
Ramasamy has been regarded as a social revolutionary who opposed casteism, there have been 
criticisms from some intellectual quarters that he was not effective in challenging them or that 
he was only privileging the dominant castes at the expense of the lowest castes. This shall be 
the core problem that I will be critiquing through a Fanonist lens in Chapter 5.  
Caste 
 
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to have an overview of caste in general, caste 
dynamics in the state of Tamil Nadu in particular. Caste, derived from Portuguese casta, has 
been a term that has been used loosely to define a closely knit group on the basis of lineage 
and/or occupation. As a social phenomenon, it is specific to the Indian subcontinent and there is 
considerable academic debate on what the term signified when it first entered public discourse 
with the onset of colonialism and whether it is a useful category to understand the nature of 
social groups in India. While in common parlance caste has been associated with varna, 
sociologists have made strong arguments for it to be used to describe jati alone.  
The varna classification system, derived from Sanskrit-Hindu texts, divides Hindu society 
into four categories – brahmans (priests), kshatriyas (warriors), vaishyas (traders) and the 
shudras (peasants, artisans), in this hierarchical order. Those falling outside these categories 
were the outcastes, the untouchables, who were defined by their ability to pollute by their very 
presence. The varnas comprise of several hundred jatis, endogamous groups that are peculiar 
to regions, who have been given a place in the varna system or try to create a place for 
themselves in the varna system. And it has been noted that in actual operation, “caste 
affiliations take not the vertical homogenous class and status form of varna but the horizontal 
                                                                                                                                                                            




heterogeneous form of jati”, with the varna model being a referent to evaluate the position of 
one’s own caste, and also to devalue the position of others.286 Quite some historians and 
sociologists agree that prior to the onset of colonialism, there was considerable mobility among 
castes that belonged to kshatriya, vaishya and shudra varnas.  However, there is very little 
evidence of castes being upgraded to the brahman status.  
Indian sociologist M.N. Srinivas, most known for his theory of ‘Sanskritization’287, argues 
that “The caste system of even a small region is extraordinarily complex and it does not fit into 
the varna-frame except at one or two points.”288 In the case of Tamil Nadu, the organization of 
castes in reality defies the varna system while in theory, certain castes have tried to uphold it or 
give themselves a place in it. The most obvious ones are the Brahmins belonging to the first 
varna, who comprised roughly 3% of the Tamil population, and who were distinct from the rest 
by their caste title, the sacred-thread worn by Brahmin males, extensive familiarity with Sanskrit 
texts, their Sanskrit laced Tamil dialect, and their exclusive role as the arbiters of god in temples 
that served as local centres of power.  
Despite the historical existence of trading and warrior communities among the Tamils, 
the non-Brahmins were en masse categorized as shudras.289 This categorization was largely a 
result of the intervention of the colonial power and the orientalist discourse that accompanied 
it to create convenient categories for data gathering and administration in the colony. Indeed, 
the way caste operated did change with the encounter with colonialism, but this cannot be led 
to conclude that the pre-existing caste elites and the concomitant power-knowledge relations 
did not shape the colonial rule in India as well. Dirks observes that “Brahmanic texts, both Vedic 
origin stories and the much later dharma texts of Hinduism’s puranic period, provided 
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transregional and metahistorical modes of understanding Indian society that clearly appealed to 
British colonial interests and attitudes.”290 An aspect of orientalism valorised Brahminical castes 
and their way of life under the colonial rule and there was a “structural bonding of the 
Brahminical with the emergent institutions” of colonialism.291 The Brahmin, one of the first to 
accept westernization, now had an additional role of being the voice of the native society, a 
voice that informed the British what the native society was, a voice that colluded with the 
British in the categorization of the native society, and a voice that later used those 
categorizations to inform the native society what its nature was.292  
The Stage 
 
The discourse of colonial-orientalism in Tamil Nadu had a certain ambivalent character to it. The 
state apparatus preferred to collaborate with the Brahmins for administrative purposes and 
influential Indophile intellectuals like Annie Besant valorised the Brahminical as the ideal worthy 
of emulation. On the other hand, Christian missionary-scholars like G.U. Pope (1820-1908), best 
known for his translation of secular and religious texts of ancient and medieval Tamil Nadu, and 
Bishop Robert Caldwell (1814-1891), philologist and linguist, who wrote extensively on the 
history of Dravidian languages besides also being interested in the problem of caste, provided 
an alternate approach to the understanding of the native society. And it was from these sources 
that the fledgling non-Brahmin movement derived its initial intellectual strength. In fact, if there 
could be a landmark event in the intellectual history of the non-Brahmin movement, it would be 
the publication of Caldwell’s A Comparative Grammar of the Dravidian or South Indian Family of 
Languages in 1856. While Caldwell notes the role the Brahmins had played in providing a 
‘higher civilization’ to the Dravidians, he also brings out a contrast between the Aryan and the 
Dravidian. In a comment on the ‘Pre-Aryan civilization of the Dravidians’, he writes: 
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Though the primitive Dravidians were probably unacquainted with the higher arts of 
life, they do not appear to have been by any means a barbarous and degraded people. 
Whatever may have been the condition of the forest tribes, it cannot be doubted that 
the Dravidians, properly so called, had acquired at least the elements of civilisation, 
prior to the arrival amongst them of the Brahmans.293 
 
Caldwell, while appreciating the intellect of the Brahmin, identifies him as an outsider in 
the Dravidian society and as the agent responsible for introducing caste among the native 
Dravidians. Pandian notes that missionary narratives were informed by a dual consciousness as 
regards the Brahmin – “envy for his philosophically-inclined religious and literary culture, and 
contempt for his ritually-driven pantheistic religious beliefs and practices because these were 
said to have reproduced caste as a system of power and subordination.”294 It was the latter 
aspect of the narrative that became ammunition for the non-Brahmin movement, whose 
organic intellectuals strategically deployed the Brahmin-Dravidian differentiation in their 
political discourse. Caldwell speculated in his preface to the second edition of his book that “the 
interest taken in their language, literature, and antiquities by foreigners will not be without its 
effect in kindling amongst the natives of Southern India a little wholesome, friendly rivalry.”295 
There was rivalry, but not of the friendly kind.  
As the Brahmins made use of the colonial construction of a Sanskrit-oriented Hinduism 
to empower themselves within the colonial structure and to assist in the creation of an 
Indian/Hindu nationalism to oppose that structure, the stalwarts of the non-Brahmin movement 
appropriated social and linguistic histories from missionary narratives to challenge the claims of 
an Indian/Hindu nationalist narratives. The political writings of intellectuals like Iyothee Thaas 
(1845-1914) and Maraimalai Adigal (1876-1950), forerunners to the Dravidian movement, show 
how indebted they were to Caldwell. While both Thaas and Adigal extensively used anti-
Brahmin rhetoric, they were unable to reach out to a wider public owing to their idealization of 
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particular identities – to Thaas, the Buddhist Paraiyar296 was the ideal and to Adigal, the 
vegetarian Saiva Vellalar297 was the ideal. Yet, the discourse of such intellectuals spawned 
considerable debate in the Tamil society of the late 19th and the earlier 20th century, a period 
claimed by some scholars to be the beginning of the modern Tamil renaissance.298 
While Brahmin scholars like UV Swaminatha Iyer (1855-1942) and the poet Subramaniya 
Bharati (1882-1921) had contributed extensively to Tamil language and literature, their loyalties 
were two fold “to the concept of one India, and to the idea of the Tamil language and the 
persistent and distinct culture that went with the language.”299 Bharati was also opposed to the 
non-brahmin movement as he felt that it would impede the Indian national struggle. Moreover, 
these few scholars apart most of the Brahmins had an aloofness from the non-brahmin Tamil 
masses and were hostile to Tamil nationalist sentiments. As Pandian puts it, “The zeal of the 
brahmin for Sanskrit had to exist in a complicated relationship with Tamil. While the brahmin’s 
use of Tamil was heavily Sanskritized and was celebrated for its beauty despite its relative 
unintelligibility to most, the Tamil spoken by non-brahmins was treated as unworthy of any 
man’s tongue.”300 The Brahmins as a community could not be completely integrated in the folds 
of the Tamil movement since the protagonists of Tamil suspected that the loyalty of the 
Brahmins lay with the Indian entity overstepping the aspirations of the Tamils, besides 
condemning their privileging of Sanskrit over Tamil. Thus, “The Tamil renaissance which 
coincided with the nationalist movement demanded that the non-brahmin, the Dravidian, 
become the custodian of his own culture.”301 
The non-Brahmin identity as an organized political movement began with the passing of 
the Non-Brahmin Manifesto – another landmark event in modern Tamil intellectual history – by 
a number of Non-Brahmin notables in Chennai, on December 1916 which demanded greater 
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representation for Non-Brahmins in politics, education and administrative services, besides 
swearing its loyalty to British rule on the premise that self-government for India without 
adequate social reform and checks and balances on the privileges of the Brahmins would only 
privilege the latter.  The Manifesto called for “progressive political development”, “no caste 
rule” and “self-government based on equal distribution of power”.302 The Manifesto concluded  
 
What is designated as “Nation building” is a laborious task, involving, and indeed 
necessitating, in the slow process of evolution, the due performance, in the proper time 
by each class and community, of the duty it owes to itself, first and foremost. It is our 
firm conviction that in India, for sometime to come at any rate, every community has 
primarily to put its own house in order, so that, when it has to cooperate with other 
communities, possible with higher social pretensions, it may do so, not as a dependent 
and helpless unit to be made a figure head or cats-paw of, but as a self-respecting and 
highly developed social organisation, offering its willing co-operation for the promotion 
of common objects on terms of perfect equality.  
 
The Tamil non-Brahmin scepticism of Indian nationalism and the Indian nation-building 
project is evident here, and the non-Brahmin representatives who were party to the Manifesto 
were insistent on prioritizing social reform and the spread of Western Enlightenment values to 
political independence. 
Also to be noted is the parallel formation of the South Indian Liberal Federation, or the 
Justice Party303, which had its genesis in the cultural organization called the Madras Dravidian 
Association. The Justice Party, which was started in 1917 by the group of elite non-Brahmins 
who were signatories to the making of the Non-Brahmin Manifesto, strove to achieve political 
power and proportional representation in educational institutions and government services for 
the non-Brahmin Tamils. It was the first political outfit to oppose the imposition of Hindi as an 
official language in the Madras Presidency, as early as 1937. The focus of the non-Brahmin 
movement was urban, “appropriation of education was not only a means for the capture of new 
emerging power structures but also for emancipation from the rigidity of ascribed, occupational 
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status – the basis of caste-feudal relations; a share in the political power of administration and 
legislation was the other issue.”304  
The Justice Party used the term ‘Dravidian’ to all non-brahmin castes in South India and 
sought to use the identity of the Dravidians, their cultural past and the vision of an egalitarian 
future under them as an assertion of the non-Brahmin castes against Brahminism. From an 
economic perspective, it was the assertion of the emerging regional bourgeoisie – comprising of 
elite sections of the non-Brahmin castes – who felt discontented by the political dominance of 
the brahmins despite the latter being a miniscule minority in the Tamil region. Being less than 
3% of the population, Brahmin representation was dominant in the judiciary, administration, 
education, and even in political leadership. 305 As Wyatt succinctly puts it, “Advocates of the 
Non-Brahman cause introduced a compelling narrative of conflict into the politics of Tamilnad 
and constructed a rhetorical separation between a tiny Brahman elite and the majority of the 
population.”306 Though the membership of the Justice Party was open to all persons of South 
India from the Madras Presidency except the Brahmins, the Justice Party was confined to Tamil 
Nadu due to various factors, the primary one being that the antagonism between the Brahmin 
and the non-Brahmin had not developed in the other southern states to the extent it had 
developed in Tamil Nadu. But as far as Tamil Nadu was concerned, it could be concluded that 
the non-Brahmin movement succeeded “in creating a lasting impression that in virtually every 
political context it was important whether a person was a Brahmin or a non-Brahmin.”307  
However, the Justice Party with its elite composition was unable to attract mass appeal 
in the state. After its defeat in the Madras Presidency legislative elections of 1937, it aligned 
itself with the more radical Self-Respect Movement which was being steered by Ramasamy. 
While the Justice Party contested the Brahmin’s power in excessive representation in public 
offices, Ramasamy challenged the Brahmin as a symbol of a hierarchical social order. To 
Ramasamy, the creation of an egalitarian society was impossible without the progressive 
disempowerment of this symbol, which again was contingent on a radical critique of the Hindu 
religion. Quite some of the liberal non-Brahmin elites in the Justice party and Saivite thinkers 
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like Adigal were perturbed by Ramasamy’s uncompromising stance against the Hindu religion in 
its entirety.  
Ramasamy’s Discourse – Its Context and Content 
 
If there was a central theme that ran coherently in Ramasamy’s thoughts it is this – anti-
Brahminism308. Ramasamy’s political affiliations and activities have varied over time – he started 
off as a Congress activist, later called it an evil to be eradicated, supported Gandhi’s campaigns 
for liquor prohibition and later called for a prohibition of Gandhism, flirted briefly with 
Communism and later criticized the Communist Party for being dominated by Brahmins, took 
the chairmanship of the Justice Party eventually criticizing the non-Brahmin elites within it and 
converting it to the more radical ‘Dravidar Kazhagam’ (Dravidian Federation) in 1944, burnt 
Hindu religious texts and broke idols of deities, advocated atheism while campaigning for rights 
of all castes to access temples, opposed the imposition of Hindi as the national language of India 
while satirizing the political rhetoric of Tamil nationalists and so. Through all this, Ramasamy’s 
discourse remained consistently anti-Brahminical.  
Born in 1879 in the town of Erode to an intermediate Naicker caste family which literally 
moved up in society from rags to riches, the better part of Ramasamy’s childhood was spent in 
an atmosphere of opulence. By his own admission, he was a social rebel even before he reached 
teenage, questioning the restrictions placed by his family and their social circle on mingling with 
children from castes relatively lower to their own, often transgressing their diktats. His family’s 
deeply religious nature only piqued the young Ramasamy’s passion in questioning their beliefs. 
In his article “The Genesis of my Self-Respect Movement”, he claims that even at the age of 
twelve, he showed interest in debates on the Hindu scriptures. “In those days Sanyasis (saints), 
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Bhagavathars (religious singers), religious mendicants had great sway in our family. I disliked 
them. I used to pester them with questions and make them feel embarrassed.”309 Scholars of 
the history of the Dravidian movement and biographers of Ramasamy in general conclude that 
it was Ramasamy’s two year trip to North India as a sceptical wandering saint at the age of 
twenty-five that strengthened his conviction that the Hindu religion was a social malaise, owing 
to his having witnessed corrupt practices in temples across the country. He returned to Tamil 
Nadu to participate in the freedom struggle with the local chapter of the Indian National 
Congress in 1919 – but with a decisive non-Brahmin orientation. After struggling within the 
Congress for six years to secure proportional representation for non-Brahmins, which was met 
by much hostility from the Indian nationalists, he left the organization in November 1925 and 
launched the Self-Respect Movement a month later.  
In the course of his political career, Ramasamy produced a voluminous amount of 
writings which were mostly published in three papers (Kudiarasu, Puratchi and Viduthalai), 
besides a journal (Pagutharivu) and an English weekly (Revolt) which were published for a brief 
period. It is really hard to trace out which thinker or what particular thought influenced 
Ramasamy’s crusade against caste, if his thoughts are indebted to any political or philosophical 
tradition. In the course of his political life, he has been known to cite Socrates, the Buddha, 
Rousseau, Marx, Russell, and has expressed admiration for Western rationalism and the 
Enlightenment. Yet, these have been only used as props to strengthen his argument and do not 
dominate the pattern of his argument as such. Ramasamy himself has not admitted to have 
been influenced by any particular thinker.  
The political discourse and social criticism of Ramasamy, the Self-Respect Movement 
and the party that he steered from 1944 to 1973, the Dravidar Kazhagam (DK), was informed by 
a “hyper-literal reading of the religious.”310 Hinduism, which Ramasamy associated with the 
Brahmins311, became the object of vitriolic criticism and ridicule. Caste hierarchy, which was 
considered an integral part of Hinduism, came under scathing attack and the Brahmins were 
accused of being the lynchpin of this social structure. Likewise, while the idea of who is a 
‘Dravidian’ fluctuates in Ramasamy’s thoughts – at different times, it has been all non-Brahmins 
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in the sub-continent, all non-Brahmins in South India, all non-Brahmins in Tamil Nadu alone – he 
has been consistent in his view that the ‘Aryan’ and ‘Aryan values’ are inimical to the interests 
of his people.312 The Brahmin, irrespective of region, was considered ‘Aryan’.313  
It needs to be mentioned here that Aryan/Brahmin and the Dravidian/non-Brahmin 
divide that Ramasamy insists on relied on colonial-missionary epistemology. Retrospectively 
speaking, one could say no Caldwell, no Periyar. But what Ramasamy does here is a strategic 
manoeuvre – while his insistence on the pre-colonial Aryan domination of the Dravidian was 
taken from missionary sources, he also notes that the Brahmin Other has made optimal use of 
the colonial apparatus to legitimize the Hindu discourse. In this, he is quite critical of colonialism 
as a system that privileges the discourse of the native elite. The Brahmin subject’s agency within 
the colonial hierarchy and the manner in which his narrative works against the interests of the 
Dravidian masses is recognized by Ramasamy. This is Ramasamy being radically political in the 
Schmittian sense; the creation of an enemy to justify the creation of a collective. We shall 
explore the strengths and pitfalls of this strategy in the next chapter. It should also be added 
that Ramasamy’s uncompromising opposition to the political figure of the Aryan-Brahmin also 
flowed from his rationalist opposition to all theological authorities.     
Ramasamy’s reading of Hindu religious scriptures involved a ‘re-evaluation of all values’, 
wherein what the scriptures claimed as ‘good’ was mocked for being bad for society, while what 
was said to be ‘evil’ was held up as a better ideal. For instance, Rama, the protagonist of the 
Hindu epic Ramayana (incidentally, the ideal figure of Man worthy of emulation and adulation 
                                                          
312 Eminent historian specializing in ancient India, Romila Thapar, contends in her book The Aryan: 
Recasting Constructs (Gurgaon: Three Essays Collective, 2008) that ‘Aryan’ is a linguistic category and not 
a racial category. Colonial-orientalism in India did play a major role in developing the idea of ‘Aryan’ and 
‘Dravidian’ as racial categories. This was appropriated by both the Hindu nationalists, who wanted to 
show that the Aryans were a superior race capable of governing themselves and others, and the anti-
caste reformers, who wanted to show that the Dravidians were oppressed by the former and were willing 
to look beyond the colonial/anti-colonial binaries. For an account for the significance of the ‘Dravidian’ in 
Tamil Nadu’s political imagination, see Jacob Pandian, “Re-Ethnogenesis. The Quest for a Dravidian 
Identity among the Tamils of India”, Anthropos, Bd. 93, H. 4./6. (1998), pp. 545-552.  Ramasamy’s strategy 
of utilizing the Dravidian terminology will be discussed in later chapters.  
313 Jacob Pandian explains that even prior to the Dravidian movement, “In southern India, historically, 
Brahmins were associated with the Sanskritic literary and religious tradition rather than with the Tamil 
literary and religious tradition although the latter (Tamil) tradition had been enriched by many Brahmins 
who were frequently the custodians of both the traditions. Due to the fact that Sanskrit is a non-
Dravidian language (despite its having many Dravidian words and structures), Sanskrit became a symbol 
of the "Aryan" identity of northern India, and non-Brahmins rejected their Aryan or Sanskritic heritage to 
forge a Dravidian or Tamil heritage, excluding the Brahmins from it.” Jacob Pandian, “Re-Ethnogenesis. 
The Quest for a Dravidian Identity among the Tamils of India”, p.546 
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in both the Gandhian and the Hindu nationalist imagination) was accused of being a patriarchal 
casteist who stood for the defence of Brahminical, Aryan-north Indian, male chauvinist views 
against the interests of the lower castes and women. On the other hand, Ravana, the chief 
antagonist of the Ramayana, and who is generally reviled by Hindu believers as the embodiment 
of evil, was praised as the paragon of Dravidian virtue and chivalry.314  
Sartre had a rather perceptive take on M.K. Gandhi’s strategy towards resolving the 
problem of caste in wake of the Indian anti-colonial struggle: 
 
In India, the caste system engendered insurmountable contradictions in all levels of 
society, but Gandhi judged it useless to take them all into consideration: it was 
necessary, he thought, to find the keystone of the building, and concentrate on that. As 
we know, he discovered it without difficulty: quite simply, it was the pariah caste.315 
 
The exact inverse of this strategy was deployed by Ramasamy in his social reform 
movement. He identified the hegemony of the Brahmin as “the keystone of the building” of the 
caste system, locating the power of this hegemony in the realm of religion and culture. While 
Gandhi’s stated mission was to eradicate untouchability and sanitize Hinduism by calling on the 
Dalits to give up their erstwhile ‘unclean’ habits, Ramasamy argued that untouchability and 
discrimination was part and parcel of Hinduism and it was impossible to reform this or that ills 
without a radical rupture of the system itself. 
The title ‘Periyar’ – the great one – was conferred to Ramasamy not at an anti-caste 
conference, an atheist association, or at a Tamil nationalist convention.  It was at the Chennai 
conference of the Progressive Women’s Association in 1938 that he was given the title and it 
became his epithet in Tamil Nadu ever since. For a substantial period, Ramasamy’s deep 
involvement with the women’s movement in Tamil Nadu was neglected by academics, or only 
found a passing mention. However, since the 90s, there has been considerable interest in 
Ramasamy’s contributions to the gender question, largely owing to the academic contributions 
of Tamil feminist social historians.  
                                                          
314 Quite a few parallels can be seen in Ramasamy’s approach to Hinduism and Russian anarchist Mikhail 
Bakunin’s attack on religion in his God and the State where in he compares the Christian god to a slave-
master and praises the devil as the first rebel besides outlining how religion has contributed to the 
systematic oppression of humanity. While this study might be interesting, there is little evidence to 
suggest that Ramasamy was familiar with the Russian’s works.  
315 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Spectre of Stalin, trans. By Irene Clephane, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969, p105 
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The very first Provincial Self-Respect Conference held at Chengalpet district on 17 
February 1929 which saw the active involvement of Ramasamy passed a resolution calling for 
greater social, political and economic rights for women, including “the same rights to property 
and inheritance as men” and “free right to choose their partners irrespective of caste, creed and 
race.”316 While Ramasamy identified Hinduism to be an important reason for the degradation of 
women in society, he was also acutely aware of Tamil prejudices. Recognizing male chauvinism 
in classical Tamil texts he chided the Tamil language as ‘barbaric’, criticizing everyday parlance 
for gender bias.317 Condemning the praise of chastity and virginity in Tamil literature and 
attacking marriage as an instrument of oppression of women, Ramasamy was instrumental in 
initiating the practice of ‘Self-Respect marriages’ – secular marriages conducted without an 
officiating Brahmin priest and religious rituals. He also exhorted women to learn from the 
progressive customs of the British and the West.  
It is hard to place Ramasamy under any ‘ism’ as he subscribed to no theory in particular 
nor did he claim to be involved in a theoretical practice. His criticism of the Hindu religion does 
not have the rigorous theoretical method that Ambedkar adopts. While Ambedkar attempted to 
bring about an alternate philosophy of emancipation for the backward castes, Ramasamy 
involved in an iconoclastic enterprise in the public sphere be it the breaking of Hindu religious 
idols or the debunking of myths, superstitions and repressive social norms.  Ramasamy viewed 
nationalism in general with suspicion and exhibited contempt for eulogies of pristine pasts, 
even be it by Tamil nationalists. He argued that nationalism was the invention of lazy 
intellectuals in the service of the propertied class against the interests of the workers and that 
“Nationalism is something that induces haze and fanaticism to a human being.”318 Nationalism, 
anti-colonial variants included, was just another form of religion. His belief was that the solace 
of humanity was in rationalism and that anything that existed contrary to reason was to be 
criticized. The extensive volumes of Ramasamy’s writings, if anything, show that he was not 
concerned with creating an ideological consensus towards a finite end but rather with 
challenging the Brahminical hegemony of the present through subversive discursive practices.  
                                                          
316 “Resolutions passed at various self-respect conferences relating to women empowerment”, in ed. K. 
Veeramani, Periyar Feminism, Thanjavur: Periyar Maniyammai University, 2010, pp.164-181 
317 Anandhi S. Bharadwaj, “Women's Question in the Dravidian Movement c. 1925-1948” in Social 
Scientist, Vol. 19, No. 5/6 (May - Jun., 1991), p.26 
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In a speech in 1970 outlining his vision of “The world to come”, Ramasamy advocated 
the abolition of monarchy, monopoly, private property, the family, the state and its repressive 
apparatus and religion.319 He called on women and men to enter into free sexual unions, and 
challenged the traditional Hindu idea that the primary purpose of sex was for procreation. He 
also emphasised on the emancipatory potential of reason and individual self-determination. 
One could argue that Ramasamy had anarchist/libertarian socialist leanings though he himself 
has not made any claims to the same. 
Ramasamy had a cautious approach towards communism and class politics. He toured 
the Soviet Union for about three months, between February and May 1932. On his return, he 
began aggressively promoting socialist ideas, denouncing nationalism and hailing the virtues of 
internationalist socialism.320 After consultation with local communists, the Self-Respecters 
passed a set of resolutions demanding radical land reforms, minimal wage and improving of 
living conditions for workers, public ownership of essential services, state control of religious 
bodies and prohibition of caste.321 Apprehensive of the radicalization of the Self-Respect 
movement, the colonial government began a crackdown on its leaders and cadres and many, 
including Ramasamy, had to serve terms in prison. Fearing that the progress made by the Self-
Respect movement would achieve sever setbacks under continued repression, Ramasamy made 
a break with his erstwhile communist allies, even though he would be attracted to socialist 
ideals for the rest of his life. However, he also had criticisms to make of the Indian brand of 
communism.  
In an article written in 1944, noting that the Indian Communist Party was dominated by 
Brahmins, he argued that as long as caste exists, any form of communism would only benefit 
the Brahmins since a change in economic status would not necessarily bring a change in ritual 
hierarchy.322 Contrasting with the Soviet Union, he said “Since the Western countries did not 
have caste, they had to wage a class war before communism could be reached. Here, owing to 
the presence of caste, it is necessary to wage a caste war before achieving communism.”323 He 
differentiates between caste and class in that class is determined by relation to labour whereas 
                                                          
319 Ramasamy, Thoughts of Periyar, pp.290-301 
320 EV Ramasamy, Kudiarasu, 11-12-1932 
321 EV Ramasamy, Kudiarasu, 1-1-1933 
322 EV Ramasamy, Thoughts of Periyar EVR (Speeches and Writings of Periyar EV Ramsamy), First Series 
(Revised and Enlarged), [Volume 3, Politics Part-2], Chennai: Periyar EV Ramasamy-Nagammai Education 
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caste is a marker determined by birth in relation to a religiously sanctioned hierarchy. He 
asserts that “In a country where there are no common rights, communism would only 
strengthen those who have been enjoying greater rights,” adding that abolishing the privilege of 
Brahmins and the upper castes would result in going half the way towards the communist 
ideal.324 Ramasamy suspected that the universality that was guaranteed by communism, in the 
Tamil Nadu scenario, would be appropriated by the Brahmins to secure their own particular 
interests. In this, he is not rejecting the universality of communism – he is rather criticizing the 
Brahmins for being unable to transcend their particularity. He argues that since it is the Shudras 
who form the bulk of the working class and not the Brahmins, it is the Self-Respect Movement 
and the Dravidar Kazhagam that alone is the best representative of their interests.325  
Ramasamy’s politics was Schmittian in the sense that it had a very strong conception of 
the ‘absolute enemy’ in the Brahmin Other. As a person claiming the absence of rights in the 
Brahminical order, he sought ‘justice in enmity’.326 However, Ramasamy’s idea of ‘friend’ was 
inconsistent.  In Ramasamy’s discourse, the term Dravidian was equated with the non-Brahmin, 
which collates discrete social groups and gives them a negative identity in that they are not 
Brahmins. So, anyone who was not a Brahmin was a ‘friend’ or at least a possible one. At a 
point, the Ramasamy’s ‘Dravidian’ included every non-Brahmin in India – interestingly, even 
Japanese who identified with their politics could be called a Dravidian – “his notion of the 
Dravidian, which he used as an all-embracing trope for multiple forms of oppression, was 
inclusive enough to accommodate anyone from beyond the narrow parochial national territory, 
if he or she stood for the equality of all.”327 After Indian Independence however, the word 
became increasingly identified with the South Indian non-Brahmin, later narrowing down to the 
Tamil non-Brahmin. The political success of the DMK in capturing state power using a blend of 
Ramasamy’s anti-Brahminism and Tamil nationalism could be credited for this.  
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In the 1967 elections, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (Dravidian Progressive Federation) 
strode into power in the then Madras Presidency, riding on the wave of the popular anti-Hindi 
agitations that rocked the state. The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) was an offshoot of the 
original DK from which it had split in 1949, since the former wanted to participate in elections 
within the Indian constitution while the latter under Ramasamy’s leadership was convinced that 
the Indian independence of 1947 was but a cover for the Brahmins to exploit the rest. The DK 
had gained considerable notoriety for declaring August 15, the day of transfer of power from 
British to Indian hands, as a black day for the lower castes and for burning Indian national flags 
and copies of the constitution. And as long as Ramasamy was alive, the DK championed the idea 
of a separate state for the Dravidians. But it is also interesting to note that the political 
discourse of the DK defined the Dravidian nation “in terms of shared ideologies and convictions 
rather than in terms of language, ethnicity and geography.”328 
The DMK on the other hand took a more reformist line and preferred to work within the 
Indian political structure. C.N. Annadurai,329 the founder of the DMK, was a disciple of 
Ramasamy and a powerful orator and playwright, played a prominent role in strategically 
appropriating the DK’s political rhetoric and using it to catapult his party into power. The DMK’s 
politics had stronger Tamil nationalist overtones, which was sharpened during the anti-Hindi 
agitations that shook the state during the 50s and the 60s.330  
Though his reign was short owing to his demise in 1969, Annadurai was the key political 
figure in ending the rule of Congress party in Tamil Nadu and heralding in what is popularly 
called the ‘Dravidian rule’, which has alternated between the DMK and the All India Anna 
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam  (AIADMK). The latter, led by cinema icon M.G. Ramachandran, 
split from the DMK, which was taken over by Annadurai’s protégé M. Karunanidhi, citing 
corruption within the party.  Both political parties have pledged allegiance to the Periyarite 
ideal, with the DMK under Karunanidhi in particular passionately claiming to be the legitimate 
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successor to Ramasamy’s legacy. The current Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, J. Jayalalitha of the 
AIADMK, a Brahmin lady who has never attempted to hide her Hindu faith, also pays lip-service 
to the thoughts of Ramasamy on occasions. With the voter base of both parties being the non-
Brahmin castes, both the DMK and AIADMK have remained firm to one political demand of 
Ramasamy even if they had compromised on his more radical principles – affirmative action for 
backward castes.331 In their favour, Narendra Subramaniam argues “the Dravidian parties 
increased political participation, aided the representation of the emergent strata, enriched civic 
life, and thus strengthened pluralist democracy.”332 
Criticisms 
 
Yet, the Dravidian rule has been criticized for violent acts against those occupying the lowest 
level in the caste hierarchy, the Dalits. From the infamous Kilvenmani massacre in December 
1968 that saw the grotesque murder of 44 Dalit agricultural labourers by non-Brahmin 
landlords, to the November 2012 ransacking of Dalit hamlets by Vanniyars, a numerically 
dominant non-Brahmin caste, in Dharmapuri district following an inter-caste marriage between 
a Dalit boy and a Vanniyar girl, the ruling Dravidian parties have been witness to several caste 
based violence in the state, and have also been accused of abetting the same. While anti-Dalit 
violence is prevalent throughout India, anti-Dalit violence in Tamil Nadu has been cited as an 
indication of the failure of the political discourse of the Dravidian movement in general, 
Ramasamy’s thoughts in particular.  
Critics of Ramasamy have accused him of several things - for being anti-Indian, for 
promoting hatred towards the Brahmins, for separatism, for advocating a collapse of family 
values and traditional morality and so. Of this, one particular criticism stands out which is the 
supposed failure of Ramasamy to take Dalit concerns seriously. What is particularly interesting 
about this criticism is that intellectuals from the left, right and centre of the political spectrum 
are united in pointing it out. Cho Ramaswamy, a Hindu right-wing critic, says of Ramasamy that 
“in his crusade against the caste system, however, he did not concentrate on the liberation of 
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the Harijans, perhaps for fear of alienating his followers, mostly from the other castes.”333 Much 
earlier, M.N. Srinivas of liberal orientations commented that the Dravidian movement in Tamil 
Nadu resulted in the dominant non-Brahmin castes gaining power, arguing that these castes 
have a “vested interest” in keeping the Dalits poor socially and economically as the latter are 
their main sources of agricultural labour.334 The Dalit Marxist activist Anand Teltumbde makes a 
grand claim that Ramasamy’s DK by 1949 “transformed into a ruling-class lobby that ignored the 
caste question altogether”335 while Ravikumar, a Dalit postmodernist writer, argues that “The 
propaganda against brahmin domination in government services and in the social sphere 
benefited only the non-brahmins (who were economically powerful) and excluded the dalits”336 
and urges the Dalits to not sacrifice their singularity by standing on a common political platform 
with the non-Brahmin castes.337  
These writers, who otherwise would not see eye-to-eye on other social issues, have a 
commonality in their criticism that the Dravidian movement’s political discourse focused solely 
on empowering the non-Brahmins at the cost of the Dalits. While indeed there have acts of 
violence and discrimination against Dalits in Tamil Nadu in the Dravidian rule338 is the exclusion 
of Dalits an inherent component of Ramasamy’s political discourse? Does the construction of 
the non-Brahmin identity and political mobilization on those lines blur the social injustices that 
the Dalits face? Does the projection of the Brahmin Other as essentially evil by Ramasamy 
provide little or no space for critical introspection of the non-Brahmin Self? Was there a failure 
of Ramasamy to appreciate “the constitutive ambiguity of identity” that could provide “the 
cultivation of respect between constituencies bound together in relations of interdependence 
and strife”?339 Or was it an act of bad faith on part of Ramasamy to consider the Dravidian/non-
Brahmin identity as an end in itself? 
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Conclusion – and a Beginning of a Dialogue 
 
A critical dialogue with Fanon could attempt to answer these questions, I would argue. While 
Fanon has generally been associated with the study of colonialism/anti-colonialism, Black/White 
identity politics and violence, Fanon’s existential humanism provides tools to study identity 
politics in general. Now this is not an attempt to blindly transpose Fanon into a critique of caste 
– that would not just be foolhardy, but also dangerous. A lazy reading of Fanonist texts, 
especially the ones like “Algeria Unveiled” might lead one to argue that the Indian nationalists 
defence of the traditional Hindu wife, of regressive cultural practices like temple prostitution, 
and the Brahmin-centric worldview, were actually genuine resistance to colonialism. The task at 
hand is to rather to probe how better the Fanonian framework can work best for an 
understanding of Ramasamy’s politics of an inferiorized caste identity, by engaging in a dialogue 
of the discourse of the two thinkers.  
As mentioned earlier, Ramasamy’s politics was more concerned with strategic actions 
for localized resistance and did not lay claim to producing a theory or to universality, even 
though many of the issues that were of his concern involved universalist considerations. Fanon’s 
interventions on the other hand, while not materializing in reality as a successful political 
project, have produced an intensive theory of the dialectics of identity relations. So in theory, 
Fanon can be used to assess Ramasamy’s discourse. Fanon’s understanding of identity politics, 
which has a cautious cultural relativism to it, is based on a belief in anti-essentialism and the 
idea that identity is to be transcended for something more universal. This is particularly useful 
in engaging with Ramasamy’s handling of the Dalit question, his consideration of the particular 
identity of the enemy Other, that is, the Brahmin, and of his attitude towards the Dravidian 
identity.  
However, this study does not uncritically use a Fanonian lens to analyze Ramasamy. For 
just as Fanon used Sartre to understand better the dialectic of experience while having a critical 
view of the Sartrean understanding of the same, this study shall also use Ramasamy’s 
perspective to judge the pitfalls in Fanonian discourse – in Fanon’s take on gender, in his 




‘A Phase in the Dialectic’: A Fanonist 





In this chapter, I discuss Ramasamy’s discourse on caste and offer a Fanonist critique of the 
same. Ramasamy’s discussions on caste politics in Tamil Nadu involved discursive strategies 
directed towards three major groups – the intermediate castes, of which he was a member, 
whose social status as ‘Shudras’ he used as a weapon to incriminate the Brahmins; the 
Brahmins, who were the Other who, according to Ramasamy, by their very presence 
condemned the rest of the population to the status of Shudrahood and untouchability; the 
untouchable Dalit castes whose particularism he respected and who he considered allies in the 
struggle against Brahminism. Comparing and contrasting with Fanon’s identity politics, I explore 
what, in my opinion, are the pitfalls in Ramasamy’s discursive strategy. These include the 
upholding of an inferiorized identity of ‘Shudra’ that is based solely on the definition of the 
Brahmin Other, the consideration of the Brahmin Other as a fixed identity with no efforts made 
to unsettle it, and finally, an indulgence of Dalit particularity. I start with a discussion of the 
Shudra identity of the non-Brahmin and the ‘anti-casteist casteism’ of Ramasamy, comparing 
and contrasting it with the ideas of the Negritude movement, whose relationship with Fanon I 
have discussed in Chapter 2. While Ramasamy did not romanticize the Shudra or the non-
Brahmin identity as the Negritude thinkers did with respect to the Negro/Black identity, there 
nevertheless was a discursive process of essentialization and Othering of the Brahmin. I then 
discuss the Brahmin Other and what it means in Ramasamy’s political discourse. Much like 
Fanon, Ramasamy was deeply suspicious of the role that a native elite would play in a 
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postcolonial society. But while to Fanon the native elite was a economic category of comprador 
bourgeoisie, Ramasamy argued that the native elites were the Brahmin caste, who would 
secure hegemonic privilege in independent India, to the detriment of the non-Brahmins. 
However, by taking the Brahmin identity as fixed, Ramasamy’s political discourse inadvertently 
gives the Brahminical ideology the power to shape the identities of and conflicts between the 
Shudras and the Dalits.  I then discuss the position of Dalits in Ramasamy’s worldview and his 
respect for the Dalit particularity. In a Fanonist reading, I argue that Ramasamy’s consideration 
of a fixed Brahmin particularity as an essentialized Other, and the Dalit particularity as an 
identity to be respected, fails to dismantle the knot of Brahminical caste ideology. Drawing from 
Fanon, I conclude that a transformative praxis in search of a post-casteist society must be a 
universalism that is cognizant of particulars, that unsettles both the identities of the oppressor 
and the oppressed. 
To begin with  
 
In November 2012, mobs belonging to the Vanniyar caste, an intermediate caste group 
numerically dominant in northern Tamil Nadu, went on a rampage in Dharmapuri district and 
burnt down hundreds of Dalits homes and vandalized properties of Dalits. The violence was 
instigated by inflammatory speeches of Vanniyar community leaders, many of whom who were 
affiliated to the Pattali Makkal Katchi (Toiling People’s Party), who condemned an inter-caste 
marriage between a Dalit man and a Vanniyar girl and accused Dalit youngsters of luring girls 
from intermediate castes into such marriages. This was followed by violence by PMK cadres in 
May 2013, where they caused significant damage to public property condemning the detention 
of some of their leaders who had made communally provocative remarks, besides urging the 
state government to ensure the prevention of inter-caste marriages. The violence of the PMK 
was harshly condemned by intellectuals and activists belonging to several Periyarite groups 
while, interestingly, the PMK itself claims to be influenced by Periyarite ideals. 
Commenting on these incidents and trying to explain the cause of the anti-Dalit violence 
in the state, social critic S. Anand, a Tamil Brahmin, argues that the non-Brahmin movement 
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was “misrepresented as an anti-caste movement, which it certainly was not.”340 On the other 
hand, MSS Pandian argues in a commentary that the Tamil Nadu state as a whole benefitted 
from the non-Brahmin movement and that the violence perpetrated against the Dalits was 
more owing to the intermediate castes’ desire to symbolically compensate for their loss of 
erstwhile authority on the upwardly mobile Dalits through such acts of violence.341 
As pointed out in an earlier chapter, anti-Dalit violence in Tamil Nadu has been 
highlighted as the failure of the Dravidian movement, with some attributing it to an inherent 
problem in the political discourse of EV Ramasamy. But it does seem evident from all accounts 
that a common platform, a common identity, for Dalits and intermediate castes was not forged. 
What was the problem in Ramasamy’s political discourse that prevented a common identity or a 
common identification for Dalits and intermediate castes to emerge? 
The ‘Shudra’ identity of the non-Brahmin and Anti-casteist Casteism 
 
A key term that Ramasamy used as a device for self-description and as a challenge to the 
Brahminical ideology was ‘Shudra’, the Sanskrit word which denotes people belonging to the 
lowest order in the Varna system. To Ramasamy, the intermediate Tamil castes were Shudras, 
who, according to his hyper-literal reading of the Hindu texts, were “sons of prostitutes of the 
Brahmins, hereditary slaves, those who should not read, those who should not accumulate 
wealth.”342 The Shudras were different from the untouchable Dalit castes and Ramasamy, 
referring to this difference on several occasions, had chided the intermediate Tamil castes for 
their pride in their relative superiority over the Dalits.  
It is here that a comparison with Negritude helps. Like the proponents of Negritude, 
Ramasamy’s discourse appropriated a condescending term associated with an inferiorized 
identity and used it to unsettle the ‘mainstream’ discourse of Indian nationalism. In an article in 
1938 titled “Nationalist milk for the Brahmin snake” he polemically argues that the Brahmins 
with the aid of Gandhi seized little liberties granted by the British for themselves and duped the 
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Shudras.343 Like the Negritude thinkers who criticized the universalism of Western 
Enlightenment for being deeply entrenched in White superiority and racism, Ramasamy was 
opposed to Indian nationalism accusing it of being a cover for Brahmin dominance. However, 
unlike the Negritude thinkers, Ramasamy did not eulogise a pristine ‘pre-contact with the 
Other’ past or romanticize the ‘noble savage’ uncorrupted by modernity. To Ramasamy, the 
Shudra Tamils needed to “rise above a state of barbarism” and for that “it is not enough that 
one hates god, religion, the Vedas, the traditional puranas, temples, festivals and religious 
processions. One also must detest the Tamil language which upholds the puranas and religious 
epics. This is so because the Tamil language is structured so as to degrade the Tamil.”344 He 
criticizes the Tamil language and literature for their inherent sexism. Further, he calls on the 
Tamils to ignore the Tamil language and learn English, English customs, and English 
modernity.345 According to Ramasamy, “English governance, English education, English customs 
and English civilization have over time have dented to some extent the caste system and caste 
hierarchies.”346 The Shudra Tamil needed to give up not just the Brahminical religious texts and 
scriptures but also an attachment to a native Tamil culture to be an individual of self-respect. 
But whatever he or she might do, the Shudra would remain a Shudra as long as a Brahmin 
remained a Brahmin. That is, the symbolic presence of the Brahmin rendered the intermediate 
Tamil castes as Shudras.  
Yet another difference from Negritude is that Ramasamy, as Geetha notes, “did not 
grant epistemological privilege to experience” and was convinced that identity must be subject 
to “reason, dialogue and argument.”347 She also observes that to Ramasamy, the agent of 
history “was neither the shudra, nor an adi-dravida; nor was it a Tamil or a dravida. Instead, it 
was the non-brahmin historic bloc, in its entirety that was to undertake the tasks of creating a 
new social, economic and ethical order.”348 Geetha argues elsewhere that Ramasamy was 
particular on respecting the specificities of the Dalit identity, but I will come to that shortly. 
While it is true that Ramasamy’s agent of history was an abstract and fluid non-Brahmin 
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category, Ramasamy’s discourse around caste when addressed  to the intermediate castes, 
addressed them as ‘Shudras’, the aspects of their Shudrahood which includes acerbic criticisms 
of their notions of superiority over the Dalits and patriarchy, and the dominance of the 
Brahmins over them. The casteist terminology of the Brahmin elite is reversed and is held up to 
them as proof of their complicity in the degraded social status of the rest of the population.  
Ambedkar notes that “while making themselves into a caste, the Brahmans, by virtue of 
this, created Non-Brahman caste; or, to express it in my own way, while closing themselves in 
they closed others out.”349 The Brahminical ideology made the Shudra in history through various 
religious and mythological texts and the assertion of the Brahmin of his identity in the present 
had the effect of reiterating the Shudrahood of the intermediate Tamil castes. In rhetorical 
fashion, Ramasamy argues that even a Brahmin of a low class would identify the intermediate 
castes as Shudras and “sons of prostitutes” and himself as a higher Brahmin identity350 and 
asserts that the only way out would be for Tamils to secede from the Indian union.351 But he 
does this without a support for an alternate nationalism or national consciousness with his sole 
argument as regards state power being that Indian nation-state privileged Brahmins and thus 
condemned the Tamils to being in the state of Shudras and untouchability. To take from Fanon, 
the Brahmin might have made the Shudra, but it is the Shudra who fashions his politics of 
resistance. It was discussed in the earlier chapters how Fanon criticized the proponents of 
Negritude and their “anti-racist racism” for the limited scope of their politics. But this criticism 
cannot be blindly transposed into a criticism of Ramasamy’s political discourse as his “anti-
casteist casteism” as mentioned above did not seek legitimating in myriad pasts or through the 
valorisation of a pure identity. A Fanonist critique must take into consideration the nuances of 
Ramasamy’s discourse and the social problem he was dealing with.  
Fanon was quick to observe that Negritude’s privileging of an inferiorized identity, its 
reification of the Black skin, would inevitably lead to a compromise with the system of 
oppression. Based on an identity shaped by the oppressor, it loses purpose without him. The 
Shudra who accuses the Brahmin for making him as such is already in the playing field of 
Brahminical discourse.  If he cannot escape its grasp, he will try to make peace with it in 
inauthenticity and bad faith. Ramasamy’s usage of the Shudra terminology does not divest it out 
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of its traditional negative meaning and ascribe it a positive value. He rather uses it to condemn 
those have condemned the rest of the lower castes to lower status. Even Ramasamy’s non-
Brahmin agent of history has his identity based only on not being a Brahmin.  
To a point, the ‘Shudra’ as an identity may strategically serve as a negative reminder to 
the non-Brahmin castes of their need to reject and challenge Brahminism. Yet, its consistent 
deployment by Ramasamy inadvertently makes the symbol of the Brahmin as the permanent 
referent, the Other without whom the Self would collapse into vacuum, an ontological 
emptiness. Those from the Vanniyar caste who were involved in the violence against the Dalits 
in 2012 firmly resist being called Shudras – they fashion themselves as Kshatriyas, the warrior 
Varna. The term ‘Shudra’ is viewed by the Vanniyars, as it is by other intermediate castes, with 
aversion as it is a fixed signifier that can only refer to a low social standing, a painful reminder of 
one’s inferiority vis-à-vis the Brahmin Other, a negative identity. And they would rather, within 
the system of social hierarchy, perpetrate violence on those lower to them than form a Shudra-
Dalit alliance against Brahminism, embracing the negative connotations of their identity. 
Through a perspicuous reading of Sartre’s Anti-Semite and Jew, Fanon observes that “In order to 
react against anti-Semitism, the Jew turns himself into an anti-Semite.”352 A similar process is in 
operation here – to escape Shudrahood, the Shudra seeks a higher place in the Brahminical 
system.          
Fanon rejects a Negro identity politics that is based only on the lived experiences of 
Blacks and their histories of suffering in favour of a broader African politics. His endorsement of 
the Algerian identity is based on its affirmative potential to have an existence independent of 
the French. The past does not validate the politics of the present. The present has to create an 
affirmative politics of the future. "I do not have the right to allow myself to bog down. I do not 
have the right to allow the slightest fragment to remain in my existence. I do not have the right 
to allow myself to be mired in what the past has determined."353 Ramasamy’s Shudra, however, 
was determined purely by the past, or to be more specific, by a particular reading of the past. 
The Shudra of the present was in his inferior social state owing to a straight succession of events 
from the time when the Sanskrit scriptures were composed and the Brahmins, generation after 
generation, prevented any move to achieve social equality. His equating of the Dravidian and 
non-Brahmin intermediate caste with the Shudra and his contempt for a Tamil nationalist 
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identity created the lack of an alternative affirmative identification. The Periyarite radical was 
one who identified with an inferior identity and used it to deconstruct the discourse of the 
dominant system. But he was, for all practical purposes, dependent on the Other’s 
categorization of his Self as a ritual inferior. There is little or no clue of what would happen to 
the Shudra identity in a post-Brahminical scenario. Is the Shudra identity, as Sartre commented 
on Negritude, a ‘passing phase in the dialectic’ or an end in itself? 
In a Fanonist understanding, the implication of Ramasamy’s political discourse is this - 
There is one destiny for the Shudra and it is the Brahmin.  
The Brahmin Other 
 
In 1926, the wife of the colonial governor of Chennai was taken on a tour of the famous 
Madurai Meenakshi Amman temple by a Brahmin priest. Commenting on this, Ramasamy in an 
editorial in the party paper of the Self-Respect movement Kudiarasu (Republic) said that while it 
was acceptable for a Brahmin to entertain the “colonizer”, an “alien”, someone who “shared no 
values with your native religion”, it was unacceptable for the Brahmin to allow temple entry to 
those belonging to the Nadar caste354 who were natives and technically belonged to the Hindu 
religion.355 He further said  
 
Just as the Whites who divided us and prevented us from achieving unity and by this 
strategy, they ruled a country of 330 million, ruling with the aid of guns and cannons, 
looting our wealth, the Brahmins have divided us into several castes, instructing us that 
one was high and the other was low, facilitated a conflict between the high and low and 
with the aid of the weapons of Vedas, the scriptures, puranas, mores have inferiorized 
us and live off our blood.356  
 
Though one school of Marxist critics claim that Ramasamy in his pursuit of social reform 
“drifted into shameful collaboration with British imperialism”357 Ramasamy clearly understood 
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the pernicious effects of British rule. He was also, much like Fanon, aware that colonial system 
relied on native elite groups for administrative purposes. Fanon argues that in colonized 
underdeveloped countries, there is no genuine bourgeoisie “but rather an acquisitive, 
voracious, and ambitious petty caste, dominated by a small-time racketeer mentality, content 
with the dividends paid out by the former colonial power”358 and was convinced that this group 
must be opposed by a genuine decolonization struggle. He devotes an entire chapter “The Trials 
and Tribulations of National Consciousness” in WOTE to discuss the malignant character of the 
native elites in the process of decolonization and in the postcolony “since this caste has done 
nothing else but prolong the heritage of the colonial economy, thinking and institutions”359.  
Interestingly, it is in this particular chapter in the entire Fanonist corpus where the word 
“caste” is used repeatedly. In Fanon’s view, this caste is a rigid, mediocre, underdeveloped 
national bourgeoisie that, though on paper is “independent” of colonizer, in practice carries the 
baggage of the colonizer.360 He argues that these elite ensure that development happens only 
to favour their sectarian interests, and that under their incompetent rule, the spirit of anti-
Colonialism quickly gives way to racism and national chauvinism.361  
Ramasamy shared a similar hostility towards the native elites who spearheaded the 
Indian nationalist struggle and who were its representatives in Tamil Nadu. He argues that while 
in the initial stages, “the poor, the peasantry, the working class” participated in the anti-Colonial 
movement, it was only the “Brahmins who emerged as the main representatives of Tamil 
Nadu.”362 In his introduction to “Puratchi” (Revolution), another paper of the Self-Respect 
movement launched in November 1933, Ramasamy wrote that  
 
“Puratchi” was not launched to destroy the White master and install the Black master. 
“Puratchi” was not launched to end White government and bring in Black government. 
Nor was “Puratchi” launched to abolish Hinduism and propagate Islam or Christianity.  
[…] 
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“Puratchi” was born to make a revolution to end the rule of all capitalist classes and all 
religions, to ensure that all people live with self-respect and that there is universal 
equality between the male and female genders.363  
 
This sits well with Fanon’s appeal that “If we really want to safeguard our countries 
from regression, paralysis, or collapse, we must rapidly switch from a national consciousness to 
a social and political consciousness.”364 
In the chapter on national consciousness, Fanon also discusses the role that the national 
party, which once was the lead advocate of decolonization, plays in creation of the elite caste. 
He argues that in several newly liberated African countries the national party “operates on a 
tribal basis. It is a veritable ethnic group which has transformed into a party.”365 This party 
further results in “regionalist thinking and separatism.” In similar tones, Ramasamy alleges that 
the national party in both colonial and postcolonial India is a party that comprises entirely of 
Brahmins and the slaves of Brahmins.366 Further, in postcolonial India, the non-Brahmin Tamils 
were enslaved through “independence” and their oppression in multiple levels was facilitated 
by the domination of Brahmins in the national party, arguing that Brahmin domination was the 
consequence of Indian national unity.  
The difference in Fanon’s and Ramasamy’s approach to the native elites is that to 
Fanon, the “caste” he refers to is a political and economic elite that took over the reins of 
colonialism whereas to Ramasamy, the Brahmin caste was an inflexible socio-cultural and 
political elite that predated colonialism, prospered during colonialism, and would dominate the 
non-Brahmins in the postcolonial condition by virtue of their ritual superiority. Where Fanon 
concerns are that decolonization is essentially good, but native elites will try to wrest control 
and suppress the masses, and they should be opposed for that reason, Ramasamy’s concerns 
are that the native elites have oppressed the masses prior to the arrival of the colonizer, and 
while colonialism is essentially bad, Brahminism is worse and a temporary collaboration with 
the ‘lesser evil’ can be justified provided it creates awareness among the non-Brahmin castes 
about the nature of power relations in the country.  
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Unlike Fanon, Ramasamy was reluctant to reduce his political discourse to a Manichean 
either/or argument, that it was either ‘freedom’ or ‘colonialism’, and he problematized what 
freedom meant, who it benefitted and who it excluded.367 Ramasamy’s conviction was that as 
bad as the British rule was, independent India, under what he believed would be Brahmin rule, 
would be worse if there were not adequate checks and balances to curtail the dominance of the 
Brahmin castes. In a speech in Dharmapuri district in 1967, he argues that the White man was 
opposed because he was an alien and so too, the Brahmin must be opposed since he also was 
an alien. He says:  
 
Though the White man ruled us, he gave us rights; he considered us as human beings; 
he ate in our homes; he wouldn’t take a bath on touching us. The Brahmin is not like 
that. Doesn’t he believe that he needs to take a bath for merely touching us? [...] 
 
We belong to this country. We do the labour that that is required for the sustenance of 
humanity, and then shouldn’t we think why we should continue being sons of 
prostitutes and Shudras to the Brahmins? Why should our women be Shudra women 
and prostitutes to the Brahmins?368 
 
Where Fanon believed that colonialism was fundamentally a dehumanization of man 
and that it was an effort in making “the colonized confess the inferiority of their culture”369 
Ramasamy insisted that, in the general case of India and in the specific case of Tamil Nadu, the 
colonized’s culture had already condemned the vast majority to inferiority by ritual sanction and 
it was colonial modernity, to some extent, that provided a space in the public sphere for the 
participation of erstwhile lower castes. Given this condition, to Ramasamy, a limited 
“collaboration” with the British was justified insofar as it weakened the hegemony of the 
Brahmin Other.  
It was mentioned in an earlier chapter that despite Ramasamy’s varying alliances in his 
long career in politics, he was uncompromisingly opposed to Brahminism. To Ramasamy, the 
Brahmins were interested in political power “for their self-advancement, for the welfare of their 
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own caste”.370 In his speeches and writings, Ramasamy polemically attacks the ritual 
inaccessibility of the Brahmin Other, the privileges that the Hindu religion bestows upon him, 
his caste purity, his role in maintaining the caste hierarchy, his role in engendering patriarchy, 
and his monopoly over the ‘ideological state apparatus’ (ISA). I have specifically used the 
Althusserian term here because in Ramasamy’s criticism of the Brahminical ideology, he 
explicitly observes its presence in all the institutions that Althusser regards as constituting the 
ISA, namely the religious, the educational, the family, the legal, the political, trade-unions, 
communications, and the cultural.371 Brahminism as ideology was embodied in the agent of the 
Brahmin and an emancipatory politics was impossible without dislodging Brahmin 
overrepresentation in the public sphere. Concomitantly, the Brahmins were to be given no 
representation in the Dravidar Kazhagam.  
A comparison may be drawn to the Black Power movement in America (many of whose 
leaders were inspired by Fanon) who, in the initial stages of the movement, opposed the 
participation of Whites in their struggle. They were apprehensive that the Whites, who were a 
majority privileged by the system, would dilute the radical potential of the movement of the 
Black minority, and impose a ‘White version’ of liberation on the Black militants.372 Ramasamy’s 
concern on the other hand, was that the Brahmin minority, who were ordained by religion to be 
superior to the rest of the population, who were privileged not just by the colonial 
administrative and education system where they constituted the bulk of native representation, 
but also by the nationalist parties where they were overrepresented, would use the instruments 
of the postcolonial nation-state to the advantage of their own while making the rest of populace 
subscribe to their ideology.  
So why did Ramasamy single out the Brahmins? I have mentioned above that 
Ramasamy criticized the intermediate castes for their assumptions of relative superiority over 
the Dalits. He was also wary of certain friends of the Self-Respect movement who, while being 
to open to criticisms of the Brahmins, were unwilling to challenge their own positions of power 
and privilege. Commenting on this 
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I am aware of the criticism that while the non-brahmins are bitter about the superiority 
complex of the Brahmins, they themselves do not grant equality to those below them in 
the infamous caste hierarchy. There is much truth in this criticism. My only reply is that 
the Brahmins have to take the greatest blame, because their forebears have been the 
authors of caste and it is they who have meticulously striven to preserve the system;373  
 
Ramasamy located the Brahmin agent at the centre of an ideological system that 
maintained social hierarchy. While other castes below the Brahmin might also be complicit in 
the preservation of this hierarchy, it was the discourse of Brahminism, which was manifested in 
the corporeal existence of the Brahmin, which needed to be challenged for any social revolution 
to be affected.  
It was discussed in a chapter before how the idea of “reciprocal recognition” was 
central to Fanon’s conception of identity politics. To Fanon, “without reciprocal recognition 
there could be no identity, no self-worth, no dignity.”374 The Other was an enemy to the extent 
that the Other failed to recognize the person of colour or the colonized. But once the colonial 
status was done away with, there would be a mutual enriching of cultures based on a 
universalism that would recognize and respect particularities. But to Ramasamy, the problem 
begins with the moment of recognition. When the Brahmin is recognized as a Brahmin, it 
automatically implies that the non-Brahmin Other who recognizes him is lower to him. The non-
Brahmin is ‘overdetermined from without’ by the presence of the Brahmin. The Jew was the 
slave of the idea that others had of him and the Black was the slave of his own appearance,375 
but the non-Brahmin was the slave of the presence of the Brahmin. In the case of the Jew the 
anti-Semite was the problem, in the case of the Black the White racist was the problem, in the 
case of the non-Brahmin the Brahmin was the problem. In Ramasamy’s discourse, the Brahmin 
was the Master-Signifier, his corporeal being and the rules and meanings that elevated him to a 
superior status were one and the same.  
In an appreciative note, Nietzsche claims that the Brahmins maintained purity despite 
the “dirt of politics”, and how they “felt removed and outside, a people of higher, over-kingly 
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tasks.”376 In Tamil Nadu, with the onset of the Dravidian movement, it was this purity and the 
exclusiveness of the Brahmin participant in the public sphere that became the focus of political 
criticism. It was this caste “purity” of the Brahmin castes and their ritual superiority that was, 
according to Ramasamy, responsible for the perpetuation of social hierarchy among the rest of 
the masses. The Brahmin was not just someone whom the non-Brahmin was not; the Brahmin 
was someone whom the non-Brahmin could never be. For while Dalits and intermediate castes 
could move up the social ladder through the process of Sankritization, the Brahmin status was 
closed once and for all. The Brahmin Other, by virtue of his caste purity, inaccessibility and fixed 
place in social hierarchy was beyond reform. So in Ramasamy’s opinion, the secular Brahmin, 
the Indian nationalist Brahmin, the Communist Brahmin or the Hindu nationalist Brahmin were 
all products of, and by that virtue, representatives of Brahmin privilege. In the realm of the 
political, in a Schmittian sense, the Brahmin was the Absolute Enemy. But Ramasamy’s idea of 
war on the enemy was not a war of physical annihilation or any form of violence against the 
person. If his conceptualization of political action to be taken against the enemy were to be 
summarized into a single sentence, it would be this - “When we meet a Brahmin we must greet 
him ‘come on you Bastard!’”377 The encounter of the non-Brahmin Self with the Brahmin Other 
was to be accompanied by a performance of ridicule at the latter, condemning him for 
inferiorizing the former.  
This is where the non-Brahmin identity emerges at its intersubjective best. The 
subjectivity of the non-Brahmin agent is locked in an eternal combat with the subjectivity of the 
Brahmin agent. The Brahmin not by look or by idea but by his ‘pure’, ‘over-kingly’ presence 
constitutes the non-Brahmin of Tamil Nadu, binding the latter as Shudras and Dalits. Sartre 
discusses this phenomenon of the externally above force creating the community of the 
oppressed: 
 
The “master,” the “feudal lord,” the “bourgeois,” the “capitalist” all appear not only as 
powerful people who command but in addition and above all as Thirds: that is, as those 
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who are outside the oppressed community and for whom this community exists. It is 
therefore for them and in their freedom that the reality of the oppressed class is going 
to exist. They cause it to be born by their look. It is to them and through them that 
there is revealed the identity of my condition and that of others who are oppressed; it is 
for them that I exist in a situation organized with others and that my possible are strictly 
equivalent with the possibilities of others;378 
 
I shall expand more on Sartre’s argument in the next section and discuss its implications 
for the intermediate castes and Dalits. But here, it can be seen how in Ramasamy’s discourse 
the Brahmin is the ‘Third’ who creates the identity of the non-Brahmin condition, of that of the 
Shudras and the Dalits.  
To take from a question of Aletta Norval posed in her letter to Ernesto Laclau, “what are 
the implications of recognizing that the identity of the other is constitutive of the self”379 in a 
condition where the non-Brahmins are in political power where Brahmin hegemony over 
political discourse has become something of the past? In a compelling observation, Laclau 
writes “as the identity of the newly emancipated groups has been constituted through the 
rejection of the old dominant ones, the latter continue shaping the identity of the former. The 
operation of inversion takes place entirely within the old formal system of power.”380 This is 
plausible explanation of the reason of the fissures within the non-Brahmin castes, of why the 
intermediate castes turned on the Dalits once they had greater political power. Taking from the 
aforementioned case, the Vanniyar identity politics, the self-identification of Vanniyars as 
Kshatriyas, and their violent reactions against Dalits is shaped not by a Vanniyar ideology or an 
intermediate caste ideology, but by an implicit reference to a social hierarchy where the 
Brahmin is permanently fixed at the apex and the Vanniyars climb up in it by stepping on those 
below.  
Though the original act of closure, as observed by Ambedkar, was done by the 
Brahmins, Ramasamy’s discourse reaffirms this closure and does little to break it. In fact, the 
discursive trajectory of Ramasamy is dictated by an assumption that the Brahmin identity is 
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immutable. The Brahmin who supposedly came into the region more than two millennia back 
along with the ‘Aryan invasions’ and the Tamil Brahmin of the present and the Brahmin of the 
future were the same and unalterable. It is to be noted that while there is no attempt at closure 
of the non-Brahmin identity, by Ramasamy’s emphasis that it remains permanently closed to 
the Brahmin, it is also recognition of the closure of the Brahmin identity.  By taking the Brahmin 
identity as fixed, Ramasamy’s political discourse inadvertently gives Brahminism the power to 
shape the identities of the groups for whom he sought emancipation in a post-Brahminical 
scenario.  
A consideration of Fanon’s essay on “Algeria’s European Minority”381 helps here. To 
Fanon, the minority of Europeans and European Jews who inhabit the colony were subjects who 
were not just products of the colonial system, but also subjects who in turn conditioned the 
system. He recognizes the subjectivities of these privileged minorities and the choices that they 
make in being complicit with, neutral to, or opposed to the system of colonialism. Fanon 
attaches as an appendix the testimony of one ‘Algerian European’ who writes “For the Algerians 
I am no longer an ally. I am a brother, simply a brother, like the others.”382 The unconditional 
recognition of the European colonizer as an enemy by Fanon is complemented with the 
conditional recognition of the European as a friend, the condition being that he gives up 
identification with oppressor and identifies with the oppressed. The discursive strategy of this 
essay is that by invoking an Algerian identity that is accommodative to the European, it not only 
disturbs the notion that the Algerian nation is something primordial; it also dislocates the 
argument of the fixedness of the European identity. As Laclau expands from Norval’s argument, 
“The reference to the other is also maintained here but, as the inversion takes place at the level 
of the universal reference and not of the concrete contents of an oppressive system, the 
identities of both oppressors and oppressed are radically changed.”383 
Commenting on Black identity politics in America, Zizek writes “it is not enough to find 
new terms with which to define oneself outside of the dominant white tradition - one should go 
a step further and deprive the whites of the monopoly on defining their own tradition.”384 
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Fanon does more than this when he appropriates universal humanism from the Europeans and 
posits it against them as a moral checkmate. He says: 
 
All elements for a solution to the major problems of humanity existed at one time or 
another in European thought. But the Europeans did not act on the missions that was 
designated them and which consisted of virulently pondering these elements, modifying 
their configurations, their being, of changing them and finally taking the problem of 
man to an infinitely higher plane.385 
 
Sartre is both right and wrong when he says that when he says that WOTE is about the 
Europeans but never to the Europeans.386 WOTE is not towards the European, but it is towards 
the European who acknowledges Europe’s failings and engages in the project of a new 
humanism – else, Fanon would not have given the task of writing the preface for his book to 
one of the most recognizable faces of Europe in the 20th Century. The oppressed of the Third 
World must “try and solve the problems this Europe was incapable of finding answers to” and 
must work towards the creation of a new man “For Europe, for ourselves and for humanity.”387 
By ceasing to be exclusivist like Negritude, Fanon’s humanism complicates the situation and 
identity of the individual belonging to the oppressor’s group. Given its universally 
accommodating character of Fanon’s humanism, one can only be inhumane if one chooses to 
oppose it or even if one remains neutral. The element of choice is left open to the oppressor 
and it was now the ‘White man’s burden’ to prove his humanity as the onus was upon him.  
In contrast, in Ramasamy’s politics, the Brahmin is given no choice. But one has to 
concede to Ramasamy, and to other social reformers like Ambedkar, that they saw no ideal 
worthy of appropriation in Brahminism or from the Brahmins – to do so, would be to accept 
casteism. Fanon’s frustration is that Europe betrayed its humanism. Ramasamy’s frustration is 
that there was no humanism whatsoever in the Hindu-Brahminical religion. The Brahmin was 
not betraying an ideal he claimed to represent. He was that ideal and that ideal was a casteist 
social hierarchy. Ambedkar, who fought for adequate political representation for Dalits and 
constitutional safeguards for them, after several scholarly analyses of Hinduism, proposed 
conversion to Buddhism as a way out of the caste system. Ramasamy gave an extensive and 
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uncompromising criticism of Brahminism and its institutions, suggested as a possible solution 
the separation of Tamil Nadu, but without effectively articulating or endorsing a self-sustaining 
identity relying more on the inferiorized identity of ‘Shudra’ as a weapon for his critique. Apart 
from this, a Fanonist criticism of Ramasamy’s discourse would be its failure to unsettle the 
Brahmin identity. By considering the Brahmin as fixed for all time, the Brahmin’s closure of his 
identity gets validated. But if a choice was left open to the Brahmin of giving him a place within 
an emancipatory political project on condition that he give up his identity, that would have 
placed a greater moral pressure on the ‘absolute enemy’ of the Self-Respect movement. And if 
the Brahmin was fixed in his place, could not the Dalit critic argue that so was the intermediate 
caste too? 
The Dalit Particularity  
 
It was discussed above how the presence of the Brahmin creates the non-Brahmin identity. But 
the non-Brahmin identity is not a homogeneous one. The identity appears self-explanatory – 
anyone who is not a Brahmin is a non-Brahmin. Technically, it is something like a non-vegetarian 
identity. One can eat all meat, or only some types of meat, eat meat on all days, or only on 
some days, but all of these fall under the label of ‘non-vegetarian’ since they are not 
vegetarians. Similarly, a Vanniyar, a Dalit, a Nadar, a North Indian Kshatriya, an Englishman, a 
Sunni Muslim or a Protestant would all be non-Brahmins since they are not Brahmins. In 
Ramasamy’s discourse, he uses the term loosely to refer to, though not restricting it to, the 
intermediate castes and the Dalits. These castes are given a common political platform as “Us 
non-Brahmins” by virtue of an external Third, the Brahmin, who is beyond reach, unrealizable. 
Sartre writes on the Third contributing to the becoming of the “Us”:  
 
We are "Us" only in the eyes of Others, and it is in terms of the Others' look that we 
assume ourselves as "Us." But this implies that there can exist an abstract, unrealizable 
project of the for-itself toward an absolute totalization of itself and of all Others. This 
effort at recovering the human totality can not take place without positing the 
existence of a Third, who is on principle distinct from humanity and in whose eyes 
humanity is wholly object. This unrealizable Third, is simply the object of the limiting-
concept of otherness. He is the one· who is Third in relation to all possible groups, the 
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one who in no case can enter into community with any human group, the Third in 
relation to whom no other can constitute himself as a third.388 
 
The Brahmin, as observed before, is in the position of the Third who gives political 
significance to the merging of the intermediate castes and the Dalits as a totality. In the politics 
of the Self-Respect movement, he is the external totalizer who creates the totalization of the 
non-Brahmin entity. Sartre writes that the concept of the Third is “one with the idea of God” 
but in the absence of God “the effort to realize humanity as ours is forever renewed and forever 
results in failure.”389 It was discussed in an earlier chapter how the Hindu religion and the Hindu 
Gods were denounced by Ramasamy for having been creations of Brahmins for the exploitation 
of the rest. His political discourse marked the Brahmin as the secular God, the Third who does 
can never enter the human community of the non-Brahmin by the virtue of his ‘overman’ 
status, a status secured by the Gods that the Brahmin created. But does the absence of this God 
result in the failure of the non-Brahmin project or does it fail owing to its own irreconcilable 
internal contradictions?  
In article on the politics of Identity/Difference in the ‘Black Consciousness’ ideology in 
South Africa, David Howarth writes “the signifier 'black' makes possible the creation of black 
solidarity and unity, and engenders political struggle, based on a common identity actively 
denied by white domination. It thus functions as a nodal point unifying different subjectivities 
and interests against the various manifestations of white oppression.”390 The ‘non-Brahmin’ as 
signifier is intended to have the similar effect in Tamil society, to create solidarity among the 
intermediate castes and Dalits and to unite plural subjectivities against Brahminism but based 
on a identity that is affirmed by Brahmin domination. It is here that Ramasamy’s approach 
towards the question of the Dalits requires critical examination.  
Ramasamy was conscious of the unique position that the Dalit occupied in the social 
hierarchy. In a way, they were the reverse of everything the Brahmin stood for. While the 
Brahmins could not be ritually approached by the Shudra because they were too clean, the 
Dalits were to be avoided because ritually they were too unclean. Just like the Brahmin caste at 
the apex was permanently closed-off to the intermediate castes, the Dalits were also closed-off 
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to the rest. While Brahminhood was a ‘No Entry’ zone, ‘Untouchability’ was generally a ‘No Exit’ 
zone.   
Dalit history in Tamil Nadu has its own rich narratives and it is not in the scope of this 
paper to explore that. In colonial modernity, Geetha and Rajadurai claim that “expression of a 
distinctive dalit sensibility predated the political expression of nonbrahminism in the Tamil 
regions of the old Madras presidency and eventually came to constitute an important and 
decisive flank of the non-brahmin movement.”391 Several intellectuals from the Dalit castes like 
Iyothee Thaas, Rettamalai Srinivasan, Masilamani wrote about the oppression that the 
untouchables faced and the unjust social structure sanctioned by Brahminism. But it should be 
noted here that these intellectuals, who were either contemporaries of or immediate 
predecessors to Ramasamy, were in favour of an alliance between the intermediate castes and 
Dalits. The movement for Dalits as a separate entity gained momentum only in the 90s.392 So 
what was it in Ramasamy’s discourse that caused the failure of its emancipatory potential?  
In an observation of the pitfalls in a secular political project, William Connolly notes that 
“The historical modus vivendi of secularism, while seeking to chasten religious dogmatism, 
embodies unacknowledged elements of immodesty in itself. The very intensity of the struggle it 
wages against religious intolerance may induce blind spots with respect to itself.”393 Now, it has 
explained before how Ramasamy was acutely aware of the problems within the secular project 
of non-Brahminism, how the non-Brahmin intermediate castes had a tendency to look down 
upon Dalits by being relatively superior in a society structured like a pyramid. Contrary to the 
accusations of those who claim that he was insensitive to Dalit particularities, he was in fact 
very keen to address the same, and in several cases, sided with the Dalits over the intermediate 
castes. For instance, in the 1957 Mudukalathur riots between the Thevars, a numerically 
dominant intermediate caste in South Tamil Nadu, and the Dalits, he sided firmly with the Dalits 
and called for the arrest of U. Muthuramalinga Thevar, a very influential leader of the Thevar 
caste. Thus, he does not provide the non-Brahmin identity as an easy suturing of the identities 
of intermediate castes and Dalits. Throughout his political discourse, he is consistent when 
referring to the non-Brahmin whole as “us non-Brahmins” or “Dravidians” or “Tamils” – but 
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when addressing specific cases of intermediate castes and Dalits, he uses “us Shudras” and “you 
Dalits”. This might appear problematic. Geetha explains in Ramasamy’s defence: 
 
Periyar was conscious of and sensitive to the specificities of dalit oppression and also of 
the crucial fact that the assumption of a distinctive identity by the SCs could secure 
much needed material succour. Besides he recognised the rights of dalits to define their 
political and social selves on their own terms and did not attempt to co-opt their 
emergent subjectivity into an undifferentiated and simplistic non-brahmin solidarity. At 
all times, Periyar was aware that this solidarity was not given but had to be 
constructed.394 
 
While it is indeed intellectual dishonesty to accuse Ramasamy of being a patron of the 
intermediate caste and for displaying insensitivity to Dalit particularities, the defence of 
Ramasamy’s support to Dalit specificity needs to be problematized. The Dalit identity is based 
purely on the social construct that the particular caste is untouchable. A Dalit particularist 
political project bases itself on the lived experience of untouchability and its Other is everyone 
else in the Brahminical social order who is not an untouchable. To draw from Fanonism, not 
only must a Dalit be an untouchable, he must be an untouchable in relation to everyone else. 
Relativity is not far from solipsism and thus, Dalit intellectuals and activists in the state (only 
from the 90s) either began particularist movements that started with promise but soon fizzled 
out, or wrote odes to pristine pre-civilizational pasts much like the Negritude poets.  
Conclusion  
 
Ramasamy’s discursive strategy as regards caste politics works like this: 1) the Brahmin, who is 
permanently fixed, needs to be ridiculed 2) the Shudra, who is in thrall of Brahminism, must be 
enlightened 3) and the Dalit, who is oppressed by the rest, should have his particularity 
respected. The play of identity, difference and relativity can be observed here. Mouffe argues 
that it is possible to understand how identity-based antagonisms arise “When we accept that 
every identity is relational and that the condition of existence of every identity is the affirmation 
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of a difference, the determination of an 'other' that is going to play the role of a 'constitutive 
outside'”.395  
The Other who unites “Us” is never an a priori given but is the construction of discourse. 
As much as recognizing the Brahmin as an Other is part of Ramasamy’s discourse, so is the 
recognition of the particularism of the Dalit identity. The latter opens up the possibility for a 
Dalit particularist to construct the intermediate castes as the Other who unites a “Us Dalits”. 
Indeed, some Dalit intellectuals from Tamil Nadu have alleged, through their readings of history, 
that just as the Aryans invaded India to oppress the Dravidians, the forerunners of the 
contemporary Dravidians also collaborated with the invaders to oppress the original natives of 
the land, the Dalits.396 The flaw in Ramasamy’s discursive strategy is not obliviousness to Dalit 
specificity as some allege, nor is it the respect of the lived experience of untouchability. Rather, 
it is the lack of an affirmative Master identity, a universal, towards which the Shudras, the 
Dalits, and those among the Brahmins who are willing to give up their privileged status, can 
travel.  Ramasamy’s ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’ and his respect for particulars open up 
spaces for discursive antagonisms from within the groups for whom he was fighting for. 
It is true that the rioting Vanniyar mob in Dharmapuri does not have an ideology of its 
own and is only following the cultural logic of Brahminism. It is true that the intellectuals 
interpreting such incidents of conflict between intermediate castes and Dalits to claim that 
Ramasamy’s Self-Respect movement was intentionally in favour of empowerment of the 
intermediate castes at the cost of the Dalits are acting in ‘fetishist disavowal’ refusing to 
recognize the systemic nature of caste violence, that is, “not only direct physical violence, but 
also the more subtle forms of coercion that sustain relations of domination and exploitation.”397 
But it is also true that Ramasamy’s discourse does not create a common identity, an affirmative 
identity that would enable the intermediate castes and Dalits to identify in something beyond 
their immediate particularities. Fanon was aware that if a White were to be criticized only for 
the reason that he was White, then that discursive strategy also provided excuses for a Black to 
criticize an Arab, a Muslim to criticize a Christian purely on the basis of identity and notions, real 
or imagined, of the relatively privileged Other. Basing a politics on a history of oppression by the 
Other alone cannot produce a transformative praxis to create a more accommodating future 
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and a post-casteist society. The Other – all Others – must be unsettled by a universalism that is 




Beyond Anti-Colonialism: Fanon, EV 




In the previous chapters, we have discussed Frantz Fanon’s conception of identity politics. 
Likewise, after introducing EV Ramasamy and his political discourse, a critique of the same 
through Fanonist lens has been made. In this chapter, continuing the dialogue between 
Ramasamy and Fanon, I shall use Ramasamy to point out the limitations in Fanon’s model and 
probe how the logic of anti-colonialism needn’t be viewed in a positive fashion by all political 
groups in a colony, i.e., it need not be the single most important empty signifier that creates 
identification of groups against the colonizing Other. I start with a discussion about Indian 
history, more specifically about how it was received and constructed by Indian nationalist and 
postcolonialist historiographers, and how it was interpreted by Ramasamy. Ramasamy rejected 
the idea of an Indian nation existing in history and considered it a construct of the British 
Empire. However, Fanon had very romanticized and non-problematized notions about Third 
World nations. While he was apprehensive about their future, he did not question their 
legitimacy. While to Fanon, anti-colonial nationalism was the manifestation of one socio-politico 
unit, Ramasamy deconstructed the idea of nation and nationalism from within. Likewise, this 
chapter also contrasts Fanon’s and Ramasamy’s respective positions on the question of women. 
While in the Fanonian corpus, women merely appear as sexual objects or political instruments, 
they rarely get mention as autonomous agents of political and social change. To Ramasamy, on 
the other hand, respecting the agency and autonomy of women’s struggle was key to his Self-
Respect movement.  
We can see that Fanon never assumes that the native’s anti-colonial discourse might 
itself be a process of privileging certain identities over others. This is crucial. Now, it has been 
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noted by Fanon scholars like Ato Sekyi-Otu that Fanon clearly recognized the irruptions of 
ethnic differences in the postcolony, how “Neocolonialism is an internal state of affairs, the 
unmasked recolonization of human existence by the blackest of black skins.”398 But it is 
important to point out here that Fanon’s notion of the temporal begins from the colonial 
encounter, or more precisely, the anti-colonial struggle. He considers the anti-colonial identity 
as legitimate (Algerian, Indian, Ghanian etc.) While it cannot be simplistically accused of Fanon 
that he was not aware of faultlines within the colony, he does not offer strategies for addressing 
divisions that predate colonialism. Anti-colonialism is valid by itself, its pitfalls were however to 
be avoided.  
To Ramasamy on the other hand, the pitfall was already there, and it was inscribed into 
the Indian anti-colonial project from the start. Ramasamy not only challenged the claims of 
Indian anti-colonialism to represent all Indians, he questioned the legitimacy of both the 
religious “Hindu” and the secular “Indian” as an identity. Ramasamy was keen on challenging 
the internal and native forms of oppression as he considered them far more insidious and 
persistent than colonialism, which he identified as a passing phase. The chapter concludes that 
a democratic identity politics, which I consider, taking from Mouffe, a “political process of 
hegemonic articulation,”399 needs to lay a claim to universalism by finding a commonality, while 
simultaneously recognizing the particular claims of discrete social groups and pluralisms that 
exist in a society.  
A Short Note From and About ‘Indian History’  
 
When ‘subaltern studies’ scholar Ranajit Guha took issue with Hegel’s assertion that India did 
not have a history, he sought to counter it by giving an example of a Bengali (upper caste) writer 
who was commissioned by Christian missionaries in 1800 to write a historical tract, which is 
praised by Guha as an “exercise in modern, rationalist historiography”.400 Though the work in 
concern was only a history of monarchs in Bengal, to Guha it was an example of ‘Indian 
historiography’. With a similar sense of outrage, noting the privileges which European historians 
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enjoy in the writing of history, postcolonial scholar Dipesh Chakrabarty argues that “‘They’ 
produce their work in relative ignorance of non-Western societies, and this does not seem to 
affect the quality of their work.”401 
It is interesting how after about five decades of Indian independence Indian scholars 
who problematize European conception of Indian pasts are reluctant to problematize how 
Indians conceptualized their own past and who were excluded in these conceptualizations. This 
is not, however, an overarching allegation against the postcolonial project. Ranajit Guha, a key 
postcolonial thinker and founder of the Indian Subaltern Studies project, does agree that the 
inadequacy of Indian elitist historiography “follows directly from the narrow and partial view of 
politics to which it is committed by virtue of its class outlook” and that “what is clearly left out 
of this un-historical historiography is the politics of the people.”402 Tamil academic Ravi 
Vatheespara too acknowledges that the Subaltern Studies initiative has exposed “the elitist 
cultural construction of Indian nationalism” and also “has been enormously productive for 
historians and especially for those working on ‘subaltern’ histories or ‘minority’ nationalisms 
often occluded by the earlier narratives privileging the ‘official’ nation.”403 But what the Indian 
postcolonial project does not adequately capture or explain is the fact that caste reformers like 
Ramasamy were extremely appreciative of European modernity, more specifically, the project 
of the Enlightenment.  In a sense, while Guha rejected Hegel's universalism of Reason for being 
Eurocentric, Ramasamy was an inadvertent Hegelian in colonial India!  
In a text that is considered to be a seminal work of secular Indian nationalism, Congress 
leader and the first Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s The Discovery of India, Indian 
history is an unproblematic teleology, which moves from antiquity to modernity. Nehru did not 
have an intellectual problem in conceiving the people in the Indian territory, a subcontinent 
whose people are as diverse in languages and cultures as the people of Africa, Europe and the 
Middle-East taken together, as constituting one nation, with one common culture and with one 
civilizational continuity. In his words 
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Some kind of dream of unity has occupied the mind of India since the dawn of 
civilization. That unity was not conceived as something imposed from outside, a 
standardization of externals or even of beliefs. It was something deeper and, within its 
fold, the widest tolerance of belief and custom was practised and every variety 
acknowledged and even encouraged.404 
 
In Nehru’s view, “we see in the past some inner urge towards synthesis” that this was 
“the dominant feature of Indian cultural, and even racial development” and this was brought 
about by the philosophical referent of the Sanskrit texts, mainly the Vedas.405 Interestingly, his 
ideological nemesis, the Hindu nationalist demagogue VD Savarkar also based his claims for the 
Hindus being a nation with more or less the same premises.406  
Mainstream Indian postcolonial historiography and debates about Indian history, 
whether secular in nature or not, has uncritically accepted the idea of India as a single socio-
cultural entity. In a perceptive note, Perry Anderson remarks that such intellectuals share the 
rhetoric of the Indian state and uphold four central tropes from the official imaginary of India 
namely “antiquity-continuity; diversity-unity; massivity-democracy; multi-confessionality-
secularity”.407 Further noting that there was never a singular politico-cultural entity called India 
prior to the arrival of colonialism, he argues 
 
The ‘idea of India’ was essentially a European, not a local invention, as the name itself 
makes clear. No such term, or equivalent, as India existed in any indigenous language. A 
Greek coinage, taken from the Indus river, it was so exogenous to the subcontinent that 
as late as the 16th century, Europeans could define Indians simply as ‘all natives of an 
unknown country’, and so call the inhabitants of the Americas.408 
 
In direct contrast to the Indian nationalists, EV Ramasamy disputes the existence of an Indian 
nation in history. 
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Can anyone say that the formation of the Indian union and the formation of the Indian 
law happened in an organic fashion without a great fraud?  
 
Can anyone say that India is not an artificial creation, and since when has a country 
called India existed?409 
 
To Ramasamy, India, the idea of the Indian nation, Indian nationalism and its symbols, 
were part of a Brahminical ideological device to rule over the Dravidians. Questioning the 
concept of an “Indian nation”, he argues that it was only under the period of colonialism that 
the Tamil region was brought together under an Indian entity and calls for the rejection of all 
Indian nationalist symbols.410 In a controversial move in the mid 50s to oppose the central 
government’s imposition of Hindi as a pan-Indian language, he called for the burning of Indian 
flags. His logic: 
 
We want our rule in our country. In our country, a language which is not our own 
should not be a language of the state, nation and education. To show the rulers that our 
country does not want a rule that forces Hindi upon us – we had to do this as an 
agitation strategy.411 
 
In Ramasamy’s perspective, colonialism and anti-colonialism were phases of history. His 
greater concern was with social institutions which have greater endurance in history. As early as 
1925, he makes his priorities clear. Arguing that self-respect is more important than self-rule, he 
further emphasised that the demand for self-rule must be postponed till a self-respecting 
society was achieved.412 Further, at a speech delivered at Trichy in 1943, he called on the youth 
to demand the separation of ‘Dravidanadu’.   
 
We are today Shudras. We are degraded. We have no right to enter the temple or 
eating houses. We are considered low untouchables. In the government we are given 
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menial jobs. Those who betray us are cared by the government and Congress. We 
remain as downtrodden for ever. We are being exploited by the Brahmins and the 
bureaucracy.413 
 
It is worthy to compare Ramasamy’s views with that of other anti-caste activists in his 
time.  For instance, in Dalit leader BR Ambedkar’s view Indian nationalism was dominated by 
upper castes and further “it is beyond question that the Congress is a body of middle class 
Hindus supported by the Hindu capitalists whose object is not to make Indians free but to be 
independent of British control and to occupy places of power now occupied by the British.”414 
This is a crucial point that differentiated Ramasamy from other anti-caste activists like 
BR Ambedkar. This contrast is worth briefly considering here. Ambedkar also agrees that 
eradication of casteism should precede self-rule and independence. In his opinion “only when 
the Hindu society becomes a casteless society that it can hope to have strength enough to 
defend itself. Without such internal strength, Swaraj for Hindus may turn out to be only a step 
towards slavery.”415 However, while Ambedkar was critical of Indian nationalism, the 
domination of upper-castes in framing the nationalist imaginary, and the frequent exaltation of 
the Hindu way of life by the Indian nationalists, he nevertheless saw a modern Indian state and 
constitutional reforms as a possible means for pushing for social justice for the Dalits and the 
lower castes. To Ramasamy on the other hand, the very political entity called India represented 
the domination of Brahmins over the lower castes, especially the Dravidians and nothing sort of 
separation would be a step towards the annihilation of caste.  
What could be Fanon’s perspective on this?  
 
Notions of Nations 
 
In a passage in the inflammatory chapter on violence in WOTE, Fanon writes 
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By its very structure, colonialism is separatist and regionalist. Colonialism does not 
simply state the existence of tribes; it also reinforces it and separates them. The colonial 
system encourages chieftaincies and keeps alive the old Marabout confraternities. 
Violence is in action all-inclusive and national. It follows that it is closely involved in the 
liquidation of regionalism and of tribalism. Thus the national parties show no pity at all 
toward the caids and the customary chiefs. Their destruction is the preliminary to the 
unification of the people.416 
 
In the previous chapters, we explored how Fanon problematized the notion of an 
essentialized Black identity. However, with regards to decolonization, while Fanon is acutely 
aware of the problems that an elitist leadership might cause in a postcolonial society, he 
nevertheless takes anti-colonial nationalism to be positive in general and does not venture into 
critiquing the discourse of the group that presents itself as the “national group”. To Fanon, the 
sovereignty of the decolonized nation was sacrosanct and “separatist” and “regionalist” 
demands were just colonial manoeuvres to destabilize the process of decolonization. The 
postcolonial society might have problems with various social groups but still, anti-colonial 
nationalism was a virtue to be defended. The very core of Fanon’s politics of identity, 
recognition of particularities and universality depended on it: 
 
universality resides in this decision to recognize and accept the reciprocal relativism of 
different cultures once the colonial status is irreversibly reduced.417 
 
In the essay “First Truths on the Colonial Problem”, while placing Nehru, Nasser and 
Sukarno together as anti-imperialists, Fanon comments on India that “What no one sees is that 
the 350 million Hindus, who have known the hunger of British imperialism, are now demanding 
bread, peace, and well-being.”418 What Fanon did not see was that at the very time this essay 
was being composed, there were voices in India problematizing the idea of ‘Hindus’ as a 
community and ‘India’ as a nation.  
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Decolonization was the precondition to the acceptance of the relativism of different 
cultures for Fanon, whereas for Ramasamy, the recognition of the existence of fundamentally 
different cultures was the precondition to the acceptance of decolonization. Ramasamy was 
extremely critical of essentialized notions of an Indian nation and instead, proposed a Dravidian 
identity based on reason, argument and shared solidarity against the native oppressive caste. 
Fanon, on the other hand, never critically examines the idea of ‘nation’ that opposes the 
colonial power, but is more opposed to ‘separatist’ and ‘regionalist’ tendencies within a broader 
anti-colonialism. 
Fanon seems to be subscribing to “strategic use of essentialism in a scrupulously visible 
political interest,”419 in this case, decolonization. The argument in the favour of such a strategy 
would be that a critical situation, like that of colonialism, demands certain essentialized notions 
of ‘we’ if at all ‘they’ have to be countered. As elaborated in earlier chapters, Fanon’s 
conception of identity is shaped largely by a violent encounter with colonialism. Though he 
makes a claim for an eventual transcendence into a larger humanism, the settling of the colonial 
encounter is a precondition to it. Fanon’s perspective on colonialism is sharply Manichean – one 
is either for colonialism, which is ‘evil’, or one is against it, which is ‘good’. The real political 
dilemma, as Sartre discovered in the late 60s, “of being 'for, but' or 'against, but'”420 is never 
acutely addressed by Fanon in the context of colonialism.  
Given the wake of the brutalities of French colonialism in Algeria, and given Fanon’s 
own role as a partisan of the FLN, it might have been strategically necessary for him to invoke 
certain types of essentialism. However, when Fanonism is taken as a theory, this type of 
essentialism can be quite dangerous when taken in different contexts. As Spivak, who has a 
cautious support for the concept, notes “a strategy suits a situation; a strategy is not a 
theory.”421 When Fanonism is uncritically applied in a context like that of India, where the 
‘nation’ as a project was itself a product of the colonial intervention, it can but have disastrous 
consequences for those social groups at the margins of the newly constructed nation. Of course, 
while Fanon himself can be excused for being ignorant of the specificities of the Indian, or more 
particularly, the Tamil condition, Fanonism needs to critiqued and critically expanded to include 
the plurality of political interests that existed in the colonial period. 
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Fanon’s emphasis is more on political unity against the enemy of colonialism. Here, he is 
most Schmittian in his understanding that “Political unity can contain and comprehend different 
contents. But it always designates the most intensive degree of a unity, from which, 
consequently, the most intensive distinction – the grouping of friend and enemy – is 
determined.”422 To Fanon, anti-colonialism as an empty signifier serves as “means of 
representation that enable the building of alliances between different groups and identities by 
pointing an enemy to be opposed and proposing solutions to the problem facing groups.”423 
Fanon believes that anti-colonial nationalism, or national consciousness, would create a sense 
of solidarity among different social groups in the colonized territory against the ultimate 
adversary, the colonial apparatus. Fanon is most influenced by Sartre’s arguments about the 
‘dialectic of the group’ from Critique of Dialectical Reason of how in a critical situation of 
violence or insurrection, “separate individuals overcome their seriality and combine under 
threat to form a fused group.”424 Fanon also takes the practico-inert concept to heart, that “We 
become dominated by the unintended features of our product, or by our own tools” especially 
when he discusses how the structural limitations of the newly decolonized society allows a 
comprador elite to take over. However, his complete non-consideration of pre-colonial history, 
as discussed briefly in Chapter 3, causes him not to explore why a fused group could be 
legitimately formed against a dominant social group within the colonized territory rather than 
against the colonizer.   
Ramasamy, on the other hand, shared the Schmittian scepticism that “it is a dangerous 
deception when one single group pursues its special interests in the name of the whole, and 
unjustifiably identifies itself with the state.”425 Ramasamy, who, unlike Fanon, was acutely 
aware of the distinctiveness of the pre-colonial history of his region, was convinced that the 
Indian nation building project was designed to protect the interests of the Brahmin castes. It is 
not within the capacity of this project to provide extensive details on the pre-colonial historical 
distinctiveness of the Tamil region in the Indian subcontinent but the following observation of 
Indian social historian Gail Omvedt should give a fair picture: 
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Here was a strongly independent Dravidian linguistic identity and a long history of being 
the southern subcontinent, not only unconquered by northerners, but a centre of 
empires of its own, stretching somewhat overseas and oriented in many ways more 
towards south-east Asia in contrast to the northern west Asian linkages.426 
 
EV Ramasamy understood that as far as Tamil Nadu was concerned, “The colonial public 
sphere was restricted in its scope and substance not merely because of the dynamics of 
colonialism, but also by the very character of the indigenous elite who participated in it. 
Without being informed by notions of substantive citizenship, it was an elite who were, by and 
large, unwilling to relinquish their traditional modes of semi-feudal authority, and hence failed 
to speak for a broader public.”427  
Hence, the central thrust of Ramasamy’s political discourse, as discussed in Chapter 5, 
was to create an alternative public sphere which would exclude the native elites and provide 
spaces for voices silenced by the Indian nationalist discourse. The Dravidian identity he 
espoused was a ‘resistance identity’ as opposed to the ‘legitimizing identity’ of Indian 
nationalism. Given the threat he perceived from unmediated Brahmin hegemony in a 
postcolonial India, he argued that ‘regionalism’ – even if it had to be carried out to the extreme 
of separating from the Indian union – would be the only permanent safeguard against the 
domination of an elite.  
In a critique of two influential historians of South India – David Washbrook and 
Christopher Baker – from the Cambridge School who restricted their discussion of caste to 
purely the confines of the colonialism/anti-colonialism binary, MSS Pandian writes: 
 
In short, the disavowal of caste identity as part of the political is complete in the 
writings of the Cambridge school. If fragmentation of different castes denies caste the 
status of caste-in-itself, the way in which caste identity was supposed to have been 
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invoked in colonial Tamil Nadu denies it the status of caste-for-itself. Caste identity is 
thus out in the cold with no political past or future.428 
 
The metanarrative of Indian anti-colonialism in general displayed a gross insensitivity to 
historical and socio-political questions of caste and region. Motifs similar to Fanon’s perspective 
on regionalism and separatism keep reoccurring in not just Indian nationalist discourse, but also 
in Indian historiography and sociology as well. For instance, GS Ghurye, a well known Indian 
sociologist, writes in 1950 that “Where it is a question of engendering a feeling of unity the 
people must be made to cooperate irrespective of caste.”429 To those like Ghurye, the British 
were responsible for introducing caste divisions in Indian society as a ‘divide and rule’ strategy 
and that the nationalist discourse led by the elite castes was justified in projecting a 
homogenous Indian nation. 
Ramasamy’s opinion stands in direct contrast in that he accuses the Brahmins of being 
the initiators of the divide and rule strategy, and further, he accuses the colonial powers of 
collaborating with the native elites for smooth functioning of the administrative apparatus. For 
instance, in a speech in 1957 in the wake of the Mudukalathur riots between Dalits and the 
intermediate castes where there were causalities on both sides, while placing his stand firmly 
on the side of the Dalits, Ramasamy also stated that “The Brahmin rejoices when clashes break 
within our people”430 alleging that the Brahmin benefits from divisions within the non-
Brahmins. Following this up in another speech, he accused the political legacy of the Indian 
nationalists, Gandhi and the Congress party of benefitting only the Brahmins. To Ramasamy 
 
We need a revolution to change this state of affairs. Revolutionary words are not 
enough. We may need to resort to the sword. Jinnah struggled in front of our eyes. He 
raised the sword! Why we (Muslims) should be trapped under the Hindus, he asked; 
after rivers of blood flowed, they gave him Pakistan. Today, it is a powerful country. 
Nehru is frightened of it.431 
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Ramasamy’s discourse understood that the large narrative of anti-colonialism was a 
garb in which the interests of the Tamil region would be compromised and that in postcolonial 
India, the Brahmin secured his domination in administrative posts by virtue of an agreement 
with the erstwhile colonizer.432 Further, according to him, in postcolonial India “Only those who 
betray our nation, only those who betray our society, can prosper in this state. Those who 
prioritize the Dravidian people or Tamil Nadu cannot. Either one lives under open slavery or, if 
one wants a respectful position in the administration, one has to live as a slave under the 
Brahmin.”433 To Ramasamy, there never was an Indian nation in history, and it was only owing 
to colonialism that the Tamil region was brought under the Indian entity.434  
We discussed in Chapter 4 how English missionary Bishop Caldwell’s A Comparative 
Grammar of the Dravidian or South Indian Family of Languages was Evental in shaping the 
discourse of the Dravidian movement in Tamil Nadu, especially the idea that the Brahmin was 
an Aryan, an alien Other who was divorced from the community of Dravidians, often in terms 
that frequently overlapped race with caste. It is instructive to consider the persistence of this 
image in the Dravidian political imaginary in Tamil Nadu, where, according to Dirks 
 
the post-colonial picture is complicated by the double presence of the displaced 
colonial other, figured most directly and conspicuously in the Brahman (and by 
implication or association the north Indian and Aryan). In a history that begins with the 
language of Caldwell in casting the Aryan as a colonial figure, we confront a post-
colonial condition with a difference. And thus both colonialism and post-colonialism 
move offstage, to be replaced by a colonial theatre of double mimesis, in which the 
Brahman plays the role – not quite, but well enough – of the British colonial ruler, and 
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in which colonialism might be said to have ended not in 1947, but only in 1967, with the 
ascension to political power of the DMK.435 
 
Thus, in the popular Dravidian political imaginary as articulated by Ramasamy, more 
than the colonial encounter, it was the pre-colonial encounter with the Aryan-Brahmin-alien-
Other that determined the contours of the political discourse.436 A Fanonist understanding, 
which considers anti-colonialism as the primary contradiction in a colonized society as a 
universal given, is bound to be problematic in a society like India largely because it is ignorant of 
the pre-colonial history which might have similar or greater influence in shaping particular 
political discourses like that which emerged in colonial Tamil Nadu.  
This tension between the abstract universality of Fanon and the concrete particularity 
of Ramasamy can also be observed in the approach of both to the language of the colonizer and 
the colonized. To Fanon, even though he wrote only in French, the colonial language was by 
itself an act of aggression in the colony.  He laments that under the colonial situation, “We 
witness the destruction of cultural values, of ways of life. Language, dress, techniques, are 
devalorized.”437 The oppressed, when confronted by the colonial power, develops a complex 
about his culture and language and begins to shy away from them and mimics the colonizer. 
“Having judged, condemned, abandoned his cultural forms, his language, his food habits, his 
sexual behavior, his way of sitting down, of resting, of laughing, of enjoying himself, the 
oppressed flings himself upon the imposed culture with the desperation of a drowning man.”438 
To Fanon, language was yet another tool used by colonialism’s ideology to enslave a nation and 
to inferiorize the native’s sense of self-respect.  
Ramasamy too had strong opinions on how imposition of alien languages inferiorized a 
native’s sense of self-respect – but to him the native was the Tamil and the alien languages 
were Hindi and Sanskrit. In 1938, at a time when the local chapter of the Congress party was 
pushing for the propagation of Hindi as a national language, Ramasamy called on the youth and 
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women to oppose the imposition of the same as it would benefit the Aryans at the cost of the 
Dravidians. In polemic fashion, he writes “What is happening now is not British rule. It is the rule 
of the priests of the varna system. Its each living breath intends to enslave the Tamil people.”439 
Following up with another essay titled “The Brahmin rule takes its revenge”, he argues that the 
Brahminical castes were seeking to dominate the south through Hinduism and Hindi and that 
anti-colonialism was a garb through which “the Brahmins are trying to retrieve their rule, their 
religion, their language.”440 Therefore, if the social integrity of the Tamil people had to be 
preserved, Hindi as a language had to be opposed. Ramasamy and his organization were at the 
forefront of several anti-Hindi agitations from the 30s continuing to the mid-60s when his 
protégé, CN Annadurai, was elected as Tamil Nadu Chief Minister riding on the wave of the 
massive anti-Hindi imposition struggles that rocked the state in the 60s.   
However, while Tamil nationalists countered the imposition of Hindi with claims of 
antiquity and superiority of the Tamil language, Ramasamy had no such romantic notions about 
the native language. Calling Tamil a ‘barbaric language’, he laments that there is no Tamil 
version of Kemal Ataturk who would substitute the classical Tamil script with the Latin 
alphabet.441 Ramasamy indicated a marked preference for English in that he considered English 
to be a universal language, a language of modernity and enlightenment. As discussed in the 
preceding chapter, to Ramasamy, the Shudra Tamils needed to “rise above a state of 
barbarism” and for that “it is not enough that one hates god, religion, the Vedas, the traditional 
puranas, temples, festivals and religious processions. One also must detest the Tamil language 
which upholds the puranas and religious epics. This is so because the Tamil language is 
structured so as to degrade the Tamil.”442 Further, he calls on the Tamils to ignore the Tamil 
language and learn English, English customs, and English modernity.443 According to Ramasamy, 
“English governance, English education, English customs and English civilization have over time 
have dented to some extent the caste system and caste hierarchies.”444 
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Besides, to Ramasamy, the Tamil language was also structurally sexist in the way in it 
described women. 
This brings to another crucial point of divergence between the two thinkers.  
White Men, Coloured Women  
 
In 1927, American writer Katherine Mayo published Mother India, a controversial book on 
colonial India that justified the prolonging of British rule over the territory citing, among other 
things, the poor condition of the lower castes and women which, according to her, the Indians 
were incapable of justly handling by themselves. In the introduction to the abridged version, 
Indian scholar Mrinalini Sinha writes that the book “was celebrated and reviled by die-hard 
imperialists and outraged nationalists.”445 However, there was also a third opinion. EV 
Ramasamy welcomed the book,446 and one of his disciples, Kovai A. Ayyamuthu had written a 
set of essays in Kudiarasu, the party paper of the Self-Respect movement, in the late 1920s 
defending Mayo against her critics. While recognizing that Mayo’s motivations were not exactly 
benign, the writer nevertheless conceded to her that her charges against India were accurate 
and that peoples in the subcontinent could not achieve true freedom without social reform.447 
In her most celebrated essay ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, Gayatri Spivak writes that 
“Imperialism's image as the establisher of the good society is marked by the espousal of the 
woman as object of protection from her own kind.”448 Spivak gives the example of Sati or the 
Hindu practice of burning widows on the pyre of their dead husbands, and explains how the 
colonial intervention into the banning of this practice was done with the intention of 
legitimizing the colonial rule and also silenced the voice of the ‘victim’ they were saving. The 
Fanonian influence here is impossible to miss. Ramasami, however, thanked the “White man” 
without whom, “in the name of religion and tradition, women would have been burnt along 
with their dead husbands. It was only the White man’s law that changed this.”449 Ramasamy had 
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no faith in the Indian anti-colonialist project to secure liberation for women. If anything, he 
viewed it as a politics that reinforced patriarchy and misogyny, which he argued, were inherent 
to Hindu society. Let us consider Fanon’s perspectives on women vis a vis colonialism and anti-
colonialism briefly. 
In Black Skin White Masks, women, to Fanon are mere sexual objects.450 His Black 
women are filled with an inferiority complex and desire to move up the social ladder by virtue 
of sexual relationships with the White colonizer. In his assessment of Martinician writer 
Mayotte Capecia, his argument is that women like her desire “lactification. For, in a word, the 
race must be whitened; every woman in Martinique knows this, says it, repeats it.”451 His White 
woman fantasizes about being raped by Black men. “If we go farther into the labyrinth, we 
discover that when a woman lives the fantasy of rape by a Negro, it is in some way the 
fulfilment of a private dream, of an inner wish. Accomplishing the phenomenon of turning 
against self, it is the woman who rapes herself.”452 In his critically acclaimed book about race 
and racism, a woman gets a place only by virtue of association with a man of this or that race, 
and that too only as objects of desire.  
A similar approach can be noted in the essay ‘Algeria Unveiled’. Here, Fanon defends a 
traditional cultural device like the veil with the argument that it served as a symbolic as well as a 
practical resistance to colonialism. His perspective of promotion of French liberal values to 
women in Algeria was wholly negative, as he considered it an integral part of the colonial 
strategy to separate the Algerian woman from the Algerian man, and making both feel ashamed 
of their national culture. “Convening the woman, winning her over to the foreign values, 
wrenching her free from her status, was at the same time achieving a real power over the man 
and attaining a practical, effective means of destructuring Algerian culture.”453 The colonial 
sought to unveil the Algerian woman and the authentic act of resistance against this was for the 
woman to be veiled. Though he asserts “The Algerian woman is at the heart of the combat.  
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Arrested, tortured, raped, shot down, she testifies to the violence of the occupier and to his 
inhumanity. As a nurse, a liaison agent, a fighter, she bears witness to the depth and the density 
of the struggle,”454 it is only the women as an instrument of the anti-colonial resistance struggle 
that is of interest to Fanon. The woman who confronts the internal oppressor, the home-grown 
patriarch is totally absent.  
One could credit Fanon’s comments on the veil and his utopian belief that its 
significance would fade away post-decolonization to his naivety as regards the role of Islam in 
the Arab world.455 In fact, Fanon maintains ambivalence as regards his position on religion. 
While he himself was born in a practicing Christian family, he does not seem have to have much 
regard for Christianity as such. While it is likely that at a personal level he was an atheist, 
inspired by Sartrean existentialism, the writings his involvement in the Algerian decolonization 
movement saw extensive use of Islamic imagery. To Fanon, this upheaval, which had religious 
undertones, was a legitimate reaction to colonialism and any regressive social practices that 
may come up in its wake would and should be resolved once, and only once, the colonizer 
exited the land. Colonial interventions to set right any regressive native practices were done 
only with the intention of maintaining the colonial system and they were to be rejected 
outright.  
Ramasamy on the other hand, welcomed the liberating effect some aspects of 
colonialism had on women in the Tamil society. In a comment on the role of the native national 
culture and its effects on women, he writes “To state it frankly, we are still living according to 
values established in barbaric times.”456 Arguing that the spread of English education 
contributed to the spread of modern egalitarian values with respect to the women’s question, 
he asserts that the ‘White man’ banning Sati and providing women access to modern education 
was one of the reasons of the anti-colonial movement which wanted to preserve traditional, 
reactionary values. In Ramasamy’s perspective, the Brahminical culture, the influence of 
religion, and Tamil patriarchy all contributed to the oppression of women and women were 
better off westernized than relying on native cultural-social values for liberation. Where Fanon 
considered native dress codes as an act of resistance against the colonizer, Ramasamy 
condemned them as regressive, and asked women to adopt western attire to attain greater 
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mobility. The practical effects of Ramasamy’s discourse could be seen in that “The women 
members of the Self Respect Movement not only participated in the non-agitational 
programmes of the movement like conferences, but also quite actively in mass agitations.”457 
Not just that, women from the most marginalized sections, like that of the devadasis or the 
‘temple prostitute’ communities, also became active participants in social reform movements in 
the state. These women took part in anti-caste struggles, the anti-Hindi agitations and protests 
demanding greater social and economic rights for women.  
 However, it is to be noted Ramasamy’s radicalism as regards women’s question was 
not taken up in good faith by many of those who claimed to be his followers. Many of the 
leaders of the Dravidian movement were not averse to using sexist and objectifying terms in 
political discourse. Terms like ‘chastity’ and projecting the Tamil language as a ‘virgin goddess’ 
were employed as rhetorical devices by many who participated in the anti-Hindi agitations, 
especially the leaders of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam under Annadurai. These led 
Ramasamy to be sceptical and critical of the uses and abuses of the Tamil language in imagining 
a Tamil national community by objectifying the body of women.   
Ramasamy’s discourse also involved a critique of terms that he considered patriarchal in 
the Tamil language. For instance, he launched a devastating attack on dominant notions of 
‘chastity’ that existed in that period that placed several social restrictions on women. To 
Ramasamy, these notions of community that sought to exercise sexual control over the bodies 
of women were remnants of barbaric times.458 He further lampooned Tamil scholars and poets 
for expecting women to be chaste, while placing no such demands on men.459 Ramasamy was 
also not averse to attacking ancient Tamil poetry and classics – exalted by Tamil nationalists – 
for their sexism and misogyny. He was convinced that any ideology that places the past, any 
past, at a high pedestal was likely to be sexist.  
Ramasamy starkly differs from Fanon in that neither did he define women in pure 
sexual relations to men, nor did he consider them as instruments of social struggle. Instead of 
speaking for them and limiting the spaces for women, he spoke with them and acted as an ally 
of the women’s struggle. Echoing contemporary proponents of standpoint theory, he argued 
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that the pain of the ‘lived experience’ of being a woman in a patriarchal society was unique460 
and more spaces should be opened up for their voices to be heard. While with Fanon the 
woman who transgressed the boundaries of the family was praised only when she was part of 
the anti-colonial struggle, Ramasamy encouraged women to break traditional family norms for 
their own good as autonomous individuals exercising control over their sexual choices, 
irrespective of whether they sought to contribute to the Dravidian movement or not. Ironically, 
while Fanon was well acquainted with the works of feminist giants like Simone de Beauvoir, the 
idea of woman existing as an autonomous political subject never appears in his works. The 
iconoclastic social reformer who never had a formal education had more perceptiveness when 
it came to this subject.  
Is Identity Politics and Universalism Reconcilable?  
 
In Chapter 4, I have explained how Fanon’s conception of identity politics is informed by a 
commitment to anti-racism and anti-colonialism, a consideration of identity as a passing stage 
in the dialectic, leading to a universal humanism that is based on an ethical reciprocal 
recognition of the Other. In the previous chapter we explored the gaps in the political discourse 
of EV Ramasamy through the prism of Fanonism. In this chapter, we explored the gaps in 
Fanon’s insistence on anti-colonialism being the precondition for political engagement and its 
limitations by drawing a parallel with the manner in which Ramasamy encountered the colonial 
condition. We can see that Fanon’s naivety as regards to the internal contradictions within the 
countries of the so-called ‘Third World’ led him to make sweeping generalizations, most of 
which could have dangerous implications. Fanon’s generalizing approach towards colonialism 
and anti-colonialism, which makes political sense in the context of Algeria, sounds both lazy and 
ahistorical if transposed to India. His views on women leave much to be desired, and in 
comparison to Ramasamy, he appears an apologist for misogyny, where he expects women to 
sacrifice their interests for the sake of a revolution led and dominated by men.  
Ramasamy, on the other hand, was acutely aware of the specificities of the Indian 
situation. He saw region, religion, caste, gender and language as deep faultlines within the 
Indian country, contradictions that existed before and would exist after colonialism. In the 
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previous chapter we saw how Ramasamy created his political discourse around identity around 
the axis of caste and religion. In this chapter, we saw how he challenged the idea of the Indian 
nation and anti-colonial nationalism. Further we also discussed his commitment to the 
emancipation of women and his unconditional endorsement of the creation of political and 
social spaces for women and his support for women as autonomous agents.  
I think we are at a stage to agree that, despite their differences, Fanon and Ramasamy 
were organic intellectuals by the virtue of them being individuals “engaged in the practice of 
articulation as the essential component in the construction of the hegemony of a group.”461 
Both were partisans of what Castells would call a ‘resistance identity’ and while Fanon had a 
‘project identity’ of a universal humanism, it was left ambiguous in Ramasamy’s discourse.  
We can understand identities as “contingent constructs, the products of social and 
political identifications with the roles and subject positions made available by historically 
produced discourses.”462 Identity politics requires not just an identification of the Self, but also 
an identification of the Other, and the relation of the Self to the Other. We saw in this chapter 
how very problematic Fanon’s notion of Self was. We discussed in the preceding chapter and 
critiques through a Fanonist lens the problems with Ramasamy’s identification of the Other and 
the relation of the non-Brahmin Self to the Brahmin Other.  
Is it possible to work out a democratic and pluralist politics of identity from this 
dialogue? If we can arrive at a normative politics of identity from this chapter and the previous 
ones, it would have to be one that is cautiously sensitive to pluralism without encouraging 
sectarianism nor without imposing conditions for universalism that are not actually universally 
applicable. We saw in the previous chapter how Ramasamy’s fixed perceptions of the identity of 
the Brahmin other, his stress on the inferiorized status of the non-brahmin identity, and his 
encouragement of Dalit particularity, failed to create an identity that would be accommodative 
of all these identities while transforming these identities into something common and larger. 
Likewise, with Fanon, we saw in this chapter on how his insistence on identification with anti-
colonialism as being a compulsory requirement for a politics of the future need not be 
universally applicable. While Ramasamy could be accused of failing to create universality, Fanon 
could be accused of not being sensitive to particularities of groups within the colonized.  
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However, despite its limitations, Fanon’s humanism nevertheless offers a framework for 
assessment of identity politics. It can be complemented in this case by Ramasamy’s sensitivities 
towards addressing the particular issues of caste, region, and gender so as to arrive at a society 
that is more accommodative to plural interests. The requirement of such an identity politics will 
need to find a commonality that would address the demands of discrete social groups under a 
larger identity, but nevertheless possesses what Mouffe would call “a constitutive pluralism” 
that is accommodative of difference. 
Yet, further questions emerge here. What sort of difference can be tolerated and what 
cannot? To Fanon, the colonial has to be annihilated before any discussion of recognition can 
begin. To Ramasamy, the Brahmin, not as a human being, but as a symbol needs to be done 
away with before a rational, egalitarian society can emerge. One of the main arguments of 
Ramasamy against the Brahmin identity is that as long as there is a social category called the 
Brahmin, there will always be someone inferior to him. Likewise, if the Dalit is recognized in his 
particularity, it still is an identity that is based on the recognition that there is someone above 
him. So, the constitutive pluralism will have to be a conditional pluralism, that is, it is tolerant to 
difference based on certain conditions. Pragmatically speaking, it would be hard to convince the 
Brahmin, the most privileged group in the caste system, and the Dalit, the most exploited group 
in the caste system, to give up the uniqueness of their identity unless there is another identity 
that provides them the incentive to cease identification with their erstwhile identities. There 
has to be an empty signifier identity that enables suturing of the identities of all the groups 
involved, while also avoiding the either extremes of appearing aggressively assimilative or being 
tolerant to sectarianism.  
The unconditional anti-colonialism of Fanon and the anti-Brahmin mobilization of 
Ramasamy fail to satisfy this requirement – the former is far too generalizing and the latter 
respects particulars too much. We have seen over the chapters that Ramasamy’s fixation on the 
Brahmin Other and Fanon’s creation of a unified colonized Self both come with their sets of 
problems, but also allow some glimpses into a solution. Is there a possibility of reconciliation of 
what appears to be two divergent viewpoints? It will have to be a discourse based on a different 
narrative that would have to serve the purpose. The real success of such a narrative would be in 
its inherent potential to enable, without superficially suturing differences, discrete social groups 





The thesis began with Fanon’s criticisms of Negritude. Rejecting the particularist race politics of 
the Negritude thinkers, Fanon agreed with Sartre’s premise that such politics were but a passing 
phase in the dialectic of emancipation. A coherent reading of Fanon and the extraction of an 
essence from his works and a fidelity to the same, and a careful avoidance of misinterpretations 
and simplistic explanations of complex passages in his works leads us to such a conclusion. 
Based on such a reading, Fanon’s critique of identity politics is explored. To Fanon, an anti-
colonial political stance is absolutely necessary for any emancipatory identity politics. However, 
rejecting historical and cultural determinism, Fanon argued that the subject was fully free in 
identifying with an identity despite the limits that circumstances placed upon him, thereby 
investing both agency and responsibility on the subject’s choice of identity politics. Recognizing 
the value of anti-colonial nationalism, Fanon was also deeply suspicious of racial and national 
particularism, and pleaded for a conscious attempt to transcend ‘anti-racist racism’ and narrow 
nationalism. Finally, rejecting the fake universalism of the colonialist, the oppressed must build 
a genuine universalism based on shared struggle and solidarity.  
After establishing Fanon’s assessment of identity politics, the research uses it as a 
theoretical framework to understand EV Ramasamy’s discourse on caste politics in the Indian 
state of Tamil Nadu. After introducing Ramasamy, the historical context in which he operated 
in, caste in Tamil Nadu, and general criticisms of Ramasamy’s politics, Ramasamy’s articulation 
of caste identity politics is placed under a Fanonist scanner. Arriving at a conclusion that 
Ramasamy’s discourse does not create a common identity, an affirmative identity that would 
enable all castes, oppressor and oppressed alike, to identify in something beyond their 
immediate particularities, a Fanonist conclusion is drawn that basing a politics on a history of 
oppression by the Other alone cannot produce a transformative praxis. Fixed identities of the 
Other and the Self must be unsettled by a universalism that is cognizant of particulars but still 
opens up spaces for transcending them. Finally, the ahistorical approach of Fanon towards 
‘native’ nations and nationalisms, his ignorance of deep pre-colonial faultlines, and his 
instrumentalization of women in his political discourse are critiqued by a comparison with the 
positions of Ramasamy on these issues. While Fanonism provides a robust theoretical 
framework for the critique of identity politics, Fanon’s unconditional anti-colonialism and his 
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insistence that identification with anti-colonialism is a compulsory requirement for a politics of 
the future thus comes with its own pitfalls. As seen with Ramasamy’s interventions, colonial 
modernity also opened the public sphere for the discursive narratives of the oppressed among 
the colonized oppressed. A further conclusion is drawn in the final chapter calling for a narrative 
that would enable discrete social groups, like castes, without an artificial suturing or 
reconciliation of identities, to transcend their particularities to something larger, universal. But 
is it possible to create such a radical universality which involves a constitutive and conditional 
pluralism? Let us return in this conclusion to Fanon’s concern in Black Skin, White Masks “to 
explain the other to myself.”463 
Introducing My-Self  
 
I am a graphic novel aficionado. I am a supporter of greater political autonomy for Tamil Nadu 
and the Kurdish struggle for democratic confederalism. I identify myself with the left, even 
while rejecting reductive analysis of several leftists, and while appreciating the insights that 
conservative wisdom has to offer. I am interested in the European Enlightenment tradition. I am 
a fan of Frank Sinatra and the 80s and early 90s Ilayaraja. I am pro-LGBT and pro-choice, an 
atheist opposed to religious bigotries. These are the multiple identities that I identify with by 
choice. However, when asked “What is your caste?” I politely decline to answer. Taylor argues 
“My own identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations with others.”464 Identity also 
crucially depends on dialogical relations imposed by others. This caste identity of mine, to take 
from Fanon, is overdetermined from without. If hell is other people, caste is the hell that the 
inquisitive Other confines me in. A reply like “I do not believe in caste” maybe accepted, but “I 
do not have a caste” is almost always looked on with cynicism much like colour-blindness in the 
West. Caste works, even if you do not believe in it. Irrespective of the choice of identity that I 
would like to make for my Self, I am located by the Other in a hierarchical network of social 
relationships. It is impossible to avoid encountering this question in India, but is it impossible to 
evade the caste identity? Both Fanon and Ramasamy would answer in the negative. Fanonism 
would argue that it is possible for the individual to go beyond his caste identity in a universalist 
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struggle of the oppressed, while Periyarism would argue for the possibility of caste identity 
breaking down by struggling against the enemy located in the particularist identity of the 
Brahmin Other.  
 Is Ramasamy guilty of ressentiment in his discourse wherein “political identity emerges 
and obtains its unifying coherence through the politicization of exclusion from an ostensible 
universal, as a protest against exclusion”?465 The Sudra identity is indeed articulated to highlight 
the exclusion from social and political power; however, the Periyarite accusation against the 
Brahmin is not that the Brahmin excludes the rest from universality, but rather that the Brahmin 
is incapable of universality. The Brahmin identity was fixed. But as long as the Brahmin was 
sealed in his Brahminhood, so would the other castes remain sealed in their particular 
identities. The Fanonian plea for subjects to exercise their agency to transcend their 
particularisms and work towards universal solidarity is appealing here. However, Fanon’s 
universalist humanism, his innate faith in the redemptive power of the struggle of the 
oppressed, does appear “as banal as it is beatific.”466 Unlike Ramasamy, he does not deeply 
probe the question of who do the oppressed oppress or the faultlines within the native culture 
in the colony. If interpreted simplistically, as it has been sadly done so often, Fanonism can be a 
justification for dictators and despots running banana republics in the Third World. An authentic 
pluralism must strike a balance between Ramasamy’s sensitivity to the particularities and the 
universalist concerns of Fanon.  
The Other 
 
I hold the view that all politics is a politics of identification, of the Self and the Other. There can 
be no politics without identification. “We know who we are only when we know who we are not 
and often only when we know whom we are against,” Huntington observed.467 It is crucial to 
note that the external Other forges who “we are” but not who “I am”. A Hegelian would 
understand the resolution of the dialectic as a stage where the “We” becomes a part of the “I” 
and “I” becomes part of the “We”. “We” in a political sense makes sense only with the arrival of 
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“They”, or the Other. Again, the Other as a political entity makes sense only when the Self is 
perceived as a part of a collective against the collective of the Other. In the political realm, the 
Other is always a terrible, threatening force who threatens to injure the political interests of the 
Self that identifies with a collective. In a Schmittian understanding, the individual has no 
political enemies, but the group cannot survive without a political enemy. The colonized against 
the colonizer, occupied against occupier, Soviets against Nazis. The enemy becomes a projected 
Otherness where the Self of different individuals unites under the banner of one identity, that 
is, the individual Self identifies with a collective fighting against another collective.  
The conflict for universalism, the conflict against universalism, and conflict of 
universalisms emerges at the stage where the Other is identified as the political enemy. 
Marxism denounces the bourgeoisie for its fake universalism and announces the proletariat as 
the agent of and for genuine universalism. Nazism identifies the Jews as a sort of a particular-
universal – confined to their Jewish identity, but nevertheless responsible for universalist 
conspiracies. Racist politics is always a conflict against universalism. Even when it is targeted 
against particular identities, like ethnic conflicts in Rwanda for instance, it involves a rejection of 
universality. A similar argument can be made for caste conflicts and politics that celebrate 
particularist identities, like that of Negritude. And we can see the conflict between neo-liberal 
regimes and Islamist terrorist groups, each seeking to impose their vision on the world, as an 
example of the conflict of universalisms. What is important to note is that the manner in which 
the Other is constructed determines the nature of the universality of the politics being 
espoused.  
Let us say the Other is a White man, does the universalist politics allow him to 
transcend his identity and be a part?  The politics of Fanon does – that of Malcolm X does not. 
This is vital to assess if a politics is emancipatory or not. If the politics ossifies the Other in an 
essentialized identity, it cannot avoid ossifying itself into an essentialized identity, “deeply 
invested in its own impotence”.468 A truly transformative praxis must unsettle the identity of 
both the Self and the Other so as to create a new paradigm of discourse where there can be a 
best reconciliation of interests of the actors involved.  
Nonetheless, an abstract universalism is not possible. To speak of a “human identity” 
makes as much sense to politics as to speak of “God’s children” – unless the human identity is 
mobilized to fight an inhuman Other or God’s children are mobilized to fight godless children. 
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Given that the understanding of the enemy in the political is still anthropocentric, such a 
universal can be more harmful than good, and likely to cause as much, if not more, harm than 
the extremist nationalist ideologies of the previous century.  
All universalisms must evolve or adapt to particular contexts. Ramasamy’s promotion of 
Enlightenment rationalist values was made with the understanding of the particular context of 
Tamil Nadu, the native social and religious customs. Likewise, all particularisms have a potential 
for transcendence into a universal. Like Fanon’s faith that both the Black person and the White 
person could give up their respective identities. But should an emphasis on transcendence be 
placed in the first place? According to Connolly, a noble response in a plural society would be  
 
to seek to transmute cultural antagonisms between transcendence and immanence into 
debates marked by agonistic respect between the partisans, with each set 
acknowledging that its highest and most entrenched faith is legitimately contestable by 
the others.469 
 
A noble desire indeed. But this assumes that the Others too hold the same values of 
agonistic respect that one professes to uphold. What if the Others are insistent that their 
values, their cultural practices, and their objects of faith are not contestable by others? Better 
still, what if the Others are willing to use violence to contest such legitimate contestations? A 
tragic example from recent times can be given: The Charlie Hebdo massacre.  
Charlie Hebdo, a satirical French magazine based in Paris that was known to mock 
political and religious figures, had a history of running into controversies owing to their 
caricatures of Christian, Jewish and Islamic religious symbols and authorities. Their offices had 
also been firebombed in 2011 by Islamists who took issue over the magazine cartooning the 
prophet Muhammed. However, the magazine continued to produce cartoons that provoked 
Islamists.470 On the fateful morning of 7 January 2015, Islamists stormed the office of Charlie 
Hebdo, killing 8 employees, 2 police officers, and 2 others. This was immediately followed by an 
attack on a Jewish store, killing 4. Demonstrators took to the street in Paris and in cities across 
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the world by the millions under the slogan of “Je Suis Charlie”, in defense of freedom of 
expression, including the right to offend, as a fundamental universal right.  
Predictably enough, impassioned debates on Islamophobia, its dangers, the spectre of 
the ‘clash of civilizations’, the future of multiculturalism followed. Quite some in the Western 
liberal-left, together with Muslim liberals and ‘soft’ Islamists, reacted to the massacre with a 
token condemnation, but accusing the magazine of offending ‘Muslim sentiments’.471 
It is dark humor that for all their ire against Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ 
theses, in fact, it is precisely this multicultural liberal-left who are the true Huntingtonians of the 
modern times. Why? More than the right-wingers, it is they who believe that there is something 
called a ‘Muslim world’ with ‘Muslim sentiments’, as different from the other worlds, whose 
inhabitants prioritize the Islamic identity over all else, and it is a liberal duty to respect this 
identity. A critical interrogation of the ideology that structures this identity, or who it privileges 
is to be avoided because it would be Islamophobic. Here lies the fix of multiculturalist identity 
politics; in its reluctance to adopt universalism owing to fears of being assimilative, it embraces 
a logic similar to that of the racist, that the Other’s identity is immutable, only that the 
multiculturalist believes that this identity must be tolerated, or even welcomed. “To us, the man 
who adores the Negro is as “sick” as the man who abominates him.”472 
The reason why Fanon was suspicious of the particularist Black identity politics of 
Negritude of his time was not only because its glorification of myriad pasts, but also because he 
believed that the simple binary mapping of Black and White obfuscated more than it revealed, 
often silencing other critical, more radical voices from the colonized. Isn’t that what is 
happening now in the debates around Islamophobia? One can observe a monopolization of the 
discourse on Islam by Islamists and liberal Muslims, which is being actively or passively assisted 
by the Western multicultural liberal-left, at the cost of those within the so-called ‘Muslim world’ 
who really do not care about the Islamic religion and real or imagined offences against it, who 
instead are working towards radical political struggle and social reform within their 
communities. As Melinda Cooper rightly argues 
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The kind of state multiculturalism promoted by the parliamentary Left and Right has in 
practice tended to corroborate the most vocal claims to cultural representativeness, 
repeatedly privileging the Hindu and Islamic Right as the authentic voices of cultural 
difference to the detriment of other, dissident tendencies on the “Asian” left. 473 
 
Here is a clear tension between universalism and (often ignorant) tolerance of non-
Western particularisms. The legitimation and valorization of the ‘Islamic’ identity overlooks the 
manner in which Islamist discourse itself functions as a blind universalism that seeks to impose 
its identity over several secular movements in the so-called Muslim world. A parallel can be 
drawn to English liberals in colonial India, for example, Annie Besant and HS Olcott, who stood 
unconditionally – and uncritically – with Indian nationalism, going to the extent of valorising the 
upper-caste Hindu identity politics as a legitimate resistance, thus contributing to the silencing 
the voices of the leaders and intellectuals of the backward caste movements.474 In their 
overzealous drive to defend native Hindu resistance and accusing the British colonials of 
violating indigenous traditions, they overlooked the fact that this resistance was spearheaded 
by an exclusivist class that was under criticism from backward caste reformers for exhibiting 
only a superficial political will to ensure that the postcolony would be a just society for the rest. 
Blinded by the simple binary of evil colonialism/good anti-colonialism, the English liberals 
muted the voice of the representatives of the backward castes. 
Pluralism, for it to be functional, must defend the right to challenge and even offend 
fixed identities. A pluralism must also respect the right to be offended. For it to function in a 
democratic manner, it must be able to place caste, race, religious and sexual identities under 
critical scrutiny. What it cannot and must not tolerate is murder by those offended and the 
legitimation of such acts. But here is the paradox of such a pluralist ethos. Even to defend liberal 
values, pluralism needs to be illiberal. One can invoke Strauss’ concern here “whether Tolerance 
can remain tolerant when confronted with unqualified intolerance.”475 Should French 
Republican values be compromised to tolerate the cultural sensibilities of certain Muslim 
groups who insist on asserting their “pure logic of difference”, which, as Laclau warns, is the 
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logic of apartheid?476 Or should the French Sovereign in Hobessian fashion be the manager of 
difference in so far as order is not threatened? This is a simplistic binary.  
We discussed in the previous chapters through the dialogue between Fanon and 
Ramasamy that transcendence from fixed identities like caste to something universal was 
desirable in for an emancipatory political project. We also discussed how universalism has to be 
sensitive to particular social contexts if it is to be relevant and politically effective. A democratic 
emancipatory politics must begin from the assumption that societies are plural; but it should 
also recognize that the identities of individuals are plural. Nevertheless, the particularity of an 
identity “can only fully realize itself if it constantly keeps open, and constantly redefines, its 
relation to the universal.”477 
A Constitutive and Conditional Pluralism  
 
There are no particular or universal identities. There are only particularist and universalist 
approaches to identification with identities. For instance, in a particularist approach, an anti-
caste movement can target the Brahmin identity as the Other and consider an inferiorized 
Shudra identity as the rallying point of the political project. However, if it is purely particularist, 
such a political project can only lead to ressentiment where the rest recriminate the Brahmin for 
being superior. The crucial point to come back to here, as discussed above and in detail in the 
earlier chapters, is Ramasamy’s understanding that the Brahmin identity by itself signifies that 
that the possessor is superior to the non-Brahmin. A critical universalist approach would, while 
targeting the Brahmin identity for its symbolic value, would nevertheless allow the Brahmin as 
an individual to transcend their identification with that particular identity, along with the non-
Brahmin, to something different.  
In the tension between universalism and particularism, in the words of Zerilli’s reading 
of Laclau, “it is a matter not of choosing one over the other but of articulating, in a scrupulously 
political sense, the relation between the two.”478 A purely particularist approach to 
identification will take an identity as complete in-itself (He is a Brahmin, she is Black, they are 
Dalits and must be respected/hated for what they are) whereas a critical universalist approach 
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considers identification with an identity as metastable, “never purely stable, nor simply 
plastic”479, as something incomplete, with the possibility of becoming for-others. This approach, 
to take from Mouffe, involves a constitutive pluralism, but also a conditional pluralism. 
Constitutive because it is accommodative of difference (LGBTQ, feminist, Mexican, Tamil, Sikh) 
and conditional because it is critically intolerant of bigoted tendencies among constituent 
groups (lets say, racism among white LGBT groups, homophobia in Black groups, anti-Semitism 
in Arab groups). Such an approach seeks neither the celebration of difference nor the erasure of 
difference, but involves the possibility of the transcendence of particularist differences into 
something truly different. Maybe this can be the prelude to a new humanism that Fanon talked 
about in the conclusion of the Wretched of the Earth.  
The chapters of this thesis touched on the Hegelian understanding of recognition in the 
Master-Slave dialectic, as understood by Fanon, and concluded with reference to the 
Nietzschean idea of ressentiment and its implication for identity politics. An area of research 
interest in the immediate future would be to use the two concepts to understand the changes 
in the contemporary discourse of caste identity politics in Tamil Nadu’s politics and society. The 
past few years have seen several political fissures within the non-Brahmin castes, especially 
violence between certain intermediate castes and Dalit castes. While everyday acts of violence 
against Dalits have been well documented, and sporadic anti-Dalit outbursts have been 
adequately covered by the media and criticized by public intellectuals and activists, little 
attention has been paid to the content of the Dalit discourse of resistance.  What appears to be 
unfolding is the strengthening of a Dalit particularist identity politics, which looks at the 
intermediate castes as its Other. Whether the trajectory of this discourse is based on a demand 
for reciprocal recognition or is fuelled by ressentiment of the alleged dominance of the 
intermediate castes would be interesting to explore.  
Separately, and eventually, I would also like to expand the findings of this thesis to 
make an intervention in theoretical discussions around multiculturalism in the West. With the 
immigration problems that several Western countries face and the rise of both majority and 
minority ethnic chauvinisms, the limits of multiculturalist tolerance are being repeatedly 
questioned. Should Western countries expand their tolerance to accommodate intolerant 
cultural practices of minorities or should there be an active attempt by the state to integrate 
minorities to ‘Western values’? The more pressing question is not what is to be valued but 
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rather to consider a re-evaluation of multicultural values, towards a new and more dynamic 
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